Comprehensive concept-phase system safety analysis for hybrid-electric vehicles utilizing automated driving functions by Knopf, Matthew David






COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT-PHASE SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS FOR HYBRID-





Matthew David Knopf 





In partial fulfillment of the requirements  
For the Degree of Master of Science 
Colorado State University 


































Copyright by Matthew David Knopf 2019 
All Rights Reserved
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Automotive system safety (SS) analysis involving automated driving functions (ADFs) 
and advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) is an active subject of research but highly 
proprietary. A comprehensive SS analysis and a risk informed safety case (RISC) is required for 
all complex hybrid-vehicle builds especially when utilizing ADFs and ADAS. Industry standard 
SS procedures have been developed and are accessible but contain few detailed instructions or 
references for the process of completing a thorough automotive SS analysis. In this work, a 
comprehensive SS analysis is performed on an SAE-Level 2 autonomous hybrid-vehicle 
architecture in the concept phase which utilizes lateral and longitudinal automated corrective 
control actions. This paper first outlines a proposed SS process including a cross-functional SS 
working group procedure, followed by the development of an item definition inclusive of the 
ADFs and ADAS and an examination of 5 hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA) 
techniques common to the automotive industry that were applied to 11 vehicle systems, and 
finally elicits the safety goals and functional requirements necessary for safe vehicle operation. 
The results detail functional failures, causes, effects, prevention, and mitigation methods as well 
as the utility of, and instruction for completing the various HARA techniques. The conclusion 
shows the resulting critical safety concerns for an SAE Level-2 autonomous system can be 
reduced through the use of the developed list of 116 safety goals and 950 functional safety 
requirements.   







I would like to thank my thesis advisor Dr. Bradley and my committee members Dr. 
Olsen and Dr. Pasricha for the opportunity to perform this work and the guidance while doing so. 
I would also like to thank my lab group and fellow Graduate Research Assistants Gabe Di 
Domenico, Troy Johnson, and David Trinko for their support and encouragement over the past 
two years. Finally, I would like to give a special thanks to my wife Leann and daughter Ava for 
their commitment and sacrifice while in pursuit of this degree.   
   
 
iv 




ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... iii 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ vii 
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... ix 
1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 The Importance of Systems Safety within the Automotive Industry ............................... 1 
2 BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................................... 3 
2.1 ISO 26262 Road Vehicles – Functional Safety ................................................................ 3 
2.1.1 ISO 26262 Management of Functional Safety.......................................................... 5 
2.1.2 ISO 26262 Concept Phase and System Development .............................................. 6 
2.1.3 ISO 26262 Product Development at the System, Hardware and Software-level ..... 7 
2.1.4 ISO 26262 Deficiencies ............................................................................................ 8 
2.2 NASA System Safety Handbook ..................................................................................... 9 
2.3 GM System Safety Process ............................................................................................ 11 
2.4 Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) ........................................................... 13 
2.4.1 HARA Definitions .................................................................................................. 14 
2.4.2 HARA Types and Techniques ................................................................................ 15 
2.4.3 HARA – Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) ....................................................... 18 
2.4.4 HARA – Design Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (DFMEA) ........................... 18 
2.4.5 HARA – System Element Fault Analysis (SEFA) ................................................. 19 
2.4.6 HARA – System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) ........................................... 20 
2.4.7 HARA – Hazard and Operability Study (HazOP) .................................................. 20 
2.5 Colorado State University .............................................................................................. 21 
2.5.1 Colorado State University - EcoCAR ..................................................................... 21 
2.5.2 Colorado State University – Toyota ....................................................................... 23 
3 OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................................................ 26 
4 RESULTS .............................................................................................................................. 28 
4.1 Safety Plan...................................................................................................................... 28 
4.1.1 Safety Activities throughout the System Safety Lifecycle ..................................... 28 
4.1.2 Cross-Functional Safety Procedure ......................................................................... 31 
   
 
v 
4.1.3 Roles and Responsibilities ...................................................................................... 33 
4.1.4 Evidence of Competence ........................................................................................ 34 
4.1.5 Evidence of Quality Management .......................................................................... 34 
4.1.6 Evidence of a Good Safety Culture ........................................................................ 35 
4.2 Item Definition ............................................................................................................... 37 
4.3 Application of HARA .................................................................................................... 42 
4.3.1 HARA applied using PHA ...................................................................................... 45 
4.3.2 HARA applied using DFMEA ................................................................................ 47 
4.3.3 HARA applied using SEFA .................................................................................... 55 
4.3.3 HARA applied using HazOP .................................................................................. 60 
4.3.4 HARA applied using STPA .................................................................................... 67 
4.4 Safety Goals and the Elicitation of Functional Requirements ....................................... 72 
4.4.1 Lane Keeping Assist System Safety Goals and Functional Requirements ............. 73 
4.4.2 Adaptive Cruise Control System Safety Goals and Functional Requirements ....... 76 
4.4.3 CAVs Safety Goals and Requirements ................................................................... 80 
4.4.4 CSMS Safety Goals and Functional Requirements ................................................ 84 
4.4.5 PSI HV & Mechanical Safety Goals and Functional Requirements....................... 87 
5 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 92 
5.1 Contributions .................................................................................................................. 92 
5.2 Future Work ................................................................................................................... 94 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 95 
Appendix 1 Management of Functional Safety – Complete Documentation ......................... 98 
Appendix 1.1 Safety Activities throughout the System Safety Lifecycle .............................. 98 
Appendix 1.2 Cross-Functional Safety Procedure ................................................................. 99 
Appendix 1.3 Roles and Responsibilities ............................................................................. 123 
Appendix 1.4 Evidence of Competence ............................................................................... 125 
Appendix 1.5 Evidence of Quality Management ................................................................. 125 
Appendix 1.6 Evidence of a Good Safety Culture ............................................................... 126 
Appendix 2 Item Definition – Complete Documentation ..................................................... 128 
Appendix 2.1 CAVs Item Definition ................................................................................... 128 
Appendix 2.2 CSMS Item Definition ................................................................................... 130 
Appendix 2.3 PSI HV Item Definition ................................................................................. 133 
   
 
vi 
Appendix 2.4 PSI Mechanical Item Definition .................................................................... 134 
Appendix 3 HARA – Complete Documentation .................................................................. 139 
Appendix 3.01 HARA CAVs / CSMS ACC DFMEA ......................................................... 139 
Appendix 3.02 HARA CAVs / CSMS LKA DFMEA ......................................................... 162 
Appendix 3.03 HARA CAVs / CSMS LKA STPA ............................................................. 178 
Appendix 3.04 HARA CAVs PHA ...................................................................................... 202 
Appendix 3.05 HARA CSMS DFMEA ............................................................................... 234 
Appendix 3.06 HARA PSI HV DFMEA.............................................................................. 263 
Appendix 3.07 HARA PSI HV HazOP ................................................................................ 285 
Appendix 3.08 HARA PSI Mechanical Controls Hardware HazOP.................................... 289 
Appendix 3.09 HARA PSI Mechanical DFMEA ................................................................. 292 
Appendix 3.10 HARA PSI Mechanical HazOP ................................................................... 336 
Appendix 3.11 HARA PSI SEFA......................................................................................... 341 
Appendix 4 Safety Goals and Functional Requirements – Complete Documentation ......... 361 
Appendix 4.1 ACC Safety Goals and Functional Requirements ......................................... 361 
Appendix 4.2 CAVs Safety Goals and Functional Requirements ........................................ 366 
Appendix 4.3 CSMS Safety Goals and Functional Requirements ....................................... 381 
Appendix 4.4 LKA Safety Goals and Functional Requirements ......................................... 390 
Appendix 4.5 PSI HV Safety Goals and Functional Requirements ..................................... 404 
Appendix 4.6 PSI Mechanical Safety Goals and Functional Requirements ........................ 414 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................................... 429 
 
  
   
 
vii 




Table 1. Example of “Roles and responsibilities” ........................................................................ 33 
Table 2. Example of “Evidence of Competence” ......................................................................... 34 
Table 3. Example of “Evidence of a Good Safety Culture” ......................................................... 36 
Table 4. Example of the Item definition for the CAVs system using the Intel Mobil Eye 6 
Camera .......................................................................................................................................... 40 
Table 5. Example of the CSMS Item Definition using the HSC as the item ................................ 41 
Table 6. Template used to perform the PHA ................................................................................ 45 
Table 7. Example of a corrective/preventative measure and the associated requirement ............ 47 
Table 8. Template used to perform the DFMEA .......................................................................... 48 
Table 9. Severity rating scale with descriptions and associated criteria [30] ............................... 50 
Table 10. Occurrence rating scale with descriptions and associated criteria [30] ........................ 51 
Table 11. Detection rating scale with descriptions and associated criteria [30] ........................... 53 
Table 12. Forming the requirement from the DFMEA prevention mode and failure type ........... 54 
Table 13. Template 1 of 2 used to perform the SEFA .................................................................. 56 
Table 14. Template 2 of 2 used to perform the SEFA .................................................................. 56 
Table 15. Example of SEFA template 1 of 2 with analysis using the PSI subsystem and a P3 
architecture .................................................................................................................................... 58 
Table 16. Example of SEFA template 2 of 2 with analysis using the PSI subsystem and a P3 
architecture .................................................................................................................................... 60 
Table 17. Template used to perform the process parameter chart of the HazOP ......................... 61 
Table 18. Template used to perform the HazOP........................................................................... 62 
Table 19. Key process parameters and their associated systems .................................................. 63 
Table 20. Process parameter and guide word chart for a HV system (X indicates a relevant 
guideword and process parameter combination) .......................................................................... 64 
Table 21. Partial HazOP analysis when a temperature stimulus is applied to a HV system ........ 66 
Table 22. Template used to perform the STPA ............................................................................ 67 
Table 23. Example of a STPA on the LKA system ...................................................................... 71 
Table 24. Safety goals of the LKA system ................................................................................... 74 
Table 25. Number of requirements for lateral control using the EBCM vs. the EPS ................... 74 
Table 26. Example of LKA system safety goals and their associated functional requirements ... 76 
Table 27. Safety goals of the ACC system ................................................................................... 77 
Table 28. Number of requirements produced for the LKA vs. the ACC system using select 
HARA techniques ......................................................................................................................... 77 
Table 29. Example of the ACC system safety goals and functional requirements ....................... 80 
Table 30. Example of CAVs safety goals ..................................................................................... 81 
Table 31. Example of the CAVs safety goals and functional requirements ................................. 83 
Table 32. Example of the CSMS safety goals .............................................................................. 85 
Table 33. Common CSMS failure causes and their associated prevention and mitigation methods
....................................................................................................................................................... 87 
   
 
viii 
Table 34. Example of the PSI HV safety goals ............................................................................ 88 
Table 35. Example of the PSI HV safety goals and their functional requirements ...................... 89 
Table 36.  Example of the PSI-Mechanical safety goals .............................................................. 90 
Table 37. Example of the PSI-Mechanical safety goals and their functional requirements ......... 91 
  
   
 
ix 




Figure 1. The management of functional safety throughout the product lifecycle [ISO 26262] .... 5 
Figure 2. Overview of NASA system safety processes in flowchart format [NASA] ................. 10 
Figure 3. General Motors' System Safety Process [GM] .............................................................. 12 
Figure 4. Relationship among cause and effect for various HARA techniques ........................... 17 
Figure 5. Colorado State University System Safety Process ........................................................ 29 
Figure 6. Flow chart describing a method for completing the Item Definition ............................ 39 
 







1.1 The Importance of Systems Safety within the Automotive Industry  
Systems safety is a disciplined and comprehensive engineering approach to identify, 
eliminate, and control safety related risks through the use of a structured analysis and assessment 
methods. The system safety approach is widely used across a variety of industries whose 
products are complex systems that involve potential risk to the operator, environment, or 
property.  
For many large industries, such as aerospace, military, and automotive industries, system 
safety is a critical component to the structure of the systems lifecycle process, and is an active 
and evolving field of research [1]. Because these industries use advanced technologies and due to 
competition within and among industries, the systems safety processes within each OEM is 
largely unique and proprietary [2]. One key challenge that is derived from the proprietary nature 
of system safety processes are the problems of safety culture building, workforce development 
for system safety engineering and sharing best practices. At present, there is no publicly 
available comprehensive system safety example or reference, which could be used to help 
engineering teams to develop these shared, effective, and safety-critical analyses and practices. 
This is particularly true for the automotive industry. The automotive industry is one of 
the largest in the world utilizing advanced technologies and implementing operator assist 
features in an effort to reduce operator error and system failures [3] [4]. This industry is unique 
because of the number and complexity of advanced technology systems that are available to and 
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operable by the untrained public every day.1.  The implementation of advanced driver assistance 
systems (ADAS) and automated driving functions (ADF) in vehicles is increasing rapidly [5] [6]. 
This stems from a desire to reduce the negative externalities associated with vehicles including 
driver-caused accidents, fuel consumption, road congestion, and emissions. ADAS and ADF’s 
(which include adaptive cruise control, lane keeping assist, and other embedded systems) aim to 
improve the ease-of-use and the safety of transportation through less demanding human machine 
interfaces, a decrease in the operator requirements, and an increase in the vehicles’ awareness of 
safety and safety-relevant behaviors [7] [8].  Despite these goals, the engineering of ADAS and 
ADFs carry safety concerns, both critical and nominal, which must be developed during the 
concept and requirements engineering phase and should be monitored and amended throughout 
the systems engineering lifecycle.  
In response to these challenges, this thesis seeks to develop a set of relevant 
documentation, processes, and outcomes (requirements) for a system safety process as applied to 
University vehicle design projects.  By documenting a system safety engineering process, this 
thesis seeks to begin to build a relevant knowledge-base, processes, and cultural basis to enable 
system safety considerations in University vehicle design/build/test projects.   
  
                                                 
1 1.2 billion cars and trucks [1] are on the road globally, which can be compared to 39,000 aircraft that fly globally.  
This speaks to the orders of magnitude higher public risk that is incurred through land vehicle design than is 
incurred through aircraft design.  [https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travel-truths/how-many-planes-are-there-in-
the-world/] 







There are many methods that have been developed for analyzing the safety of a complex 
systems. Key references that will be reviewed to provide some background into the state of the 
art in system safety engineering include the NASA System Safety Handbook, General Motors’ 
Introductory Materials for EcoCAR System Safety (authored by Mark Vernacchia), and ISO 
26262. 
NASA has developed a holistic and systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting 
from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assists [9]. The uniqueness of 
NASA’s system safety process is the use of a holistic practice which references supplemental 
approaches to traditional forms of risk management. For example NASA considers measures of 
aggregate safety risk to include risk to the operator, environment, mission, and equipment. 
Specific to the automotive industry, GM has produced a proprietary and evolving system safety 
approach using a waterfall model [10]. The waterfall model is generally linear and iterative with 
clearly defined tasks and phases. The automotive industry standard for systems safety is the ISO 
26262 Road Vehicles Functional Safety. This standard generally follows the systems engineering 
“V”-model and is available to the public for purchase [11]. 
 
2.1 ISO 26262 Road Vehicles – Functional Safety 
Safety is a key issue in the development of road vehicles internationally. To address the 
safety risks of the development and implementation of automotive embedded systems a publicly 
accessible International Standard was created to guide OEMs in this process. The standard that is 
entitled “ISO 26262 Road Vehicles – Functional Safety” is intended to be applied to safety 
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related systems that include one or more electrical and/or electronic (E/E) systems within 
passenger cars with a maximum vehicle mass up to 3500 kg [11]. ISO 26262 states that it 
addresses possible hazards caused by malfunctioning behaviors of E/E safety related systems and 
the interactions of these systems but does not address the hazards related to internally caused 
failure such as fire, smoke, heat, or external caused failures such as adverse road conditions, or 
poor weather conditions. ISO 26262 also does not address failures associated with operator error, 
which represents a significant weakness because operator errors are asserted to be responsible for 
>94% of vehicle accidents [12]. 
Although not a comprehensive study on all safety aspects of an automotive system, ISO 
26262 presents the framework for applying a systems safety analysis which can be expanded to 
more thoroughly determine automotive systems safety requirements. 
ISO 26262 defines functional safety as the aspects of the safety of a system that require 
automatic control and regulation to deliver the safety function. Analogous to the design of a 
system to achieve any other function, the design of functional safety requires a system for 
management of the system safety function/product over its lifecycle. 
The structure of the functional safety management includes a set of processes documented in 
Figure 1. Under the Management of Functional Safety process, ISO 26262 describes the 
following phases: 
1. Concept phase, 
2. Product development at the system-level, 
3. Product development at the hardware-level, 
4. Product development at the software-level, 
5. Production and operation. 




Figure 1. The management of functional safety throughout the product lifecycle [ISO 26262]  
These phases are described in more detail in the following sections. 
 
2.1.1 ISO 26262 Management of Functional Safety 
The management of functional safety, ISO 26262-2, describes a framework for creating 
and implementing a safety culture. It identifies the roles and responsibilities in safety 
management throughout the project lifecycle which is clearly geared towards large companies 
who have many personnel working on the safety management team. 
For smaller teams at the institutional level (more relevant for this university-based system 
safety exercise), ISO 26262-2 provides guidance as follows: 
 The work product of a functional safety management process should be meeting the 
corresponding requirements of ISO 26262 and evidence of compliance with these 
safety requirements [13].  This means that a functional safety management work 
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product should result in meeting the requirements of the ISO, and should include 
evidence of meeting these requirements. 
 Confirmation measures should be work products that are evaluated during subsequent 
activities.  This means that work products should be confirmed and evaluated during 
and as part of their use in the tasks to which they are inputs. 
 Functional safety assessments should be an evaluation of an item’s functional safety 
achievement.  The assessment of functional safety should be based on evaluation2.  
 
The safety case should provide a clear, comprehensive and defensible argument, 
supported by evidence, that an item is free from unreasonable risk.  This means that the safety 
case is a document that makes the reasoned argument that the vehicle is safe to operate. 
 
2.1.2 ISO 26262 Concept Phase and System Development 
ISO 26262-3, “Concept Phase”, is arguably the most critical part of this document 
particularly for smaller teams developing new systems and advanced components. It is with in 
the concept phase that hazards and risks can be identified and mitigated through a process of a 
detailed item definition and hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA). From this HARA 
analysis a functional safety concept is derived. 
Step 1 (ISO 26262 section 3-5) is to define the item. 
The definition of the term item is a system or array of systems to implement a function at 
the vehicle level, to which ISO 26262 is applied [14]. 
The objectives of the item definition: 
                                                 
2 Where assessment can be considered to be a determination of the quality of an item, and evaluation can be 
considered to be a systematic determination of a subject's enumerated or ranked merit.   
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 Describe the item, its functionality, dependencies on, and interaction with, the driver, 
the environment and other items at the vehicle level  
 To support an adequate understanding of the item so that the activities in subsequent 
phases can be preformed 
Next, the HARA is performed (ISO26262 section 3-7).  The objectives of the HARA include: 
 To identify and to classify the hazardous events caused by malfunctioning behavior of 
the item 
 To formulate the safety goals (SGs) with their corresponding automotive safety 
integrity level (ASILs) related to the prevention or mitigation of the hazardous events, 
in order to avoid unreasonable risk 
 
Together the item definition and HARA are used early in the development process to 
understand potential vulnerabilities within the system, and to help to define safety goals. Failure 
mode and effects analysis (FMEA) and a hazard and operability study (HazOP) are suitable 
techniques to support the HARA [14]. The result of these analyses will be a classification of the 
hazardous events using the ASIL rating system. A safety goal will be produced for each 
hazardous event with an ASIL exceeding quality managed (QM) ratings. The functional safety 
concept is a set of safety measures and mechanisms which support and lead to the enforcement 
of the safety goals, and is an output of the concept phase. 
 
2.1.3 ISO 26262 Product Development at the System, Hardware and Software-level 
At the product development phase at the system-level, detailed in ISO 26262-4, ISO 
26262-5, and ISO 26262-6, specifications of the technical safety requirements are determined 
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and a system design is created. These work products feed the hardware and software 
development ultimately releasing the design for production and operation, detailed in ISO 
26262-7.  Because we seek to develop design requirements, phases 4 through 7 of the ISO 26262 
safety lifecycle include activities beyond the scope of this thesis and will not be addressed in 
detail. 
 
2.1.4 ISO 26262 Deficiencies 
ISO 26262 gives guidance on how to perform a thorough system safety analysis but falls 
short on a few key issues during the concept phase for the purposes of this study. The 
deficiencies in ISO 26262 are understandable as it cannot possibly identify all potential hazards 
to all automotive architecture types, but there are key concept phase deficiencies which this 
study will attempt to elaborate: 
 Lack of explanation and examples for how to perform the item definition task 
 Lack of explanation and examples of how to perform a FMEA or HazOP in support of a 
HARA 
 No comprehensive document or template to reference which aids in performing an item 
definition, HARA, or ASIL determination 
 No list of the most critical safety concerns for any automotive architecture type 
 No consideration of ADF or ADAS in the HARA activities [15] 
 
In the production of the ISO 26262, comprehensive system safety analysis were conducted 
and documented to vet the developed process but the documentation of this process is not 
accessible. It would be significantly helpful as a comprehensive reference providing true 
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examples of hazard analysis techniques at a system, hardware, and software-level and the 
associated analysis templates. 
 
2.2 NASA System Safety Handbook 
NASA has published a System Safety Handbook to serve as educational material and 
procedural documentation for its purposes.  NASA System Safety Handbook addresses a wider 
breadth of safety concerns than does ISO 26262 to include human, environmental, equipment, 
and property safety. The inclusion of property, equipment and the depth of environmental 
concern used by NASA is an important supplement to the ISO 26262 description of safety, 
although these concerns are, by custom, not generally considered in automotive industry [Mark 
Vernacchia]. 
In the aerospace industry, equipment and property safety is of high importance because, 
when in operation, maintenance can be impossible and missions are often a one-attempt 
assignment. As systems become increasingly complex and the cost of designing, building, and 
operating becomes more important, the NASA system safety process presents a holistic approach 
to ensure hazards are identified and known risks are controlled [9]. Although not specifically 
tailored to the automotive industry, the NASA System Safety Handbook details a functional 
safety approach that can be viewed as broader than the ISO 26262 but with even fewer specifics 
and examples. 
NASA’s system safety framework illustrated in Figure 2 and begins with the definition of 
key decision points (KDPs) which are points of resolution along the system lifecycle. The KDPs 
define a set of phases, A through F, which include concept studies, technology development, 
design fabrication and completion, assembly and testing, operation and sustainment, and 
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closeout. The NASA system safety framework is broken into four phases and is performed in 
parallel to the KDPs [9]. 
 
Figure 2. Overview of NASA system safety processes in flowchart format [NASA] 
 
1. The safety objectives phase helps teams to understand the mission-level objectives, goals, 
requirements, and analysis protocols. 
2. The system safety activity phase is further broken into four categories: concept 
development and early state system design, detailed system design, system realization, 
and system operation. This phase performs appropriate safety and risk analysis, assess 
safety management controls, and monitors system performance to identify 
risks/opportunities. During the safety and risk analysis an integrated safety analysis (ISA) 
is performed which is equivalent to the ISO 26262’s HARA in that the principle outputs 
are: 
 A set of accident scenarios that can produce undesirable safety performance 
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 Identification and evaluation of the potential causes of these accident scenarios 
 Identification and evaluation of existing controls associated with the scenarios 
 Probability density functions 
 Safety margins 
3. The risk-informed safety case (RISC) development and re-baselining phase augments and 
evidences the RISC and safety claims. RISC is analogous to a functional safety concept 
in that it is a structured safety case, supported by a body of evidence that provides 
compelling analysis that a system will be adequately safe [9]. 
4. The RISC evaluation phase performs a final review of safety claims and determines if the 
systems is adequately safe. 
 
2.3 GM System Safety Process 
The GM system safety process is documented in a series of publicly available 
presentations, documents and personal correspondence with Mark Vernacchia, GM System 
Safety Engineering Fellow.  The GM procedures document a robust and applied process, similar 
to and referencing the ISO 26262 process, but it differs in a few key ways. The GM process uses 
a “waterfall” model and divides the safety tasks in to four phases: concept, requirements, design, 
and final safety case [10]. A block diagram of GMs system safety process presented in Figure 3. 




Figure 3. General Motors' System Safety Process [GM] 
Key phases of the GM system safety process are: 
1. The concept phase involves a preliminary hazard analysis followed by the development 
of a safety program plan. Within this initial phase is the HARA, but GM prefers the use 
of a system element fault analysis (SEFA) and a system-theoretic process analysis 
(STPA). The conclusion of the concept phase is the creation of the system safety concept 
and a review of that concept.  
2. The requirements phase involves a functional interface analysis, the elicitation of the 
safety requirements, and the development of a safety verification and validation (V&V) 
plan. 
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3. The design phase involves a system/component design failure mode and effects analysis 
(DFMEA), system-level fault tree analysis (SLFTA), and a common cause failure 
analysis. Following these analyses, an update to the safety requirements and V&V plan is 
developed. Finally the system technical safety concept is created. 
4. During the final safety case phase, a software fault tree analysis and FMEA are 
performed. Component, subsystem, and vehicle V&V are closed out and a final safety 
report and assessment is documented. 
 
Unlike the ISO 26262 process, GM does not require an item definition or impact analysis at 
the item level. This is perhaps justifiable because the items are well-defined in an engineered 
automobile, but ISO 26262 asserts that an item analysis is a crucial step to determining all items, 
sub-items, and the dependencies, interactions, and interfaces to one another [14]. 
 
2.4 Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) 
An important component of each of the methods reviewed above is the HARA.  A hazard 
analysis identifies the hazards associated with the equipment under control (including the 
equipment control systems), hazard effects, and the hazard causal factors. From these identified 
hazards, risk reduction measures will be applied and safety design actions will be implemented. 
A thorough hazard analysis systematically surveys the entirety of the system being developed, 
the subsystems, items, sub-items, personnel, software, and their interfaces and interaction.   
The risk assessment aims to achieve a reduction in the associated hazard through applied 
safety functions. The application of a safety function can come in a variety of forms including 
software controls, redundancy verification method to monitor sensor data, or controls hardware 
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to decrease data latency or to improve visibility, or an additional piece of hardware such as an air 
bag. 
HARA techniques continue to evolve as new methods are developed which broaden the 
capability of systems safety engineers to identify potential hazards and mitigation strategies 
earlier in the lifecycle process.  
 
2.4.1 HARA Definitions 
Across the spectrum of analysis types and techniques there is a common language used. 
The verbiage making up the systems safety language generally has similar definitions and it is 
important to note those.  The following terms are regularly used within most HARA methods and 
the definitions described come from sources which define in reference to a systems safety 
application.  
Failure:  The event when a required function is terminated or exceeded the acceptable limits 
(JUS IEC 50). 
Fault: The state of an item characterized by the inability to perform a required function, 
excluding the inability during preventative maintenance or other planned actions, or due to a 
lack of external resources (JUS IEC 50). 
Error:  A discrepancy between a computed, observed, or measured value or condition and the 
true, specified or theoretically correct value or condition (JUS IEC 50).  
Hazard:  A real or potential condition that could lead to an unplanned event or series of events 
(i.e. mishap) resulting in death, injury, occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or 
property, or damage to the environment (MIL-STD-882). 
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Mishap:  An event or series of events resulting in unintentional death, injury, occupational 
illness, damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment. For the 
purposes of this Standard, the term “mishap” includes negative environmental impacts from 
planned events (MIL-STD-882). 
Mitigation Measure:  Action required to eliminate the hazard or when a hazard cannot be 
eliminated, reduce the associated risk by lessening the severity of the resulting mishap or 
lowering the likelihood that a mishap will occur (MIL-STD-882). 
Safety:  Freedom from conditions that can cause death, injury, occupational illness, damage to 
or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment (MIL-STD-882). 
Risk:  A combination of the severity of the mishap and the probability that the mishap will occur 
(MIL-STD-882). 
Hazard Casual Factors:  One or several mechanisms that trigger the hazard that may result in 
a mishap (MIL-STD-882).  
Safety Requirement: A condition or series of conditions necessary for the system to prevent, 
detect, and mitigate potential hazards, faults, or failures. 
 
2.4.2 HARA Types and Techniques 
There are a wide variety of HARA types and techniques used to identify hazards and 
mitigate risk throughout the entirety of a projects lifecycle. Each technique examines a specific 
view of the system, and as a result, has an associated set of strengths and weaknesses [16].  
HARA’s are especially valuable early in the concept and development phases but can be utilized 
through a systems production, operation, and disposal. Popovich [17] notes that there are over 
100 different hazard analysis techniques, many of which are minor variations of other 
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techniques. He outlines 22 unique analysis methods and places them on an engineering 
development lifecycle model to indicate when each method can provide the most utility at which 
stage of the systems engineering process.  
Popovich further discusses the two primary categories of hazard analysis: types and 
techniques.  The notable distinction between the two are the following: 
Type: 
 Establishes where, when, and what to analyze, 
 Establishes a specific analysis task at a specific time in the projects lifecycle, 
 Establishes what is desired from the analysis, 
 Provides a specific design focus. 
Technique: 
 Establishes how to perform the analysis, 
 Establishes a specific and unique analysis methodology, 
 Provides the information to satisfy the intent of the analysis type. 
 
In addition to the types and techniques of hazard analysis, these two can be further classified 
as being inductive, deductive, or exploratory methods. These terms can be confusing and are 
often incorrectly applied so it is important to understand how they fit into the context of hazard 
analysis and how they add value to the safety analyst [17]. Within the context of system safety 
analysis, inductive and deductive techniques are equivalent to bottom-up and top-down analysis 
methods while exploratory reasoning uses a middle-out approach [18]. The utility of these 
distinct methods derives from their potential to identify unique requirements from each. Of 
course, it is possible that an inductive method will identify some of the same requirements as an 
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exploratory method, but by including multiple methods, the systems safety engineer can hope to 
produce both exclusive and a comprehensive set of requirements.  
An inductive analysis follows the path from specific to broad generalizations. This technique 
looks at “what if” scenarios and breaks down the system into individual components [17]. For 
example an inductive approach would initially identify the cause of a failure (flat tire), which 
through the appropriate analysis technique such as a failure mode and effects analysis will then 
lead to the possible effects (unintended longitudinal motion). An inductive approach can be 
difficult to apply to complex systems due to the large number of components to consider and the 
potential for compounding failure combinations 
A deductive approach follows the path from general to specific. This technique looks at “how 
can” scenarios [17]. A deductive approach initially identifies the known effects of a failure 
(unintended longitudinal motion), then deduces possible causes (flat tire).  This method of safety 
analysis is applicable for all sizes of systems and more easily identifies hazards caused by 
multiple or interacting failures.  
The third technique is an exploratory method [10] which begins by identifying a single 
deviation to the system using guide words such as “function is required but not provided”.  From 
this, the system safety analysist can develop potential causes and effects of the failure. Figure 4 
visualizes the paths taken for each analysis technique. 
 
Figure 4. Relationship among cause and effect for various HARA techniques 




Of the many HARA types and techniques, the automotive industry commonly uses a 
select few; preliminary hazard analysis, failure mode and effects analysis, system element fault 
analysis, system theoretic process analysis, and a hazard and operability study. All of which rely 
of expert judgement and knowledge of the system and components to assess potential hazards 
and the significance of the effects. 
 
2.4.3 HARA – Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
A PHA is a type of inductive analysis used in the initial stages of the systems design. It is 
a broad technique focusing on identifying hazards, assessing the severity of the effects that 
would occur from that particular hazard, and identifying corrective and preventative measures 
[19]. The benefit of a PHA is that it allows for early recognition of weakness in the system 
concept, thus saving time and money that would be required during future discovery of the 
weakness.  
The benefits and characteristics of the PHA are as follows: 
 Provides early identification and high level hazard recognition, 
 Elicits consistent safety requirements for both hardware and software systems, 
 Applicable to any activity or system big and small, 
 Elicits qualitative hazard descriptions and provides qualitative rankings of the hazardous 
situations which is used to prioritize hazard reduction tasks. 
 
2.4.4 HARA – Design Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (DFMEA) 
A DFMEA is an inductive analysis technique and one of the earliest developed methods 
for hazard analysis. Similar to all HARA techniques, the DFMEA aims to assess system and 
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design risk, and develops strategies to detect and mitigate those risks. Unique to the FMEA is 
that the method ranks those risks based a risk priority classification. If it is completed very early 
in the concept stages of design, the DFMEA can provide valuable insight into potential hazards, 
the impact of those hazards, and the interfaces and interactions between subsystems [20] [21]. 
The benefits and characteristics of the DFMEA are as follows:  
 Provides a deep-dive hazard analysis at the system, subsystem, and component level, 
 Ranks potential hazards base on a risk priority number (RPN) to identify highest priority 
risks (𝑅𝑃𝑁 = 𝑆𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛), 
 Intuitive and thorough analysis templates are available and used to identify potential 
failure modes, failure effects, causes of failure, and detection and mitigation methods. 
 
2.4.5 HARA – System Element Fault Analysis (SEFA) 
A SEFA is an inductive analysis technique used at the system-level to assess the 
consequence of system element faults. This analysis involves a methodical systems element 
review based on an already known system architecture and assists in recognition of systematic 
weaknesses of a design or architecture [10]. 
The benefits and characteristics of the SEFA are as follows: 
 It must be completed after system architecture is defined and is used to compare multiple 
architectures, 
 Allows for identification of component faults on the system as a whole, 
 Clearly utilizes specific operating scenarios and associates component-to-component 
failures with hazards, 
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 Inclusion of the immediate resulting state after a failure leads to better hazard diagnostic 
and mitigation methods. 
 
2.4.6 HARA – System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) 
An STPA is an exploratory analysis technique used primarily from a controls perspective.  
STPA treats failures as controls problems, which can be useful in systems that are controls-
centric [22] [23]. It is typically applied to control functions such as lane keeping assist systems 
and uses guide phrases to identify hazards and resulting hazard mitigation methods. This method 
delivers unique requirements that are not identified through other analysis techniques but the 
STPA’s scope is limited to functional responses and does not easily pick up on elemental faults. 
The benefits and characteristics of the STPA are as follows: 
 Specific to controls functions and software systems in particular, 
 Identifies hazards through the use of unsafe control actions such as “function provided 
but incorrect timing”, 
 Elicits unique requirements from the use of causal factors and control constraints. 
 
2.4.7 HARA – Hazard and Operability Study (HazOP) 
A HazOP is also an exploratory technique of risk analysis which uses guide words and 
process parameters. These process parameters are dependent on the component and can be 
applied to system items resulting in partial or whole-system failures. Where the engine is the 
component, and a partial failure is possible, an example of this would be “only part of the 
requested torque is produced by the engine”. This technique identifies system and component 
level hazards but also considers operability failures.   
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The benefits and characteristics of the HazOP are as follows: 
 Far reaching scope to identify component and system-level requirements, 
 Identifies potential failures through the use of function-deviating guide words such as 
“part of, more, less, late”, 
 Uses process parameters such as “torque, temperature, NVH” specific to the item of 
investigation. 
 
2.5 Colorado State University  
Colorado State University has long recognized the crucial role that the interplay of energy and 
mobility has around the globe and has pioneered research in this area. Colorado State University’s 
(CSU) Engines and Energy Conversion Laboratory is an unparalleled network of researchers, centers 
and facilities focused on energy research, development and innovation. The Engines and Energy 
Conversion Laboratory is located at CSU’s Energy Institute - Powerhouse Energy Campus which 
serves as a unifying hub for clean energy research, policy centers and start-up companies. Through its 
13 affiliated centers, the Institute aims to increase collaboration with industry and governmental 
partners to solve real-world energy problems, and to accelerate the dissemination of CSU research and 
solutions.  
 
2.5.1 Colorado State University - EcoCAR 
One of the means by which CSU has built its research and workforce development 
program is through vehicle design/build/test programs. CSU has been a participant in the 
prestigious Advanced Vehicle Technology Competition (AVTC) “EcoCAR” since its inception 
with the primary objective of converting a conventional vehicle into a hybrid electric vehicle to 
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meet the specific functional and technical requirements of the EcoCAR competition. The current 
EcoCAR competition is the fourth in this line of AVTCs. Each of the previous competitions had 
a unique set of rules which the teams must develop their systems around. These rules may be 
more performance driven, as was the case in EcoCAR 3, or more environmentally driven, as was 
the case in EcoCAR 2.   
2019 begins the first of four years of the new “The EcoCAR Mobility Challenge (MC)” 
competition. The current competition tasks 13 North American universities to apply advanced 
propulsion systems, SAE Level 2 autonomy, Vehicle-2-X connectivity, and connected and 
automated vehicles (CAVs) to improve the energy consumption of a 2019 Chevrolet Blazer 
without compromising the vehicles emissions, drivability, utility, or safety [24]. A competition 
objective is to provide a real-world training ground for students to gain hands-on experience 
following a vehicle development process to design, build, and refine advanced technology 
vehicles [25]. 
In the case of EcoCAR MC, CAVs, which makes up 40% of the competition activities, 
includes systems such as adaptive cruise control (longitudinal autonomy), Vehicle-to-X-
communication, lane keeping assist (limited lateral autonomy), and in-cabin augmented reality 
[26]. CAVs achieves a SAE Level 2 autonomy by implementing automated functions like 
acceleration and steering, but the driver must still remain engaged with the driving task and 
monitor the environment at all times. The addition of these embedded systems can have critical 
safety concerns, especially at the institutional level where manpower, time, and funding may be 
restricted compared to larger automotive companies. The development of an adequate functional 
safety concept is critical to the success of the project and safety of personnel, environment, and 
equipment.  
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The EcoCAR MC requires that the teams allocate a systems safety manager to address 
these issues, along with teams devoted to propulsion systems integration (PSI), controls systems 
modeling and simulation (CSMS), CAVs, and project management [26]. The vehicle will 
compete annually in a variety of events of which safety is the foundation. A few of these events 
include CAVs perception and longitudinal safety evaluation and propulsions system on-road 
safety evaluation. Successful completion of the evaluations will be an initial validation to the 
stakeholders that the system meets the safety requirements to perform the following rounds of 
evaluations. The systems safety manager is responsible for developing the system, functional, 
and technical requirements using a recommended General Motors (GM) system safety process 
outline previously. 
 
2.5.2 Colorado State University – Toyota 
Similar to EcoCAR, CSU has also been conducting research funded by Toyota Gasoline 
Hybrids Vehicles Research and Development to determine fuel economy impacts of predictive 
optimal energy management strategies [27]. Specifically, this project researches the application 
of pre-computed acceleration event controls as acceleration events provide particularly attractive 
opportunities for predictive optimal energy management because of their high energy cost and 
limited variability.  This research also requires a full architectural redesign of a conventional 
vehicle into a hybrid electric vehicle. A thorough and documented safety analysis and testing 
plan is required and must be approved by the stakeholders. 
The test vehicle platform (TVP) is a 2018 Toyota Tacoma. The objective of the TVP will 
be to demonstrate measurable fuel economy improvements using a predictive acceleration event 
(PAE) control strategy. Those improvements will be measured relative to a baseline control 
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strategy that does not use prediction. In order to get reliable data which can demonstrate the fuel 
economy improvements, the TVP team is implementing an autonomous switch activated drive 
cycle that is highly repeatable for both the PAE and baseline control strategies. The autonomous 
drive cycles command longitudinal movements only and leave lateral control in the hands of the 
operator. The predicative ability will come from a GPS signal accessible to the TVP’s hybrid 
supervisory controller (HSC) [28]. The GPS signal will share the roads speed limit with the HSC 
which will then determine the optimal energy management strategy during acceleration events.  
Regardless of the architecture type, from a hardware perspective the redesign will include 
the integration of an electric motor (EM) and a power source for that motor. This power source is 
often a high voltage battery pack built by the vehicle innovation team to meet the specific needs 
of the system. The addition of an EM involves reducing the length of the driveshaft and 
interfacing directly to the rear of the transmission in a P3 configuration. From a software 
perspective the redesign must include a hybrid supervisory controller which manages all other 
controllers including but not limited to the engine control module, transmission control module, 
and electric motor controller. The control strategies used by the HSC are original and 
independent to the redesigned vehicle. It is clear by the amount of modification to the Tacoma’s 
hardware and controls systems that an early safety analysis and safety concept is going to guide 
the architecture design, component selection, and require a robust multi-phase test plan.  
These vehicle innovation teams (VITs) are structured and preform in an equivalent 
manner to larger OEM’s by categorizing sub-teams such as controls, powertrain, and high-
voltage. Because the TVP’s architectural redesign poses potentially severe safety risks to the 
operator, environment, and the vehicle platform its self, Toyota enforces strict standards for 
systems safety and requires CSU to incorporate a safety management team that is responsible for 
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the institutionalization a safety culture, development and execution of a hazard and risk analysis 
on the system, environment, and equipment, development of requirements, and ultimately 
ensuring safe production and operation. Toyota does not give guidance on the specifics of how to 
perform the safety analysis and test plan development so the safety management team has the 
availability to select from a range of analysis structures and techniques. 
  







The EcoCAR and Toyota projects are in development concurrently with the same 
management and system safety personnel working on both projects. The EcoCAR project 
requires a specific structure to part of the safety case analysis whereas the Toyota project has no 
requirement for structure of the safety case analysis. This allows the safety management team the 
opportunity to develop a structure that meets the needs of both projects. Because much of the 
redesign and additions are similar for both the EcoCAR and the TVP, the safety analysis will 
share many commonalities. 
Colorado State University is consistently involved with vehicle innovation and the 
electrification of conventional vehicles. It would be ideal to have a comprehensive safety 
analysis to reference for future projects. Currently there is not a system that shares predecessor 
automotive safety work and for each new project the system safety manager has to start from the 
beginning with often little to no knowledge on the subject.  
We seek to develop a set of objectives which contribute to provide answers to the following 
questions: 
 Can a systems safety case be developed which addresses the concerns posed in the 
EcoCAR, Toyota, and future projects? 
 What is an efficient and effective structure for performing a systems safety case? 
 What is an efficient and effective method for performing a safety analysis during the 
HARA activity? 
 What are critical safety concerns with implementing ADFs and ADAS 
The objectives of this thesis are as follows: 
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Objective 1. Provide a University-level automotive system safety process by determining 
the most effective ways to develop a risk informed safety case. 
Objective 2. Create a cross-functional safety working group procedure which will guide 
future safety managers, sub-team safety representatives, and provide requirements and 
testing traceability. 
Objective 3. Develop a comprehensive system safety analysis for a hybrid architecture 
advanced-vehicle build utilizing ADFs and ADAS. 
Objective 4. Determine an efficient and effective HARA procedure for the various 
subsystems of a hybrid vehicle. 
Objective 5. Determine critical safety concerns through the elicitation of safety goals 
and functional requirements. 
  







4.1 Safety Plan 
A project plan defines the scope and high-level objectives of a project while the safety plan, 
defining high level safety concepts, is a compliment to this written report [13]. The safety plan 
cannot be thoroughly completed in the early stages of a project and is not intended to be 
inclusive of all safety elements because not all safety critical elements can be identified at this 
beginning stage of the project. This thesis’s safety plan follows the ISO 26262 guidelines and 
therefore will include the following: 
 Definition and plan of safety activities throughout the system safety lifecycle, 
 Definition and assignment of roles and responsibilities regarding safety management and 
activities, 
 Evidence of competence, 
 Evidence of a good safety culture, 
 Evidence of quality management, 
 Cross-functional safety procedure. 
 
4.1.1 Safety Activities throughout the System Safety Lifecycle 
A well-structured systems safety process provides value through the entire engineering design, 
development, testing, and manufacturing phases of a systems process, and it provides early input 
to the system design by identifying potential hazards and determining the safety strategy. It then 
helps in the development of appropriate hardware, software and interface requirements 
ultimately leading to verification and validation of the system perforce to the defined 
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requirements [13]. The system safety activity can have a significant impact on the systems 
content early in the development phases as the requirements that are allocated to major 
components can be vetted and traced to meet the system needs. 
The structure and method of system safety activities determines the fidelity of the system 
safety case. A variety of widely used system safety processes have been outlined previously and 
all hold a very similar structure with differences only seen in term definitions and methods for 
analysis of individual safety activities.  
To fulfill Objective 1 an initial Colorado State University System Safety Process was 
developed and later modified after completion of the concept phase functional requirements. The 
modified process can be seen in Figure 5 where the primary change to the layout was the 
elimination of the elicitation of ASIL ratings.   
 
Figure 5. Colorado State University System Safety Process 




After discussion with professional automotive system safety personnel at GM and 
Continental, it was recommended that the ASIL ratings not be used based on their subjective 
nature. This idea is reinforced by research documented by Khastgir [29] where the rule-set ASIL 
system was put to the test by conducting a workshop involving international functional safety 
experts as participants in an experiment where rules were provided for severity and 
controllability ratings. Khastgir states that based on the qualitative results and the variation seen, 
the rule-set was re-calibrated and a reduction in variation occurred. However, this experiment 
shows that ASIL ratings incur a large amount of variation of results, even among the automotive 
world’s functional safety experts. 
The general outline used in this system safety case aligns closely with ISO 26262 functional 
safety process with the following exceptions: 
 Major phases are defined more closely matching a systems engineering V  model 
 ISO 26262 recommends using a HazOP and FMEA for the HARA activities. Instead a 
DFMEA, PHA, SEFA, HazOP, and STPA will be used here to elicit the safety goals and 
functional requirements 
 In the definition and analysis of failure ISO 26262 does not include loss to the system or 
property. Instead a loss of property or systems will be included in this analysis (similar 
to NASA system safety process) 
 NASA’s Risk Informed Safety Case (RISC) method will be used to define the final 
safety case. 
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4.1.2 Cross-Functional Safety Procedure 
A cross-functional safety procedure, fulfilling Objective 2 and fully documented in 
Appendix 1.2, is developed to facilitate the use of safety practices within the individual teams. 
For the purposes of University vehicle design projects, it is not possible for the system safety 
manager (SSM) to be completely involved in the technical low-level decision making of each 
team. In order to complete requirements, both technical and functional, and keep systems safety 
as a priority, the teams will follow this procedure when considering project scope and the 
implementation of systems.  
The safety procedure requires that each team have a primary safety representative who 
will perform the steps to complete the safety objectives. These representatives should be 
identified very early in the project.  The primary safety representative should be an individual 
with strong working knowledge of the low-level technical aspects of the team they are on. This 
individual will be the liaison between the safety manager and the specific team, tasked with 
translating system safety responsibilities and performing HARA activities. It is imperative that 
the safety representative set up times to allow for team collaboration in order to more thoroughly 
complete the safety activities.  
The cross-functional safety procedure allows for the various teams working on a project to 
perform the appropriate safety analysis and provides guidance on how to do so. The document is 
easy to use and provides templates for each type of analysis. The teams can simple copy and 
paste the templates onto their own document and begin brainstorming. The SSM will guide and 
assist in ensuring the safety representatives have a thorough understand of how to complete the 
safety activities. It is critical that the individual teams perform their own analysis as they will 
undoubtedly present more unique and applicable safety concerns based on their subject matter 
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knowledge. But, the SSM should be an active participant in the individual teams HARA 
activities for the following reasons: 
 The SSM has the most knowledge on how to perform the safety activities. 
 The SSM can guide the teams on how to think about safety. 
 The SSM will gain team specific low-level technical knowledge. 
 The SSM will be the one compiling and presenting the information. 
 The SSM must ensure oversight and that the work is being completed. 
 
Often, the HARA activities can be intimidating to begin and the team specific safety 
representative may be unsure of how to respond to these tables. The objective of this procedure 
is not to be over-bearing with guidance and instruction but is to provide the necessities for 
completing the analysis with simple examples. It is important to encourage open-mindedness and 
reassure representatives that there are no poor considerations at the concept phase. Even if the 
idea has little potential to cause a hazard or failure, then it should be documented, evaluated and 
then discounted through this process. Because the team specific safety representative 
occasionally performs this duty as an additional role, the SSM should limit their individual scope 
and guide them to focus on components that are being added, modified, or interface and interact 
with the added and modified.   
Each of the three vehicle design projects have utilized a similar team structure. The sub-
teams outside of the managerial staff includes a propulsion system integration (PSI) team, a 
controls and system modeling & simulation (CSMS) team, and a connected and automated 
vehicles  (CAVs) team. These teams will be instructed to perform specific tasks in the cross-
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functional safety procedure based on requirements given by the project organizers. The structure 
of the team can be easily modified to suit the needs of any future project. 
 
4.1.3 Roles and Responsibilities 
Definition and assignment of roles and responsibilities regarding safety management and 
activities is the initial step to beginning the systems safety lifecycle. Roles shall be directed by 
the project manager and the safety management team shall be assigned based on project scope 
and individual expertise. The safety management team is a collection of team leads who have 
specific experience and will contribute at a technical level to the identification of potential 
hazards and mitigation solutions. Safety is a collaborative effort especially at the University 
projects where students’ experience with system safety processes can be limited. Table 1 
provides an example of the Roles and Responsibilities for the CSU-VIT 
Table 1. Example of “Roles and responsibilities” 
CSU VIT Roles and Responsibilities 
Role Member Responsibilities 
Project 
Manager 
Dr. Thomas Bradley Oversee high-level mission activities and operate in a supervisory 
capacity. Define project scope, and manage requirements, planning, 





Gabriel Di Domenico 
Troy Johnson 
Determine system/component requirements. Sourcing and 







David Trinko Development of controls software. Determine system/component 




Matthew Knopf Develop system safety case. Perform safety analysis and determine 
safety requirements. Develop test plan and V&V methods. 
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4.1.4 Evidence of Competence 
The project manager assigning the roles and responsibilities shall ensure those members 
have sufficient skills, competencies, and qualifications in order to execute that assignment. Table 
2 provides an example of the Evidence of Competence for CSU-VIT 
Table 2. Example of “Evidence of Competence”  
CSU VIT Evidence of Competence 





Graduate research assistant involved in AVTC’s for the previous 3 years. 
Currently also in role as PM for EcoCAR MC. Advanced study of hybrid 
electric vehicle architecture. Involved in the development and build of a 






Graduate research assistant involved in FSAE as the PM role. Currently 
also in role as EM for EcoCAR MC. Advanced study of hybrid electric 






Graduate research assistant involved in HEV development for previous 3 
years. Advanced study of hybrid electric vehicle architecture. Integral 






Graduate research assistant involved in AVTC’s for the previous 2 years. 
Currently also in role as system safety manager for EcoCAR MC and 
acted in that role for EcoCAR 3. Involved in the development and build 
of a hybrid Chevrolet Camaro 
 
4.1.5 Evidence of Quality Management 
It is critical to institute and maintain a quality management system to support functional 
safety. Quality management, across all phases of the safety lifecycle, includes the university and 
facilities overall safety management, the project dependent safety management, and safety 
management regarding production, operation, service, and decommissioning [13].  
Overall safety management ensures that those responsible for performing safety activities 
in the safety lifecycle achieve the following objectives: 
 Institute and maintain a top-down safety culture, 
 Promotes effective communication across all disciplines, 
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 Institute and maintain adequate functional safety organizational rules and processes, 
 Ensure training, guidance, a functional safety procedure is available for members, 
 Ensure that the competence of the member is proportionate with their responsibilities. 
 
Project dependent safety management ensures that during the concept development phase 
and at the system, hardware, and software-levels, the organization achieves the following 
objectives: 
 Define safety activities for the system safety lifecycle, 
 Plan, coordinate, and track the progress of safety activities, 
 Create comprehensive safety cases in order to provide the argument for the achievement 
of functional safety, 
 Decide at the end of development if the item achieves the minimum acceptable level of 
safety to be released for production and operation. 
 
Safety management during the system lifecycle stages of production, operation, service, and 
decommissioning is a body of evidence, assembled from the previous work products, that 
justifies the system’s level of safety during those phases of the product lifecycle. 
 
4.1.6 Evidence of a Good Safety Culture 
A good safety culture is a priority at the University level. Inexperience at any level of the 
systems engineering process can lead to severe safety implications. It is a requirement of the 
University, team, and individual to maintain functional safety and impose a commitment to 
integrity and excellence. It is important to note that a good safety culture requires management 
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buy-in then implementation throughout the facilities and working groups [13]. Table 3 provides 
an example of the Evidence of a Good Safety Culture for CSU-VIT. 
Table 3. Example of “Evidence of a Good Safety Culture” 
Examples indicative of a poor safety culture Examples indicative of a good safety culture 
Accountability is not traceability The process assures that accountability for decisions 
related to functional safety is documented and 
traceable 
 
Cost and schedule take precedence over safety and 
quality 
 
Safety is the highest priority 
The reward system favors cost and schedule over safety 
and quality 
The reward system supports and motivates the 
effective achievement of functional safety 
The reward system penalizes those who take short cuts 
that jeopardize safety or quality 
 
Personnel assessing safety, quality, and their governing 
processes are influenced unduly by those responsible 
for executing the processes 
 
The process provides adequate checks and balances 
- The appropriate level of independence in the 
safety, quality, verification, validation processes 
Passive attitude toward safety 
- Heavy dependence on testing at the end of the 
product development cycle 
- Management reacts only when there is a problem in 
the field 
 
Proactive attitude towards safety 
- Safety and quality issues are discovered and 
resolved from the earliest stage in the product 
lifecycle 
The required resources are not planned or allocated in a 
timely manner 
The required resources are allocated 
Skilled resources have the competence commensurate 
with the activity assigned 
 
- “Groupthink” 
- ‘Stacking the deck’’ when forming review groups 
- Dissenter is ostracized or labelled as “not a team 
player” 
- Dissent reflects negatively on performance reviews 
- “Minority dissenter” is labeled or treated as a 
“troublemaker”, “not a team player”, or a 
“whistleblower” 
- Concerned employees fear repercussion 
 
The process uses diversity to advantage 
- Intellectual diversity is sought, valued, and 
integrated in all processes 
- Behavior which counters the use of diversity is 
discouraged and penalized 
 
Supporting communication and decision-making 
channels exist and the management encourages their 
usage 
- Self-disclosure is encouraged 
- Disclosure of discovery by anyone else is 
encouraged 
- The discovery and resolution process continues in 
the field 
 
No systematic continuous improvement processes, 
learning cycles or other forms of “lessons learned” 
Continuous improvement is integral to all processes 
Processes are “ad hoc” or implicit A defined traceable and controlled process followed at 
all levels, including 
- Management 




- Development interfaces 
- Verification 
- Validation 
- Functional safety audit 
- Functional safety assessment 
 
4.2 Item Definition 
The definition of the term item is a system or array of systems to implement a function at the 
vehicle level that is able to cause harm to people inside or outside the vehicle [14]. In the early 
stages of concept development there are no concrete definitions of an item or system as these are 
confirmed from the development process but we can complete the item definition by anticipating 
which components will be used.  The concept development phase begins with an item definition 
where the goal is to describe all items within a subsystem and their functionalities. Through this 
process the system safety analysist will begin to build an understanding of the item impact, 
interactions, interfaces and dependencies on other items and the system as a whole. ISO 26262 
does recommend that the item definition include, in addition to the item, sub-items, and its 
functions, a written description of the dependencies on, and interactions with, the driver, the 
environment and other items at the vehicle level [14]. If not explicitly done during the item 
definition, dependencies, interactions, and interfaces will be investigated during the HARA 
activities. A procedure for performing the item definition is a follows: 
1. Identify and group major vehicle systems, 
2. Identify the items making up that system, 
3. Identify the sub-items making up that item, 
4. Determine a thorough list of the item functions focusing on the item inputs and outputs. 
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Identifying and grouping major vehicle systems can be accomplished by considering system 
boundaries. For hybrid vehicles the systems are PSI (mechanical, high-voltage), CSMS (controls 
hardware and software), and CAVs (semi-autonomous longitudinal and lateral control systems). 
Each of these has clearly defined boundaries and unique system functions. 
Identifying the items making up the system will involve research and a greater understanding 
of the individual components involved in that system. These items can be viewed as subsystems 
because they provide a critical function to the vehicle and are comprised of sub-items. It is 
important to collaborate with the teams of the system you are working on since they will be 
knowledgeable of the items involved.  
Identifying the sub-items will produce a thorough list of all components making up the item. 
It is the lowest level of the system component. Because of the intricacies of subsystems, research 
in conjunction with team collaboration, must be performed to accurately document all sub-items.  
Determining a thorough list of the item functions is the final step in the item definition and 
illuminates the distinct roles of the item. The item function describes how the item contributes to 
the system, inputs to the item, interactions and interfaces, and outputs from the item. Like the 
previous steps, it can be helpful to research the item to identify the inputs and outputs. Table 8 
shows the individual steps and how the item definition evolves. 




Figure 6. Flow chart describing a method for completing the Item Definition 
The item definition is particularly useful in the investigation and documentation of some 
of the lesser understood items and functions such as CAVs, controls hardware, and controls 
software. This allows for the safety teams to list out all items and begin to formally document the 
potential functions of the items and sub-items. This process solidifies the decision making of 
which system owns which control functions and guides the team in determining constraints 
especially when software or functional ambiguity is present. Table 4 demonstrates the Item 
Definition for the CAVs system using the Intel Mobileye 6 camera as the item. The 
comprehensive CAVs Item Definition for the vehicle design project can be seen in Appendix 2.1. 
Major Subsystems 
Items of the PSI-Mechanical Subsystem 
Sub-Items of the Brakes 
Functions of the Brakes 
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Table 4. Example of the Item definition for the CAVs system using the Intel Mobil Eye 6 Camera 
CAVs  Intel Mobileye 6 Item Definition 
Item Sub-Item Functional Behavior 
Intel Mobileye 6 Mount - Performs multi-feature tracking 
 
- Performs object and lane detection 
 
- Performs forward collision warning 
 
- Performs pedestrian collision warning 
 
- Performs headway warning 
 
- Performs traffic sign recognition 
 
- Sends data to associated controller 
 








As with many aspects of system safety analysis there is not a clearly defined 
comprehensive example of how to perform the Item Definition. The system safety analyst must 
use common sense and trial and error to determine the item, sub item, and functions of a system. 
For the propulsion systems integration (PSI) the items, sub-items, and functions are obvious.  
The item would be all major hardware systems such as the brakes, steering, engine etc… while 
the sub items would be the components making up those individual systems such as brake pads, 
lines, rotors etc... The functions of these items are also easy to identify especially when working 
in collaboration. It is still very beneficial to research articles on the functions of these items 
where more experienced professionals can better speak to the inputs and outputs. The 
comprehensive PSI Item Definition for the vehicle design project can be seen in Appendix 2.3 
and Appendix 2.4. 
Common sense and trial and error plays a role in the vehicle systems where the items and 
functions are less obvious. For example, during the analysis of the CSMS systems it was 
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challenging to decide if the controls hardware or the controls software was the item and what the 
specific functions would be. After producing both, it was easier to justify the controls hardware 
as the item because the hardware drew clearly defined boundaries around each item and its 
functions. Table 5 demonstrates an example from the CSMS Item Definition using the HSC as 
the item. The comprehensive CSMS Item Definition for the vehicle design project can be seen in 
Appendix 2.2. 
Table 5. Example of the CSMS Item Definition using the HSC as the item 
CSMS HSC Item Definition 









- Acquires operator and various sensor inputs (APPS, gear, vehicle speed) 
 
- Controls all hybrid driving functions 
 
- Controls torque via engine/EM torque split using rules-based or PAE control 
strategy 
 
- Maintains SOC at appropriate level 
 
- Determines gear shifting 
 
- Modifies stock signals 
 
It is important to account for and understand the item functions. These functions will be 
carried through and built upon during the course of the systems safety lifecycle and the HARA 
activities specifically. They will help determine hazards, failure modes and ultimately feed the 
safety goals and requirements. Typically during HARAs, the potential hazard or deviation is the 
failure of an item’s function. For example, if one of the functions of the brakes is to: inhibit 
vehicle motion then the failure type would be that the brakes: fail to inhibit vehicle motion. 
During a DFMEA you would continue the analysis by saying a potential impact of this failure is: 
unintended longitudinal motion with a potential cause being: brake pad/rotor failure. The safety 
goal of this example could be that: the brake system shall inhibit vehicle motion to match driver 
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intent. In this example, we can see how an accurate description and awareness of the item’s 
intended function is built upon and eventually results in a thorough understanding of failure 
types, the potential impact, causes, prevention, detection, and mitigation modes, and ultimately 
the safety goal and functional requirements.  
A thorough analysis of the item definition will highlight item functions which clearly 
have a more critical risk association. This will be identified by the function’s ability to 
potentially cause a loss of acceleration, braking, steering, or system failures that could cause the 
vehicle to decelerate or accelerate suddenly.  
 
4.3 Application of HARA 
As discussed in the background, there are many types and techniques of HARAs which 
can be applied throughout the system lifecycle. Because we are in the concept development 
stages of both the Toyota and the EcoCAR projects the HARA activities were focused on 
techniques which would provide safety goals, functional requirements, and guidance during this 
early design phase. We seek to know what techniques of HARA’s will most effectively and 
efficiently produce potential hazards and provide detection and mitigation methods. The 
automotive industry routinely uses a common set of hazard identification methods [10] [17]. 
With this in mind the HARAs used during this activity were the PHA, DFMEA, SEFA, HazOP, 
and STPA.  
For each team performing the HARA, a structured analysis is produced and followed. 
Each team performs a minimum of both an inductive and exploratory HARA technique. Based 
on some preliminary research, the general structure of the various analysis methods, and 
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discussions with systems safety representatives, specific techniques were chosen and performed 
for each team and subsystem. 
CAVs is implementing a system of autonomous controls for lateral and longitudinal 
motion using a network of sensors and control strategies. The nature of this system is reliant on 
the recognition of vehicle deviation and the strategy for corrective action. Innately this would 
benefit from using an exploratory HARA technique and based on the template setup and type of 
analysis a STPA would likely produce the most complete and relevant set of safety goals and 
functional requirements. In an attempt to expand the investigation and further identify unique 
hazards of CAVs a DFMEA specific to the LKA and ACC systems was produced. The LKA and 
ACC systems control longitudinal and lateral motion so it would be beneficial to do an analysis 
specific to these two control strategies. A PHA was produced using the CAVs system as a whole 
in an effort to determine variances in between the PHA and DFMEA techniques. 
CSMS is strictly a software system with arguably the greatest risk for potential hazards. 
CSMS controls all hybrid driving functions and subsystems. It is out of the CSMS that 
unintended vehicle behavior could most likely occur, including important safety considerations 
such as unintended accelerations, thermal runaway, and high voltage de-energizing. The LKA 
and ACC systems utilize aspects of both the CSMS and CAVs systems. Integration of CSMS 
controls hardware was determined to be a part of the PSI Mechanical team but the controls 
functionality is clearly within the CSMS domain.  
The domain of PSI includes the largest amount of components and system interfaces and 
interactions. PSI is responsible for all mechanical/powertrain, HV, and controls hardware items. 
There are often clear “mechanical” and “component-level” distinctions between these systems 
which the DFMEA, SEFA and HazOP activities has the ability to address individually.  A SEFA 
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is produced on the PSI system as a whole, while the HV components will be analyzed with a 
DFMEA and HazOP. The PSI Mechanical items will also be analyzed using a DFMEA and 
HazOP. In total, 5 individual HARA techniques will be used and 11 separate analysis will be 
performed to elicit safety goals and functional requirements. The techniques and their associated 
system of analysis are shown below. 
 CAVs – PHA 
 CAVs / CSMS ACC System – DFMEA 
 CAVs / CSMS LKA System – DFMEA, STPA 
 CSMS – DFMEA 
 PSI – SEFA 
 PSI HV – DFMEA, HazOP 
 PSI Mechanical – DFMEA, HazOP 
 PSI / CSMS Controls Hardware – HazOP 
 
The HARA activities are often performed in a collaborative setting including contributions 
from the system safety manager, team-specific system safety representative, engineering 
manager, and team-specific safety representative. The systems safety manager normally leads 
this discussion and the team completes the analysis step by step until all HARA activities have 
been finalized.  
There is not an available comprehensive resource or template guiding the safety analysist to 
perform the HARA activities. An important contribution of this thesis is the templates provided 
and the thoroughly documented safety analysis of each of the methods used. 
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4.3.1 HARA applied using PHA  
The PHA was performed on the CAVs system as an initial method for determining a broad 
range of safety goals and functional requirements. The template used to complete the PHA can 
be seen in Table 6. The PHA moves through the analysis at the item level using the following 
steps: 
1. Produce a block diagram of the relevant systems, 
2. Identify potential hazards, 
3. Identify causes of the hazard, 
4. Identify major effects of the hazard, 
5. Identify corrective and preventative measures of the hazard, 
6. Determine and document the requirements. 
 
Table 6. Template used to perform the PHA 
PHA Template 
Item:      
Potential Hazard Cause Major Effect Corrective/Preventative Measures Requirement 
 
Producing a block diagram can be done at the item or system-level. Both will visualize 
the items interfaces and interactions with other components. This step allows the analyst to gain 
a better understanding of how the item assists the systems functionality 
Identifying the potential hazards is an item level analysis which describes a failure of the 
items function that was documented in the item definition. An example using the item “brakes” 
would be a failure to slow or stop a moving vehicle, where slowing or stopping a moving vehicle 
is a function described in the item definition. 
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Identifying potential causes of the hazard relies on a very strong understanding of how the 
item acts. Considerations for this section are environmental causes, operator causes, or sub-item 
causes. Emphasis should be placed on causes which produce a critical system impact such as 
unintended vehicle motion. Common causes found during the analysis include: 
 Wiring failures 
 Unintended access or physical damage to the item 
 Power failure 
 Operation outside of min/max temperature range 
 Sub-item failures 
 Signal failures (latency, EMI, noise) 
 Coding errors 
 
Identifying the major effects of the hazard will highlight those effects which are more safety 
critical and guide the preventative measures. This step is more creative than the previous and can 
begin by asking “what if”.  It can also be useful research item impacts from a situations which 
may cause a hazard. This can be more difficult to do when analyzing software and electronic 
systems. Common critical effects found during the analysis include: 
 Unintended longitudinal or lateral motion 
 Loss or degradation of propulsion 
 Operator and/or passenger injury 
 Damage to or loss of property 
 Damage to the environment 
 Fire or thermal event 




Identifying corrective and preventative measures of the hazard is done from understanding 
the cause and effect. This step can be completed in part by looking at the item manufactures 
specification sheet where they will describe installation and operating specifications. Less 
obvious and more creative prevention methods will also be identified especially if using a 
working group brainstorming approach. The measures identified here will directly lead to the 
item functional requirements.   
Documenting the requirements that are a result of these system safety considerations is 
essentially a rewording of the corrective and preventative measures. The automotive system 
safety industry uses common and formal verbiage to describe a functional requirement through 
methods known as “shall statements”. An example of the preventative measure and associated 
requirement are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. Example of a corrective/preventative measure and the associated requirement 
CAVs Requirement Production 
Item:     CAVs Intel Tank Computer 
Corrective/Preventative Measures Requirement 
To reduce computer signal input and output noise 
ensure wires are kept away from electrical 
machinery, are as short as possible, and use 
shielding 
To reduce CAVs systems computer signal input and 
output noise the development team shall ensure wires are 
kept away from electrical machinery, are as short as 
possible, and use shielding 
 
4.3.2 HARA applied using DFMEA 
The DFMEA is an item level hazard analysis which was performed on the CAVs / CSMS 
LKA and ACC systems, CSMS, and the PSI Mechanical and HV systems. After performing this 
analysis it was found that the template and requirements are very similar to those of the PHA. 
The major difference between the two methods is that the DFMEA determines a risk priority 
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number (RPN) based on the severity, occurrence, and detection or the failure. The template used 
to complete the DFMEA can be seen in Table 8. The steps to completing the DFMEA include: 
1. Produce a block diagram of the relevant system, 
2. Document the function, 
3. Identify the failure type, 
4. Identify the potential impact and severity (S) involved, 
5. Identify the potential causes and the likelihood of occurrence (O), 
6. Identify the prevention modes, detection modes, and the ease at which the failure is 
detected (D), 
7. Determine the risk priority number (RPN) using the formula, 𝑅𝑃𝑁 = 𝑆𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
8. Determine and document the resulting requirements. 
 
Table 8. Template used to perform the DFMEA 
DFMEA Template 











Mode D RPN Requirement 
 
Producing a block diagram can be done at the item or system-level, just like the PHAs 
block diagram, and provides a better understanding of the items interactions and interfaces with 
other components 
Documenting the function is taken directly from the function, as determined and 
documented in the item definition. If an addition or update to the function occurs during the 
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DFMEA then it should also be updated in the item definition. This step will allow the safety 
analyst to easily state the failure type. 
Identifying the failure type is a direct failure of the function of the item. For example if 
the function of the item “CAVs LKA” is to “control lateral movement via electric power 
steering”, then the failure type would be “failure to control lateral movement via electric power 
steering”. 
Identifying the potential impact for a DFMEA is very similar to identifying the effects for a 
PHA. There are common high-level impacts which pose a critical safety risk. In addition to those 
mentioned in the effects column of the PHA, others found during the analysis include: 
 Unintended acceleration 
 Unintended exposure to toxic/flammable components 
 Unintended exposure to HV 
 
Determining the severity of a failure is subjective, especially when considering new or 
modified components, but a standard is available which is used to make this task more 
consistent. Table 9 describes the criteria and description for the severity rating. 
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Table 9. Severity rating scale with descriptions and associated criteria [30] 
Severity Rating Scale 
No. Description Criteria 
1 No effect No discernible effect.  
 
2 Annoyance Appearance or Audible Noise, vehicle operable, item does not conform. Defect 
noticed by discriminating customers (< 25%).  
 
3 Annoyance Appearance or Audible Noise, vehicle operable, item does not conform. Defect 
noticed by many customers (50%). 
  
4 Annoyance Appearance or Audible Noise, vehicle operable, item does not conform. Defect 
noticed by most customers (> 75%).  
 
5 Degradation of 
secondary function 
Degradation of secondary function (vehicle operable, but comfort / convenience 
functions at reduced level of performance).  
 
6 Loss of secondary 
function 
Loss of secondary function (vehicle operable, but comfort / convenience 
functions inoperable).  
 
7 Degradation of primary 
function 
Degradation of primary function (vehicle operable, but at reduced level of 
performance).  
 
8 Loss of primary 
function 
Loss of primary function (vehicle inoperable, does not affect safe vehicle 
operation).  
 
9 Safety and/or regulatory 
compliance 
Potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves 
noncompliance with government regulation with warning.  
 
10 Safety and/or regulatory 
compliance 
Potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves 
noncompliance with government regulation without warning.  
 
Identifying the potential causes of a failure during the DFMEA is identical to that step in the 
PHA analysis and can be determined looking at the following: 
 Environmental factors (debris, weather, NVH) 
 Operational inputs (vehicle speed, gear selection, APP) 
 Operational modes (PRNDL) 
 Sub-item failures (line leaks, broken belt, component fatigue) 
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Determining the likelihood of occurrence is also subjective and a standard is available which 
helps guide the analysist with consistent application. Table 10 describes the criteria and 
description for the occurrence rating. 
Table 10. Occurrence rating scale with descriptions and associated criteria [30] 
Occurrence Rating Scale 
No. Description Criteria 
1 Very low Failure is eliminated through preventative control.  
 
2 Low No observed failures associated with almost identical design or in design 
simulation and testing.  
 
3 Low Only isolated failures associated with almost identical design or in design 
simulation and testing.  
 
4 Moderate Isolated failures associated with similar design or in design simulation and 
testing.  
 
5 Moderate Occasional failures associated with similar designs or in design simulation and 
testing.  
 
6 Moderate Frequent failures associated with similar designs or in design simulation and 
testing.  
 
7 High Failure is uncertain with new design, new application, or change in duty 
cycle/operating conditions.  
 
8 High Failure is likely with new design, new application, or change in duty 
cycle/operating conditions.  
 
9 High Failure is inevitable with new design, new application, or change in duty 
cycle/operating conditions.  
 
10 Very high New technology/new design with no history.  
 
Identifying the prevention mode involves a low-level understanding of the item and the 
cause of failure. Prevention methods can be hardware mitigation, software control strategies, or 
operational restrictions. Some hardware prevention methods can be found from the item 
manufacturer specification sheet where they describe mechanical constraints and installation 
requirements. Software control strategies may impose operational limits and actuate a 
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preventative action such as running a cooling system when a components temperature reaches a 
specified limit. 
Identifying the detection mode will state the earliest time a failure can be detected and 
during what operational mode it can be detected in. It was found that in many cases detection can 
only occur while the vehicle is in an operation, which is inherently more dangerous than if it 
could be detected and vetted during the development phases, during diagnostics or while the 
vehicle was inoperable.  
Determining the possible detectability of a failure can be equally as ambiguous as 
determining the severity and occurrence but a standard has been produced to assist in applying a 
consistent approach. Table 11 describes the criteria and description for the detection rating. 
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Table 11. Detection rating scale with descriptions and associated criteria [30] 
Detection Rating Scale 
No. Description Criteria 
1 Detection Not 
Applicable - Failure 
Prevention  
Failure cause or failure mode cannot occur because it is fully prevented through 
design solutions (e.g. Proven design standard/best practice or common 
material, etc.). 
 
2 Virtual Analysis - 
Correlated  
Design analysis/detection controls have a strong detection capability. Virtual 
Analysis (e.g. CAE, FEA, etc.) is highly correlated with actual and/or expected 
operating conditions prior to design freeze.  
 
3 Prior to Design Freeze  Product validation (reliability testing, development or validation tests) prior to 
design freeze using degradation testing (e.g. data trends, before/after values, 
etc.).  
 
4 Prior to Design Freeze  Product validation (reliability testing, development or validation tests) prior to 
design freeze using test to failure (e.g. until leaks, yields, cracks, etc.).  
 
5 Prior to Design Freeze  Product validation (reliability testing, development or validation tests) prior to 
design freeze using pass/fail testing (e.g. acceptance criteria for performance, 
function checks, etc.).  
 
6 Post Design Freeze and 
Prior to Launch  
Product verification/validation after design freeze and prior to launch with 
degradation testing (Subsystem or system testing after durability test e.g. 
Function check).  
 
7 Post Design Freeze and 
Prior to Launch  
Product verification/validation after design freeze and prior to launch with test 
to failure testing (Subsystem or system testing until failure occurs, testing of 
system interactions, etc.).  
 
8 Post Design Freeze and 
Prior to Launch  
Product verification/validation after design freeze and prior to launch with 
pass/fail testing (Subsystem or system testing with acceptance criteria e.g. Ride 
& handling, shipping evaluation, etc.). 
  
9 Difficult to Detect  Design analysis/detection controls have a weak detection capability; Virtual 
Analysis (e.g. CAE, FEA, etc.) is not correlated to the expected actual 
operating conditions.  
 
10 Absolute Uncertainty  No current design control; Cannot detect or is not analyzed. 
 
Determining the risk priority number allows the analyst to easily identify which failure 
causes pose the greatest risk. Although the application of determining the severity, occurrence, 
and detection will seem subjective, at this stage in the analysis high risk items will stand out. To 
determine the RPN the analyst will multiple the severity, occurrence and detection numbers with 
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the highest possible value being 1000. It is beneficial to perform the severity, occurrence, and 
detection ratings after all analysis has been complete and in one sitting so that the ratings will be 
applied more consistently and under a continual thought process. 
Producing the requirements is the final step of the DFMEA template and is accomplished 
by rewording the failure type, potential cause, and prevention mode. This step requires the use of 
specific verbiage and sentence structure. It can be beneficial to word the prevention mode very 
similarly to how the requirement will be worded. This allows for easy documentation of the 
requirement. When writing the requirement, be specific. State what it is preventing, who will 
perform the prevention mitigation, and how it will be prevented. Table 12 shows a partial 
example of how this might look with select columns of the DFMEA omitted. 
Table 12. Forming the requirement from the DFMEA prevention mode and failure type 
DFMEA Applies to the LKA System 


















To prevent a lane-line, object 
detection, or multi-feature 
tracking failure ensure sensors 
have clear field of view and 
are free of visibility 
obstructions 
To prevent a lane-line, object 
detection, or multi-feature 
tracking failure the development 
team shall ensure sensors have a 
clear field of view and are free 
of visibility obstructions 
 
The DFMEA uses the failure of the function of an item to determine potential impacts, 
causes, prevention, and detection modes. The prevention mode is often a translation and 
advancement of the cause of the failure which then becomes a requirement while the function is 
stated as a safety goal.  The DFMEA method produced the largest set of safety goals and 
functional requirements but in our execution was especially repetitive in that it identified 
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requirements often related to the installation, operation, and maintenance of the item system 
being analyzed. 
We can see that the PHA and DFMEA are similar in template setup, analysis method, and 
requirements elicitation, but the DMFEA is a slightly more thorough technique. The DFMEA 
forces the analysist to consider the severity, occurrence, and detectability of the failure which 
produces the RPN. This quantitative step helps visualize the critical nature of a failure as 
compared to all other failures. The DFMEA also allows for the analyst to consider detection 
modes which is the beginning of thinking about a testing procedure for the failure.  
 
4.3.3 HARA applied using SEFA 
The SEFA is system-level analysis technique performed by modeling the “failing” of a single 
element and analyzing its impact throughout other elements. The SEFA is not typically 
performed on software systems but is often conducted on actuators, motors, and other functional 
elements. For our analysis the SEFA was used on PSI systems. Table 13 and Table 14 show the 
templates used to complete the SEFA. The steps to completing the SEFA include: 
1. Produce a system-level block diagram, 
2. Identify systems operational states, 
3. Name all elements within the system, 
4. Identify the behavioral function of each element, 
5. “Fail” each element individually, 
6. Identify the impact of the element fault, 
7. Identify the immediate resulting state prior to mitigation actions, 
8. Identify the potential safety hazards, 
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9. Determine diagnostic methods, 
10. Determine mitigation actions, 
11. Identify the system state after mitigation action, 
12. Determine and document requirements. 
 
Table 13. Template 1 of 2 used to perform the SEFA 







(P,R,N,D) Item Functions 
Item No. Operating 
States 




1 2 3 
1 
       
 
Table 14. Template 2 of 2 used to perform the SEFA 














Producing a system-level block diagram helps identify element placement, interactions, 
and interfaces. It allows for a visualization of the system under analysis which better indicates 
potential element failures when performing the SEFA. 
Identifying the operational states allows the analysist to perform the SEFA on multiple 
operating scenarios such as park, reverse, neutral, and drive. This will be used in understanding 
the immediate resulting state prior to and after mitigation methods are introduced.  
Naming all elements in the system prepares the analysist for performing the “failure” 
section of the SEFA. 
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Identifying the behavioral function of the element should come directly from the item 
definition. If elemental functions are identified during the SEFA it should be updated in the item 
definition.  
“Failing” each element individually is the first analytical step in this analysis and 
involves considering the impact on all other elements within the system. To fail the element, the 
analysist places a “0” in the associated “Item No. Operating State” column, then moves along the 
same row considering the state impact of each element listed. In this step, “0” means the element 
does not provide functionality to system as a whole and “1” mean the element does provide 
functionality to the system as a whole 
Identifying the impact of the element fault simply states the system effects prior to any 
mitigation actions.  
Identifying the immediate resulting state prior to mitigation actions helps to identify how 
the vehicle will perform after the failure is incurred. Table 15 shows an example thus far of how 
the SEFA is performed. 
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Table 15. Example of SEFA template 1 of 2 with analysis using the PSI subsystem and a P3 architecture 
SEFA Applied to PSI Subsystem 











Impact of Item Fault 
Immediate 
Resulting State 
1 2 3 
1 Driveshaft Longitudinal shaft 
which transmits torque 
from 
engine/transmission to 
rear of vehicle 
0 0 0 No torque transfer from 
engine/motor to differential 
Vehicle decelerates 




2 Motor Provides torque at user 
request by converting 
onboard stored 
electrical energy into 
rotational motion. 
Allows for energy 
regeneration and 




1 0 1 Reduced power generation 
 
No torque generated from 
electrical energy transfer 
from ESS 
 





3 Engine Provide torque at 
request of operator by 
converting gasoline 
energy into kinetic 
motion 
1 1 0 Reduced power generation 
 
No torque generation from 
stored energy in fuel tank 
 





Identifying the potential safety hazard is identical to the hazard step in the DFMEA and 
PHA. The analysist should focus on hazards that pose a critical safety risk to the operator, 
passengers, pedestrians, environment, or property. Commonly used critical safety hazards 
include: 
 Unintended longitudinal or lateral motion, 
 Loss or degradation of propulsion, 
 Operator and/or passenger injury, 
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 Unintended exposure to toxic/flammable components, 
 Unintended exposure to HV. 
 
Determining diagnostic methods allows the analyst to consider how the fault will be 
identified and assists in structuring the testing procedure. Because of the number of new and 
modified systems, the diagnostic methods will rarely come from the commonly used OBD II port 
but will often come from newly implemented software verification and validation checks which 
should then notify the operator when a system is functioning outside of normal limits. 
Determining a mitigation action is particular to the fault and a product of the diagnostic 
method. In the ideal scenario, a software-identified corrective control action can provide an early 
diagnostic and mitigation action to prevent a safety hazard. If the unsafe control action cannot be 
diagnosed and mitigated from a controls perspective, then the operator would be required to 
perform the mitigation action. It was found that in any event, the operator must be allowed to 
override a corrective control action with minimal force and in short time.  
Immediately following the mitigation method, the safety analyst should document the system 
state to identify the vehicle operational range. To describe a few examples, this would specify if 
(after the particular failure) the vehicle were stopped, capable of drive or reserve, or has any 
propulsive ability. 
The final step in a SEFA analysis is determining and documenting the safety goals and 
functional requirements. This is similar to the safety goals and requirements step of the 
previously described HARA techniques but adds the diagnostic and mitigation wording into the 
requirement. The safety goal will restate the items function using the correct verbiage while the 
requirement will restate the failure of the function, impact of the fault, and the diagnostic and 
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mitigation method using correct verbiage. Table 16 describes an example of part 2 of the SEFA 
template as a continuation from Table 15 above. 
Table 16. Example of SEFA template 2 of 2 with analysis using the PSI subsystem and a P3 architecture 






























current to and 















such as smoke) 















speed and torque 
governor when 






via HSC when 
motor, battery 








Vehicle would be 




motor shut off 
occurs the vehicle 







To prevent motor 
failure due to 
overheating the EMC 
shall actuate thermal 
controls to maintain 
motor temperature 
within a specified limit  
 
To prevent motor 
failure due to over-
torque or over-speed, 
the HSC shall impose a 
governor to regulate to 
motor torque and speed 
to specified limits 
 
To prevent motor 
failure due to over-
current the EMC shall 
impose a governor to 
regulate the flow of 
current within specified 
limits of the motor and 
battery pack 
 
To prevent motor 
failure the operator 
shall be provided real-
time diagnostics and 




4.3.3 HARA applied using HazOP 
The HazOP is both an item-level and system-level hazard analysis technique used, in our 
example, by the PSI team to determine human-caused and difficult-to-detect hazards.  This 
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technique was used by the PSI team to analyze the mechanical, HV, and controls hardware 
systems. This is a two-part method using process parameters and guide words unique to the 
system being analyzed. Table 17 and Table 18 show the templates used to complete the HazOP. 
The steps to complete the HazOP are as follows: 
1. Identify the item or system being analyzed, 
2. Produce the process parameter and guide word chart, 
a. Identify process parameters specific to the item, 
b. Determine which guide words are applicable to the process parameter, 
3. Complete the HazOP table using the specific process parameter and guide word, 
a. Determine the deviation of the item, 
b. Determine the consequences of the deviation, 
c. Determine the causes of the deviation, 
d. Determine safeguards to the deviation, 
e. Determine and document the safety goal and requirement. 
 
Table 17. Template used to perform the process parameter chart of the HazOP 









of Reverse Early Late Before After Faster Slower More Less 
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Table 18. Template used to perform the HazOP 
HazOP Template 
Process Parameter applied to Item:           
Guide Word Deviation Consequences Causes Safeguards Requirement 
 
Identification of the item or system being analyzed will come directly from the item 
definition. In our case, a system-level HazOP was performed. The difference being, for example, 
the analysis was applied to the high voltage energy storage system rather than the HV 
components (i.e. wiring harness, battery pack) individually. 
The first step in producing the process parameter chart is to identify what process 
parameters apply to the specific system under analysis. For example, a high voltage system 
would have parameters such as temperature, current, voltage, clearance, or vibration while a 
controls software system would have signal, current, latency, noise, bandwidth, storage, or logic, 
to name a few. Table 19 describes the process parameters which can be used by each system 
while performing a HazOP. This can also be performed on specific system functions such as the 
LKA and ACC functions. 
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Table 19. Key process parameters and their associated systems  
 
Major Subsystems and Associated Process Parameters 











































































Determining which guide words are applicable is relatively straight-forward but not all 
guide words will be used for a specific parameter. If the parameter can be applied in the way the 
guide word indicates and poses a potential safety risk then it should be used. The guide words 
should not be selected if there is no resulting hazardous event. The analyst should use best 
judgment and has the freedom to add parameters and guide words as necessary. Table 20 
demonstrates an example of the process parameter and guide word combination chart for a HV 
system.  
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Reverse Early Late Before After Faster Slower More Less 
NVH         X  X  
Temperature           X X 
Current X  X X X X     X X 
Voltage X  X        X X 
Clearance           X X 
Unauthorized 
Access 
          X  
 
Completing the HazOP table using the specific process parameters and guide words is the 
next step of this HARA activity. The table is very similar to the previous analysis methods in that 
the analysist identifies the deviation, consequence, causes, safeguards or mitigation methods, and 
requirements based on the application of the parameter and guide word. 
Determining the deviation can be accomplished simply by stating the guide word and 
parameter in a way which describes a fault to the system or item under investigation. For 
example, the deviation could be, “No voltage to input terminal”. 
Determining the consequences of the deviation is identical to the effects columns of the 
PHA, DFMEA, and SEFA activities described previously. Commonly used safety-critical 
consequences are listed under the descriptions of the PHA and DFMEA and typically involve 
unintended movements and or injury to the operator or passengers. 
Determining the causes of the deviation is not a restating of the guide word and 
parameter but rather a brainstorming as to the reasons for the guide word action. This describes 
how the deviation occurs and can be anything from hardware item failure, obstructed sensor 
view, or software failures. Assuming the causes of deviation is a critical step to determining 
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safeguards and ultimately producing the requirement. Time should be allocated to discussion 
with subject matter experts to produce a comprehensive list of possibilities. 
Determining safeguards to the cause of the deviation will have the greatest impact on the 
requirement. The safeguard is a description of the preventative and corrective measures used to 
identify and mitigate the hazard, either by producing a reduction in severity or occurrence. Broad 
examples of safeguards can be software control actions, implementation of manual emergency-
stop switches, or an increase in the factor of safety for mechanical items. 
Producing the requirement will be a restating of the deviation, cause, and safeguard using 
the common system safety verbiage. Table 21 shows a partial example of the HazOP table when 
temperature stimulus is applied to the HV system. 
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Table 21. Partial HazOP analysis when a temperature stimulus is applied to a HV system 
Process Parameter applied to Item:     Apply temperature stimuli to the HV system 
Guide 
Word 




































































The high voltage 






will be validated 
during SIL, HIL, 
and closed course 
testing 
 
The high voltage 
harness will be as 










The high voltage 
system will 
provide real-time 
feedback to the 
operator 
 
The operator will 
have a high 
voltage system 
emergency-power-
off switch  
To avoid operation outside of 
min/max temperature range all 
necessary high-voltage 
components shall operate 
within specified temperature 
limits 
 
To avoid operation outside of 
min/max temperature range the 
high voltage system shall be 
thermally controlled 
 
To avoid operation outside of 
min/max temperature range the 
thermal control software shall 
be validated during SIL, HIL, 
and closed course testing 
 
To avoid software controls 
signal failure causing high 
voltage system operation 
outside of min/max 
temperature range the high 
voltage harness shall be as 
short as possible, have 
sufficient clearance from 
electrical machinery, and use 
sufficiently fast signal transfer 
medium 
 
To avoid operation outside of 
min/max temperature range the 
high voltage system shall  
provide real-time feedback to 
the operator 
 
To avoid operation outside of 
min/max temperature range the 
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4.3.4 HARA applied using STPA 
The STPA is a system-level analysis, and was performed on the LKA system because of the 
large amount of controls impact on the vehicle. The STPA helps to develop a safer control 
structure by identifying unsafe control actions, causal factors, and control weaknesses. Table 22 
shows the template used to complete the STPA. The steps to completing an STPA include: 
1. Produce a block diagram of the relevant system, 
2. Compete the STPA template of the desired system or item, 
a. Identify control functions of the system, 
b. Determine unsafe control actions (UCAs), 
c. Identify potential hazards for each UCA, 
d. Identify the causal factors, 
e. Determine prevention and mitigation methods, 
f. Document the requirements. 
 
Table 22. Template used to perform the STPA 
STPA Template 












Creating a block diagram is a critical step in the understanding of the control flow for 
software heavy systems. It assists in identifying potentially hazardous dependencies, interfaces, 
and interactions. It is important to emphasize that STPA should not be applied at the item-level, 
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and this block diagram should document system-level interactions. This diagram should be a 
living document, modifiable as the STPA and control structure evolves.  
Completing the STPA template requires a strong working knowledge of how the system 
functions under various operational states or UCAs. It is encouraged that this analysis be 
completed using a cross-functional safety working group. Those who have low-level technical 
knowledge of how the system functions and reacts to failures will provide insight for causal 
factors and possible prevention and mitigation methods.  
Identifying the control functions of the system describes how the system works, inputs, 
outputs, dependencies, and interfaces. Determining functions can produce a large amount of 
variability and different analysts will produce different results. Think about the functions in the 
order that they occur and consider if it is reasonable to consolidate multiple functions into a 
single function. Using the example of an LKA system the functions may be the following: 
1. The operator initiates the LKA system. 
2. The LKA sensors perform lane-line, object detection, and multi-feature tracking. 
3. The LKA sensors send gathered data to the LKA computer. 
4. The LKA computer performs sensor fusion data verification & validation using 
developed algorithms and NNs. 
5. The LKA computer determines and sends appropriate corrective control action to the 
supervisory controller. 
6. The LKA system provides real-time feedback to the operator via haptic, audio, and visual 
stimuli. 
7. The LKA system may control lateral movement via the EPS system. 
8. The LKA system may control lateral movement via the EBCM system. 
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9. The operator disables the LKA system. 
 
In the example above, the functions are described in the order that they occur beginning with 
the enabling of the LKA system and ending with the eventual disabling. But where does the 
extent of a function end? This can be difficult to determine. If the EPS is an item of the LKA 
system then could we have included the actions and interfaces of the EPS system? If so, function 
7 from the above list may continue as so: 
7.1 The supervisory controller sends corrective control action to the EPS. 
7.2 The EPS controller verifies the steering and steering-torque sensor output. 
7.3 The EPS controller sends a corrective control action torque request actuating the EPS 
motor. 
7.4 The EPS motor resolver sensor sends motor rotational data to the EPS controller. 
7.5 The EPS controller determines the corrective control action is met and halts actuation. 
 
This amount of detail in a systems function is determined by the depth and breadth of the 
analysis and is not necessary for our purposes at the University level because the EPS system is 
stock and not modified in any way. In general, this step can be guided by or contribute to the 
block diagram in understanding functional flow. Typically, the block diagram will feed the 
understanding of the system functions and performing the “identifying functions” task will 
produce modifications to the block diagram. 
Determining the UCAs can involve using the four common UCAs or developing unique 
UCAs that better fit the functions of the system under analysis. In the automotive industry the 
four common functional UCAs used are: 
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1. Required but not provided, 
2. Provided but not required, 
3. Provided but incorrect timing, 
4. Provided but incorrect duration. 
 
UCAs guide the analyst through an exploratory but controlled investigation of how 
functional deviations can occur. The analyst should maintain focus on the scope for the particular 
UCA. From the above list, UCA3 and UCA4 can have overlap and cause redundancies within 
the analysis. UCA3 is asking the analyst to consider that the function under investigation be 
provided late or early while UCA4 is asking to consider that the function under investigation be 
provided for too-long or too-short a period of time. 
Identification of UCA-specific hazards is the point at which this unique HARA technique 
becomes like the HARA techniques mentioned previously. Similar to the previous techniques, 
the analyst should focus on hazards which may produce unintended vehicle movement, damage 
or injury to the operator, passengers, property, or the environment. 
Identification of casual factors will inform the prevention and mitigation method. The STPA 
was performed on controls and software systems which produced a few common causal factors: 
 Power failure, 
 Signal corruption, 
 Wiring failure (not proper gauge, installation or manufacturing failure), 
 Operating system failure, 
 Unintended access or physical damage (liquid, puncture), 
 Algorithm, Neural Network, computational, or cyber-security failure, 
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 Sensor visibility obstruction or failure. 
 
Along with some common casual factors, unique causal factors specific to the UCA and 
associated hazard were also identified. These eventually lead to a set of STPA-derived 
requirements not found by performing other HARA techniques. 
Determining prevention and mitigation methods is a direct product of the function, hazard, 
and especially the causal factors. Generally, there is at least one prevention and mitigation 
method for each causal factor.  
Documenting requirements is the final step in completing the STPA template. A requirement 
is often a rewording of the prevention and mitigation method. Similar to the previous HARA 
techniques, the automotive industry uses specific verbiage during this formal part of the analysis. 
The requirements list will be the document which is viewed by the development teams. A brief 
example of a partially completed STPA template for an LKA system is listed in Table 23. 
Table 23. Example of a STPA on the LKA system 





























When the speed and 
operational 
environment allow, 
the LKA initiation 
procedure will be 
clearly defined to the 
operator via audio 
and visual alert with 
minimal required 




To prevent a failure to 
initiate the LKA system, 
when the speed and 
operational environment 
allow, the LKA initiation 
procedure shall be 
clearly defined to the 
operator via audio and 
visual alert with minimal 
required actions by the 
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This documented requirement demonstrates how the failure of the control function and 
the prevention and mitigation method are incorporated to define the specific functional 
requirement.   
 
4.4 Safety Goals and the Elicitation of Functional Requirements 
The elicitation of safety goals and functional requirements is the final work product to 
come out of the concept phase for the systems safety process. These requirements set the safety 
rules for the systems development teams. They are specific to the individual systems which were 
analyzed during the HARA activities and are traceable throughout the systems lifecycle. Safety 
goals are high-level safety requirements of the item. Similar to conventional functional 
requirements on the item function, these safety goals describe how the item or system safely 
behaves.  Each system will have many safety goals and each safety goal will have at least one 
functional requirement.  In addition to this, technical requirements and a verification and 
validation procedure will be developed for each functional requirement. The requirement-
specific test plan will provide traceability and build evidence for the risk informed safety case 
presented at the end of the systems safety process. 
During this thesis, safety goals and functional requirements were developed for the ACC, 
CAVs, CSMS, LKA, PSI HV, and PSI Mechanical systems. Through the analysis it was found 
that safety goals are a top-level, item-specific claim, which states that the item functions will 
operate safely and avoid unreasonable risk. In all the HARA techniques discussed in this paper, 
not one allows for a place to define a safety goal. Through the analysis, in an effort to create 
consistency among the various HARA activities, the safety goal would be derived primarily from 
the items function and in some cases through the fault or hazard of the function. 
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The requirements produced out of the HARA activity would become the functional 
requirements. These describe how the safety goal will be met, free from unreasonable risk. 
Although there are many unique safety-critical requirements which were found during the 
HARA activities some requirements may appear to be common sense or repetitive. Without these 
thoroughly documented, the development team may overlook a small but critical aspect effecting 
the items functionality. This could result in unnecessary hazards or eventual failures causing 
injury, redesign, wasted time, manpower, or money.  
 
4.4.1 Lane Keeping Assist System Safety Goals and Functional Requirements 
The LKA safety goals and functional requirements were produced from a DFMEA and 
STPA on the LKA system. The analysis elicited 8 safety goals and 189 unique functional 
requirements. The safety goals are a close derivative of the systems functions. These high-level 
goals seen in Table 24 dictate how the LKA system will safely operate. A comprehensive list of 
all LKA system safety goals and functional requirements can be found in Appendix 4.4. 
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Table 24. Safety goals of the LKA system 
LKA System Safety Goals 
SG No. Safety Goal 
SGL01 The LKA system shall safely control lateral movement via the EBCM system 
 
SGL02 The LKA shall safely control lateral movement via the EPS system 
 
SGL03 The LKA shall perform lane-line, object detection and multi-feature tracking 
 
SGL04 The LKA sensors shall transmit data to the associated controller 
 
SGL05 The operator shall enable and disable the LKA system 
 
SGL06 The LKA system shall provide feedback to the operator (LKA status, haptic, visual, audio) 
 
SGL07 The LKA computer shall perform sensor fusion data verification & validation  
 
SGL08 The LKA computer shall send control action decisions to the associated controller 
 
Typically the LKA system controls lateral movement either by braking the wheel 
opposite of the lane deviation which uses the EBCM or by providing a torque to the steering 
system which uses the EPS. The DFMEA and the STPA analyzed both options and produced the 
results seen in Table 25. Controlling lateral movement via the EBCM is shown produce a greater 
potential for a fault. This is because the EBCM analysis produced a greater number of 
requirements and because the braking system has more interfacing and interacting components 
when compared to the EPS. The results state that the LKA system will provide corrective control 
actions through the EPS system. 
Table 25. Number of requirements for lateral control using the EBCM vs. the EPS 
LKA System Lateral Control Requirements 
 Using the EBCM Using the EPS 
No. of 
Requirements 20 17 
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Some requirements were developed which state how the sensors shall be installed to 
minimize potentially obstructive views. Some requirements state that the LKA system needs to 
alert the operator when the LKA system is not operational based on external environmental 
factors (operational speed, fog, poor lane-line visibility), or that the LKA system wiring will be 
installed according to manufacturer specification to include bend radii, heat shielding, EMI 
avoidance, proper gauge, and interfacing connections. 
Less apparent requirements found through the analysis were that the LKA systems 
outward facing camera will be mounted on the interior of the windshield within the operational 
area of the windshield wipers. The LKA system will also have a secondary control of the 
windshield wipers because the operator may not be aware if the cameras field of view is 
obstructed by a small piece of debris. The LKA system will maintain a secondary control of the 
headlights in the scenario where a low-light event obstructs the sensors visibility. It was also 
found that the LKA feedback system should use at least two forms of feedback to alert the driver 
of lane deviation.  
It was determined that the timing, duration, and level of feedback stimulus will be based 
on an assessment of operator engagement. Operator engagement will be determined by an on-
board operator-monitoring camera. This camera will read and analyze the amount of head tilt, 
eye deviation, and hands-on-wheel engagement. Assessing driver responsiveness is a current 
subject of research with numerous questions outstanding. If the feedback stimulus is too great 
will the operator be startled and create a hazardous situation? What is the correct timing to 
provide feedback based on operator engagement, and at what audio, visual, or haptic levels? The 
answer is operator dependent but testing can be conducted, and a consensus formed, on levels 
and timing of feedback. There is also potential for the feedback system to learn the operator’s 
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response times, possibly based on factors such as time of day, and adjust accordingly. Table 26 
describes a partial list of the unique LKA system requirements. 
Table 26. Example of LKA system safety goals and their associated functional requirements 
LKA System Safety Goals and Functional Requirements 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGL02 The LKA system shall safely 
control lateral movement via 
the EPS system 
FSRL02.02 The LKA EPS response system shall respond 
(feedback, lateral movement) more quickly in the 
event of less operator engagement (hands on wheel, 
head tilt, eye deviation) 
 
FSRL02.04 The LKA EPS response system shall allow the 
operator to override automated controls with minimal 
steering engagement 
 
SGL03 The LKA shall perform lane-
line, object detection and 
multi-feature tracking 
FSRL03.02 The LKA system shall monitor the operators 
engagement to include head tilt, hands-on-wheel, and 
eye deviation 
 
FSRL03.07 To avoid sensor visibility obstruction the LKA system 
shall have control of the wind shield wipers 
 
FSRL03.08 To avoid sensor visibility obstruction the LKA system 
shall have control of the headlights 
 
SGL05 The operator shall initiate the 
LKA system 
FSRL05.04 To prevent accidental disabling of the LKA system, 
the LKA system shall have a safeguard such as 
individual on/off buttons 
 
FSRL05.09 Turn-indicator actuation shall be required for free 
movement out of lane, otherwise feedback will warn 
operator 
 
SGL06 The LKA system shall 
provide feedback to the 
operator (LKA status, haptic, 
visual, audio) 
FSRL06.07 The LKA system audio feedback shall adjust to 
ambient volume (stereo system, excessive cabin 
noise) 
 
4.4.2 Adaptive Cruise Control System Safety Goals and Functional Requirements 
The ACC safety goals and requirements were produced from a DFMEA. The analysis 
elicited 7 independent safety goals and 86 unique requirements. The high-level safety goals are 
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reflective of detailed ACC functions which are shown in Table 27. A comprehensive list of all 
ACC system safety goals and functional requirements can be found in Appendix 4.1. 
Table 27. Safety goals of the ACC system 
ACC System Safety Goals 
SG No. Safety Goal 
SGA01 The ACC system shall safely control longitudinal velocity via braking 
 
SGA02 The ACC system shall safely control longitudinal velocity via throttle position or APP 
 
SGA03 The ACC sensors shall observe surrounding traffic/object distance, velocity, size and position to 
include operator engagement 
 
SGA04 The ACC system shall transmit sensor data to associated controller 
 
SGA05 The Operator shall determine and set the ACC system velocity constraint 
 
SGA06 The Operator shall determine and set the ACC system distance constraint 
 
SGA07 ACC system shall provide feedback to the operator (ACC status, haptic, visual, audio) 
 
The ACC and LKA systems provide a corrective action for longitudinal and lateral 
movement respectively. These systems are similar in that they use CAVs sensors and computers 
for data gathering and validation, then determine and send a corrective control actions to the 
CSMS supervisory controller. The LKA analysis used a DFMEA and STPA while the ACC 
analysis used only a DFMEA. The value of the STPA can be seen in Table 28, the amount of 
unique requirements produced for the LKA system versus the amount for the ACC system.  
Table 28. Number of requirements produced for the LKA vs. the ACC system using select HARA techniques 
 
LKA analysis 




Requirements 189 86 
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The difference in number of unique requirements for the two very similar LKA and ACC 
systems between the DFMEA and the STPA analysis methods is notable. It implies that the ACC 
system should undergo an STPA analysis to more thoroughly investigate the requirements 
elicitation. 
The ACC system will require the control of both the accelerator pedal or throttle position 
and the braking system. It was determined in the LKA and PSI Mechanical analysis that the 
braking system provides a relatively great potential for fault but in this case there is no option but 
to use the EBCM system. As you will see in the PSI Mechanical analysis, because the braking 
system is largely unmodified the requirements to ensure safe operation are focused on proper 
installation and maintenance. In the case of the ACC system, requirements were found which can 
minimize the potential braking fault. An example of this is when a braking corrective control 
action is required, the system shall ensuring that the EBCM engages in a timely manner such that 
the controls do not put undue stress on the braking system and components. A timely braking 
control action will also ease operator and passenger discomfort. This can be done by ensuring 
brake lines are flooded early and are immediately able to be actuated in anticipation of a 
corrective action.  
Through the analysis it was found that the operator shall be able to override the ACC 
automated controls with minimal braking or acceleration pedal engagement. Variations in the 
sensitivity of this override will need to be tested on a closed course and the program will need to 
be adjusted accordingly.  
A primary safety concern discovered during the analysis was the distance and speed at 
which the ACC system should control a corrective braking action. If the program is not 
thoroughly vetted then the program can operate reliably but still put the vehicle in a hazardous 
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scenario. This is found to have serve safety implications to the operator, the vehicle, and the 
environment. It will require many iterations of controls testing to determine optimal braking 
actuation as a function of vehicle speed, vehicle load, distance from the object, and operator 
engagement.   
A safety critical requirement can be seen in FSRA01.14 in Table 29. This describes that 
the corrective braking action needs to respond earlier in the event that there is less operator 
engagement. A harsher corrective braking response will startle the operator who may then make 
an immediate unsafe control decision such as slam on the brakes.  Like the LKA system, 
operator engagement is measured by head tilt, eye deviation, and hands-on-wheel. Operator 
engagement will also determine the timeliness and level of feedback stimuli. Other unique ACC 
system requirements can be found in Table 29. 
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Table 29. Example of the ACC system safety goals and functional requirements 
ACC System Safety Goals and Functional Requirements 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGA01 The ACC system shall safely 
control longitudinal velocity 
via braking 
FSRA01.01 The ACC system shall allow operator to override 
automated controls with minimal braking engagement 
 
 FSRA01.14 The ACC brake response system shall respond 
(feedback, longitudinal movement) more quickly in 
the event of less operator engagement (hands on 
wheel, head tilt, eye deviation) 
 
SGA07 The ACC system shall  
provide feedback to the 
operator (ACC status, haptic, 
visual, audio) 
FSRA07.03 The ACC system shall alert operator when deviation 
from set distance or velocity occurs 
 
 FSRA07.08 The ACC system visual feedback shall adjust to 
ambient light (decrease during night, increase during 
day) 
 
SGA03 The ACC sensors shall 
observe surrounding 
traffic/objects distance, 
velocity, size and position to 
include operator engagement 
FSRA03.10 The ACC system shall only be operational if sensor 
performance meets a minimum standard 
(communication speed, sensor availability or 
visibility) 
 
4.4.3 CAVs Safety Goals and Requirements 
The CAVs safety goals and functional requirements were produced from a HazOP and 
PHA. The analysis elicited 31 independent safety goals and 243 unique requirements. A sample 
of the high-level safety goals are shown in Table 30. A comprehensive list of all CAVs safety 
goals and requirements can be found in Appendix 4.2. 
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Table 30. Example of CAVs safety goals 
CAVs Safety Goals 
SG No. Safety Goal 
SGC01.1 The Intel Tank Computer shall be responsible for blending various sensors (cameras, radars) data to 
achieve reliable, high-definition images 
 
SGC01.3 The Intel Tank Computer shall be responsible for determining if control action (EPS torque, 
braking, feedback) is required 
 
SGC02.2 The Intel Mobileye 6 camera shall perform multi-feature tracking 
 
SGC03.1 The Bosch Front, Rear, and Corner MRR Radars shall perform early front, rear, and corner speed 
detection 
 
SGC08.2 The Zed camera shall perform 6-axis positional tracking to sense space and motion  
 
The CAVs primary function is to determine potentially hazardous scenarios, such as lane 
deviation, and decide if a corrective control action is required. This is done through lateral and 
longitudinal control by the use of the LKA and ACC systems which were analyzed and described 
in the previous sections. The safety goals produced here pertain to the CAVs item functions and 
controls hardware itself. Those items include the Intel Tank computer, Intel Mobileye 6 camera, 
Bosch front and rear radar, Bosch medium range corner radars, Intel Movidius neural compute 
stick, KVaser, Niles operator-monitoring camera, real-time display, ZED depth perception 
camera, and the GPS module.  
The requirements produced alert the development team to potential failures of the item 
functions and offer preventative measures. These include failure causes such as: 
 wiring failures, 
 unintended access or physical damage to the item, 
 power failures, 
 algorithm, neural network, computational, or cyber security failures, 
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 memory failures, 
 over-heating, 
 signal corruption. 
The requirements developed relate directly to these failure causes and include software 
technical standards by which the CAVs development team should derive their program. Some of 
these technical standards include a sensors horizontal field of view, sensors speed accuracy, and 
cycle time. Other safety concerns were found in understanding and designing for signal latency, 
noise, quality, and bandwidth. This analysis also produced mounting, installation, and wiring 
requirements.  Table 31 describes a brief example of the safety goals and a sample of the 
associated functional requirements. 
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Table 31. Example of the CAVs safety goals and functional requirements 
CAVs Safety Goals and Functional Requirements 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGC01.2 
 
The Intel Tank Computer 
shall be responsible for 
performing sensor fusion 
data verification & 
validation using developed 
algorithms and NNs 
FSRC01.06 The development team shall ensure the Intel Tank  
computer only makes corrective action decisions 
when fidelity of image meets minimum specified 
resolution 
 
 FSRC01.07 The development team shall ensure if the Intel 
Tank computer fails, it does not prevent vehicle 
from manual driving operations 
 
 FSRC01.12 To prevent unintended access and physical damage 
the development team shall ensure the Intel Tank 
computer is inaccessible by passengers 
 
 FSRC01.47 To prevent an Intel Tank computer operating 
system crash the development team shall ensure the 
program is developed such that it does not attempt 
to access an incorrect memory address leading to 




The Bosch Front, Rear, and 
Corner MRR Radars shall 
safely perform early front, 
rear, and corner speed 
detection 
FSRC03.19 To reduce radar signal noise the development team 
shall ensure the use of wire shielding and conduit 
 
 FSRC03.27 The development team shall ensure the integrated 
program accounts for radar horizontal field of view 
and elevation (±6° (160m), ±6°(100m), ±10°(60m), 
±25°(36m), ±42°(12m)) 
 
SGC08.3 The Zed camera shall 
perform large-scale 3D 
mapping 
FSRC08.14 To reduce ZED camera signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the use of 
automotive industry standard filtering techniques 
 
The CAVs functions carry critical safety concerns to include determining and requesting 
automated corrective control actions which were mentioned in the LKA and ACC analysis. 
Being a student built vehicle without the expertise, time, manpower, equipment, and financial 
backing to thoroughly investigate the use of automated driving functions, the development team 
should err on the side of caution when implementing the timeliness and magnitude of a 
corrective control action request. The analysis determined that based on the university “skill 
level” the CAVs controls should, in typical operational scenarios such as routine driving on a 
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highway, provide preemptive control action requests and operator feedback. The CAVs 
development team will implement a data validation, distance, speed, and deviation buffer which 
ensures the vehicles control action decisions are truly corrective and accomplished in a manner 
which reduces the potential hazard. This can be completed by ensuring the Intel tank computer 
determines the fidelity of blended and non-blended images before deciding on control actions. 
The CAVs controls will implement minimum standards for sensor data resolution, quality, noise, 
and latency. The operator will always be aware of the “on/off” status of the CAVs controls. It is 
also imperative that the operator is capable of easily overriding a control action request either by 
actuation of the steering wheel, acceleration pedal, brake pedal, or turn signal. 
 
4.4.4 CSMS Safety Goals and Functional Requirements 
The CSMS safety goals and functional requirements were produced from a DMFEA and 
STPA. The analysis elicited 24 independent safety goals and 109 unique requirements. A sample 
of the high-level safety goals are shown in Table 32. A comprehensive list of all CSMS safety 
goals and functional requirements can be found in Appendix 4.3. 
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Table 32. Example of the CSMS safety goals 
CSMS Safety Goals 
SG No. Safety Goal 
SGS01.2 The HSC shall safely control engine/EM torque split 
 
SGS01.5 The HSC shall modify stock signals 
 
SGS02.1 The ECM shall safely control engine torque output as requested by the HSC through regulation of 
current 
 
SGS05.3 The BMS shall protect against over-current, over-voltage, under-voltage, and over-temperature 
 
SGS09.1 The APPS shall monitor the position of the accelerator pedal and transmit a torque request 
 
SGS10.1 The low voltage system shall control all auxiliary functions to include air bags, windshield wipers, 
instrument cluster, lights, entertainment system, turn signals, haptic feedback, security system, 
pumps, fans, controller and DAQ 
 
The primary function of CSMS is to safely control vehicle longitudinal and lateral motion 
by controlling all associated controllers from a hybrid supervisory controller (HSC).  
Longitudinal motion is controlled by the HSC through the use of a torque split between the EM 
and engine. Lateral motion is also controlled by the HSC through the use of the EPS. Additional 
functions of CSMS are energy management optimization and to manage auxiliary functions such 
as windshield wipers, fans, pumps, and the DAQ. The HSC is the primary controller determining 
all safety critical vehicle operations to include acceleration, deceleration, steering, braking, 
corrective control actions, HV controls, and thermal control systems. Items of CSMS include the 
HSC, ECM, TCM, EMC, EBCM, BMS, EPS, low-voltage systems, OBC, OBD II, CAN bus, 
and the APPS.  
CSMS is the most safety critical system on the vehicle because of its ability to cause 
unintended longitudinal or lateral motion and the potential for a thermal control failure to cause 
HV thermal runaway. The HARA activities investigated CSMS item functions, control 
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strategies, and hardware items. Some of the safety-critical requirements of CSMS are associated 
with: 
 Controls software development and integration, 
 Implementing a propulsive request in coordination with the TCM, ECM, EMC, EBCM, 
EPS, and the APPS, 
 Implementing automated corrective control action requests. 
 
To ensure safe vehicle control, the analysis determined that CSMS software and programing 
hazards can be prevented and mitigated through robust software modeling, simulation, and a 
V&V plan. The approach to safe vehicle functionality will be, in part, through iterative modeling 
and simulation activities. This iterative approach is designed to validate the controls software 
program and will be accomplished through the use of model in the loop, software in the loop, 
hardware in the loop, vehicle in the loop,  closed course testing, and then open course testing.   
Constraints of vehicle performance such as minimum 0-60 acceleration and emissions output 
provide additional safety concerns as the vehicle must be capable of open road certification. 
Safety analysis also found requirements for self-imposed constraints which must be 
implemented. These allow the vehicle to meet the open road certification constraints while 
operating in the safest possible manner. A few of the self-imposed constraints are shown below. 
 Torque limitations on the EM and engine, 
 Temperature limitations on the engine, EM, EMC, and battery pack, 
 Speed limitations on the engine and EM, 
 Current constraints on the EM, EMC, OBC, and battery pack. 
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Common failure causes of CSMS software were signals, algorithm, computation, or logic 
faults. Automotive programing and installation standards will be used to reduce the risk of these 
types of failures. A partial list of common causes of failure for CSMS controls and their 
associated prevention and mitigation requirements can be seen in Table 33. 
Table 33. Common CSMS failure causes and their associated prevention and mitigation methods 
CSMS Failure Causes and Prevention/Mitigation Methods 
Cause Prevention/Mitigation Method 
Signals Failure (quality, 
latency, noise, bandwidth) 
- Ensure use of high quality transmission medium and appropriate gauge to  
handle expected throughput (load) 
 
- Ensure wires are efficiently routed and as short as possible 
 
- Ensure wires are kept away from electrical machinery 
 
- Ensure use of wire shielding and conduit 
 
- Ensure use of proper wire grounding practices 
 
- Ensure use of filtering 
 
- Ensure security of wire and controller connection 
 
Algorithm, NN, 
Computational, or Logic 
Failure 
- Ensure robust V&V plan (automotive industry standard is one defect per 
1000 executable lines of code) 
 
- Ensure use of automotive software development standards 
 
- Ensure use of multiple software scanning tools (Jarvis) to identify 
vulnerability and error in program code 
 
- Ensure control of computational overflow and rounding errors 
 
- Ensure use of data validity checks and redundancies 
 
4.4.5 PSI HV & Mechanical Safety Goals and Functional Requirements 
PSI safety goals and functional requirements were produced from SEFA, PHAs, 
DFMEAs, and HazOPs on the HV and mechanical systems. In total the PSI HARA activities 
produced 39 individual safety goals and 529 unique requirements.  
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The PSI HV safety analysis created 20 individual safety goals and 314 unique 
requirements around the individual components and the HV energy system as a whole. HV 
components to which safety goals and requirements were developed include the battery pack, 
enclosure, junction box, wiring harness, BMS, OBC, EM, and the EMC. A sample of the high-
level PSI HV safety goals are shown in Table 34. A comprehensive list of all PSI HV safety 
goals and requirements can be found in Appendix 4.5. 
Table 34. Example of the PSI HV safety goals 
PSI High Voltage Safety Goals 
SG No. Safety Goal 
SGH01 The HV battery pack shall safely store and supply energy to the EM 
 
SGH02 The HV enclosure shall safely contain enclosed components through the prevention of unintended 
horizontal or vertical movement and unauthorized access 
 
SGH05.2 The BMS shall safely monitor and report the data of the HV ESS voltage, temperature, SOC, and 
current 
 
SGH07.1 The EMC shall safely control the supply of current to the EM 
 
SGH08 The HV component clearance requirements shall be met to ensure safe vehicle operation 
 
SGH11 The magnitude of the current applied by the HV ESS when discharging shall match the current 
requested 
 
The HV system is developed and built in our labs at CSU to meet the specific 
requirements for the hybrid vehicle it will be a part of. The HV system provides critical safety 
concerns as a thermal runaway or unintended exposure to HV can cause risk to life, property, and 
the environment. Through the analysis, the primary sources of risk reduction was found to be 
proper training, installation, thermal control systems, and software controls limiting HV 
component temperatures, current, voltage, and torque. 
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The exploratory HazOP technique, when applied to the PSI HV system, produced safety 
goals outside of the standard functional safety goals that were seen in the DFMEA. A brief 
example of the unique safety goals and associated functional requirements can be seen in Table 
35.  
Table 35. Example of the PSI HV safety goals and their functional requirements 
PSI High Voltage 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGH01 The HV battery pack shall 
safely store and supply energy 
to the EM 
FSRH01.02 To prevent the HV battery pack from operating 
outside of the max/min temperature range the 
development team shall ensure actuation of battery 
pack thermal control system (fans) when the 
temperature reaches specified limit 
 
SGH02 The HV enclosure shall safely 
contain enclosed components 
through the prevention of 
unintended horizontal or 
vertical movement and 
unauthorized access 
 
FSRH02.08 To prevent the HV enclosure failure from improper 
installation and mounting of components the 
development team shall ensure component mounting 
hardware is fire retardant 
SGH04 The HV wiring harness shall 
safely transfer energy from 
the battery pack to the EM 
FSRH04.09 To prevent HV wiring harness over-current failure the 
development team shall ensure relays and fuses are in 
place and functional to prevent over drawing of 
current 
 
The PSI mechanical safety analysis produced 19 safety goals and 215 unique 
requirements. Particular focus was on the items and components which would be new or 
modified. The components to which safety goals and requirements were developed include the 
driveshaft, differential, engine, EM, transmission, vehicle body, suspension system, braking 
system, thermal system, power steering system, exhaust system, and the fuel system. A sample 
of the high-level PSI Mechanical safety goals are shown in Table 36. A comprehensive list of all 
PSI Mechanical safety goals and functional requirements can be found in Appendix 4.6. 
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Table 36.  Example of the PSI-Mechanical safety goals 
PSI Mechanical Safety Goals 
SG No. Safety Goal 
SGM03 The suspension system shall safely support the vehicle weight and absorb/reduce excess energy 
from road shock 
 
SGM04 The braking system shall inhibit vehicle motion, slow or stop a vehicle in motion, and keep 
stationary vehicles stopped 
 
SGM05 The thermal system shall detect and control cabin and component temperatures 
 
SGM07 The exhaust system shall safely assist in the removal of toxic gases, fumes and noise reduction 
 
SGM09 The applied torque magnitude shall match the torque magnitude requested 
 
SGM16 The current applied to the EM shall not exceed maximum operating parameter 
 
Many of the PSI Mechanical requirements produced include component specific installation 
and maintenance necessities. Maintenance requirements are listed in a vehicle technical 
inspection (VTI) which should be completed prior to vehicle operation. The VTI includes 
requirements such as ensuring proper fluid levels, no loose wiring, no leaks, no debris (snow, 
mud) build up, and low voltage auxiliary functionality. Common requirements found among the 
PSI Mechanical components which meeting the needs of safe installation practices include: 
 Load bearing mount modeling 
 Component shielding and enclosures to prevent unintended access or physical damage 
 Accurate interface angles for drive line components 
 Wire/tube bend radii and  the security of their interface connections  
 
Table 37 demonstrates and brief example of the PSI Mechanical system safety goals and 
functional requirements.  
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Table 37. Example of the PSI-Mechanical safety goals and their functional requirements 
PSI Mechanical 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGM05 The thermal system shall 
detect and control cabin and 
component temperatures 
FSRM05.05 To avoid engine overheating the development teams 
shall ensure thermal system is designed such that 
there is sufficient air flow to cool engine components 
 
SGM04 The braking system shall 
inhibit vehicle motion, slow 
or stop a vehicle in motion, 
and keep a stationary vehicle 
stopped 
 
FSRM04.02 To avoid brake pad failure the development team 
shall ensure brake pad bolts and mounting hardware 
are securely fastened and free from potential 
loosening or unintended movement 
 
SGM09 The applied torque magnitude 
shall match the torque 
magnitude requested 
FSRM09.01 The engine and EM shall split the torque magnitude 
requested based on associated map 
  







The system safety process is required by both the University and funding stakeholders for 
all advanced vehicle technology builds. Automotive systems safety procedures, analysis and 
findings are highly proprietary. While the structures of some safety procedures are publicly 
available, a comprehensive analysis is unavailable. In addition, there is a lack of continuity in the 




The intent of this work was to 1. Provide a University-level automotive system safety process 
by determining the most effective ways to develop a risk informed safety case 2. Create a cross-
functional safety working group procedure 3. Develop a comprehensive system safety analysis 
for a hybrid architecture advanced-vehicle build utilizing automated driving functions and 
advanced driver assistance systems 4. Determine an efficient and effective hazard analysis and 
risk assessment procedure for the various subsystems of a hybrid vehicle 5. Elicit safety goals 
and functional requirements. Through this investigative process a few notable contributions were 
made in the each of these areas.  
1. A University-level automotive system safety process was created using an investigation 
of various well established industry system safety procedures.  This developed process 
efficiently combines the most effective ways to develop a risk informed safety case. It 
provides a detailed description of the safety activities to be performed throughout the 
systems lifecycle. 
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2. A cross-functional safety working group procedure was created. This document outlines 
the way in which team-specific safety representatives will be selected, their duties within 
that role, and how they will incorporate a safety mindset into their specific team. It 
provides a delegation of HARA activities to include detailed templates, instructions for 
completing those templates, and examples to reference. Lastly, it gives guidance on 
documentation, traceability, and how to create a test plan. 
3. A comprehensive systems safety analysis was performed for each subsystem using a 
variety of HARA techniques to include DFMEA, PHA, HazOP, SEFA, and a STPA. This 
analysis provides all associated templates for future use and guidance for completion of 
the HARA activity. The detailed analysis documents the item definition and the item 
functions. It provides a complete documentation of the HARA investigation to include 
failure types, potential impacts, causes, and prevention, detection, and mitigation 
methods. 
4. Determining an efficient and effective HARA procedure for the specific subsystems was 
accomplished through an understanding of the comprehensive systems safety analysis. It 
provided comparisons of the inductive and exploratory approaches. This lead to the 
matching of specific HARA techniques to specific vehicle subsystems and the 
importance of at least one inductive and one exploratory approach for each subsystem. A 
key finding was that sub-teams should complete a DFMEA rather than a PHA. This is 
because the DFMEA investigates a detection mode and provides a risk priority number 
for easy identification of greater safety critical items. For exploratory techniques the 
STPA is ideal for software and control systems while the HazOP is superior when applied 
to mechanical or physical systems. 
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5. The elicitation of the safety goals and functional requirements specifies in detail how the 
development team should design, construct, install, and operate their system. It describes 
the method for deriving the safety goals and requirements from the item function, 
prevention, and mitigation methods.  
 
5.2 Future Work 
The results of this project fulfills the management and safety plan and concept phases of 
the CSU system safety process. Determining technical requirements is a necessary task which 
defines the detailed mechanics of the systems development. This requires manufacturer technical 
specifications and can be completed once the components have been selected. Once the technical 
requirements are documented the design and development will begin and a structured test plan 
for each requirement will be made and adhered to. When subsystems are validated and deemed 
safe for integration, the production phase will begin and whole-system testing will provide the 
last work products for the risk informed safety case. 
A thorough investigation into the safety-critical feature of the timeliness and magnitude 
of automated control actions is required. The timeliness and magnitude of the control action and 
feedback will be a product of the vehicle speed, operator engagement, external environmental 
conditions, and surrounding object locations and trajectory. This will require robust software, 
hardware, and in vehicle verification and validation. Bench testing on operator responsiveness to 
various feedback types, times, and magnitudes should be analyzed based on the operators 
engagement. In vehicle testing will be required to modify the LKA and ACC control action 
decisions. This can only be completed once the vehicle is fully functional and should be 
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Appendix 1 Management of Functional Safety – Complete 
Documentation 
Appendix 1.1 Safety Activities throughout the System Safety Lifecycle 
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Appendix 1.2 Cross-Functional Safety Procedure 
 






























































































Appendix 1.3 Roles and Responsibilities 
Management of Functional Safety 
 
Roles and Responsibilities 
Team:     Management  
Role Member Responsibilities 
Faculty Advisors Dr. Thomas 
Bradley 
 
Dr. Brett Windom 
 
Dr. Jason Quinn 
Oversee high-level mission activities and operate 
in a supervisory capacity. Define project scope, 
and manage requirements, planning, schedule, 
budget, and stakeholder engagement. 
Project Manger Gabriel Di 
Domenico 
 
Determines scope of work and high-level 
technical and functional goals.  Defines what work 
will be done and manages the development of the 
systems as a whole. 
Engineering Manager Troy Johnson Manages system-level requirements for CAVs 
CSMS and PSI teams. Determine 
system/component selection and implementation 
strategy. Over sees day-to-day concept, 
engineering, and development operations. 
Systems Safety Manager Matthew Knopf Develop system safety case through coordination 
with team system safety representatives. Performs 
safety analysis and determine safety requirements. 
Develop test plan and V&V methods. 
Team:    CAVs 
Role Member Responsibility 
CAVs & CSMS Graduate 
Advisor 
Vipin Kumar Provide team guidance and assist with bridging 
CSMS and CAVs 
GRA for Mechanical and 
CAVs 
Aaron Rabinowitz Assists with CAVs software and hardware 
implementation. Develop sensor validation 
methods. 
CAVs Graduate Advisor Joydeep Dey Develop CAVs framework design, and manage 
CAVs software and hardware implementations. 
CAVs Team Lead Haoying Wang Develop and integrate CAVs sensor architecture 
design, and CAVs software and hardware 
implementations 
CAVs Systems Safety 
Representative 
Hein Thant Develop system safety case. Perform safety 
analysis and determine safety requirements. 
Develop test plan and V&V methods. 
CAVs Vision Team 
Member 
Hein Thant Perform Matlab simulations, FOV scenarios, and 
DNN research. 
CAVs Vision Team 
Member 








Wes Taylor Assist with controller in coordination with rest of 
CAVs system; Assist in judging CAVs controller 
capability 
CAVs Mechanical team 
member  
Abdulla Alghfeli Perform wiring, CAD modeling, 3D printing, and 
mounting. 




Perform wiring, CAD modeling, 3D printing, and 
mounting. 
CAVs Engineer JT Bovee Perform CAVs software implementation. 
CAVs Engineer Shaolong Shi Develop and simulate sensor fusion algorithm 
Team:    CSMS 
Role Member Responsibilities 
CSMS Team Lead Nikki Machado Oversee high-level mission activities and operate 
in a supervisory capacity. Define project scope, 
and manage requirements, planning, schedule, 
budget, and stakeholder engagement. 
CSMS Technical Manager Josh Urban Development of controls software. Determine 
system/component requirements through software 
simulation 
CSMS Systems Safety 
Representative 
Grant Moore Develop system safety case. Perform safety 
analysis and determine safety requirements. 
Develop test plan and V&V methods. 
Team:    PSI 
Role Member Responsibilities 
PSI Co-Team Lead Nick Brunson-
Williams 
Provide high level technical advice, vendor 
communication, task development and delegation. 
PSI Co-Team Lead Brady Johnson Provide high level technical advice, vendor 
communication, task development and delegation. 
PSI System Safety Co-
Representative 
Ben Mckenney Provide technical support for powertrain team 
functions including safety documentation and 
brainstorming 
PSI System Safety Co-
Representative 
Wesley Martin Provide technical support for mechanical  team 
functions including safety documentation and 
brainstorming 















Appendix 1.4 Evidence of Competence 
CSU VIT Evidence of Competence 
Member Role Evidence of Competence 
Gabriel Di Domenico Powertrain Technical Manager Graduate research assistant involved in AVTC’s for 
the previous 3 years. Currently also in role as PM for 
EcoCAR MC. Advanced study of hybrid electric 
vehicle architecture. Involved in the development 
and build of a hybrid Chevrolet Camaro 
Troy Johnson Powertrain Technical Manager Graduate research assistant involved in FSAE as the 
PM role. Currently also in role as EM for EcoCAR 
MC. Advanced study of hybrid electric vehicle 
architecture.  
David Trinko Controls Technical Manager Graduate research assistant involved in hybrid 
controls development for previous 3 years. 
Advanced study of hybrid electric vehicle 
architecture. Integral part in the development of the 
controls for Toyota project. 
Matthew Knopf System Safety Manager Graduate research assistant involved in AVTC’s for 
the previous 2 years. Currently also in role as system 
safety manager for EcoCAR MC and acted in that 
role for EcoCAR 3. Involved in the development and 
build of a hybrid Chevrolet Camaro 
 
Appendix 1.5 Evidence of Quality Management 
It is critical to institute and maintain a quality management system to support functional 
safety. 
Quality management, across all phases of the safety lifecycle, includes the university and facilities 
overall safety management, the project dependent safety management, and safety management 
regarding production, operation, service, and decommissioning. 
Overall safety management ensures those responsible for performing safety activities in the 
safety lifecycle achieve the following objectives: 
 Institute and maintain a safety culture, 




 Institute and maintain adequate functional safety organizational rules and processes, 
 Ensure that the competence of the member is proportionate with their responsibilities. 
 
Project dependent safety management ensures that during the concept development phase and 
at the system, hardware, and software-levels, the organization achieves the following objectives: 
 Define safety activities for the system safety lifecycle, 
 Plan, coordinate, and track the progress of safety activities, 
 Create comprehensive safety cases in order to provide the argument for the achievement 
of functional safety, 
 Decide at the end of development if the item achieves the minimum acceptable level of 
safety to be released for production and operation. 
 
Safety management regarding production, operation, service, and decommissioning is a body 
of evidence, assembled from the previous work products, that justifies the systems level of safety. 
Appendix 1.6 Evidence of a Good Safety Culture 
Management of Functional Safety 
 
Evidence of a Good Safety Culture 
Examples indicative of a poor safety culture Examples indicative of a good safety culture 
Accountability is not tractability The process assures that accountability for decisions 
related to functional safety is documented and traceable 
Cost and schedule always take precedence over safety 
and quality 
Safety is the highest priority 
The reward system favors cost and schedule over safety 
and quality 
The reward system supports and motivates the effective 
achievement of functional safety 
The reward system penalizes those who take short cuts 




Personnel assessing safety, quality, and their governing 
processes are influenced unduly by those responsible for 
executing the processes 
The process provides adequate checks and balances 
- The appropriate level of independence in the 
safety, quality, verification, validation processes 
Passive attitude toward safety 
- Heavy dependence on testing at the end of the 
product development cycle 
- Management reacts only when there is a problem in 
the field 
Proactive attitude towards safety 
- Safety and quality issues are discovered and 
resolved from the earliest stage in the product 
lifecycle 
The required resources are not planned or allocated in a 
timely manner 
The required resources are allocated 
Skilled resources have the competence commensurate 
with the activity assigned 
- “Groupthink” 
- ‘Stacking the deck’’ when forming review groups 
- Dissenter is ostracized or labelled as “not a team 
player” 
- Dissent reflects negatively on performance reviews 
- “Minority dissenter” is labeled or treated as a 
“troublemaker”, “not a team player”, or a 
“whistleblower” 
- Concerned employees fear repercussion 
 
The process uses diversity to advantage 
- Intellectual diversity is sought, valued, and 
integrated in all processes 
- Behavior which counters the use of diversity is 
discouraged and penalized 
 
Supporting communication and decision-making 
channels exist and the management encourages their 
usage 
- Self-disclosure is encouraged 
- Disclosure of discovery by anyone else is 
encouraged 
- The discovery and resolution process continues in 
the field 
No systematic continuous improvement processes, 
learning cycles or other forms of “lessons learned” 
Continuous improvement is integral to all processes 
Processes are “ad hoc” or implicit A defined traceable and controlled process followed at 
all levels, including 
- Management 
- Engineering 
- Development interfaces 
- Verification 
- Validation 
- Functional safety audit 





Appendix 2 Item Definition – Complete Documentation 
 
Appendix 2.1 CAVs Item Definition 
CAVs Item Definition 
Item Sub-Item Functional Behavior 




- Feedback system 
 
- CSMS systems 
 
- PSI systems 
- Operator initiates LKA system 
 
- Performs lane-line, object detection and multi-
feature tracking 
 
- Sensors send data to associated computer 
 
- Computer performs sensor fusion data verification 
& validation using developed algorithms and NNs 
 
- Computer sends control action decision to 
associated controller 
 
- Provides feedback to the operator (LKA status, 
haptic, visual, audio) 
 
- Controls lateral movement via EBCM 
 
- Controls lateral movement via EPS 




- Feedback system 
 
- CSMS systems 
 
- PSI systems 
- Operator initiates ACC system and sets velocity 
and distance constraint 
 
- Monitors surrounding traffic/object distance, 
velocity, size and position  
 
- Monitors operator engagement  
 
- Sensors send data to associated computer 
 
- Computer sends control action decision to 
associated controller 
 
- Provides feedback to the operator (ACC status, 
haptic, visual, audio) 
 
- Controls longitudinal movement via EBCM 
 
- Controls longitudinal movement via throttle 
















- Blends various sensors (cameras, radars) data to 
achieve reliable, high-definition images  
 
- Performs sensor fusion data verification & 
validation using developed algorithms and NNs 
 
- Determines if control action (EPS torque, braking, 
feedback) is required 
 
- Sends control action request to associated 
controller 
 







- Eye-Watch Display 
 
- Sensor 
- Performs multi-feature tracking 
 
- Performs object and lane detection 
 
- Performs forward collision warning 
 
- Performs pedestrian collision warning 
 
- Performs headway warning 
 
- Performs traffic sign recognition 
 
- Sends data to associated controller 
 
- Provides a real-time display 
Bosch Front 
and Rear Radar 





- Performs early front and rear speed detection 
 
- Performs early front and rear position detection 
 









- Performs early corner speed detection 
 
- Performs early corner position detection 
 
- Sends data to associated controller 




- Fuse  
 
- Battery 




- USB plug 
 
- Sensor fusion algorithms  
 
- NNs 
- Performs vision processing tasks in assistance to 
Intel Tank computational capabilities 
 
- Assists in blending various sensors (cameras, 






 - Assists in performing sensor fusion data 
verification & validation 
 
- Assists in determining if control action (EPS 
torque, braking, feedback) is required 
 
- Offload DNN computation 
KVaser - Controller - Interfaces CAN signals to USB 





- Performs real-time monitoring of operator 
 








- Acquires sensor fusion images from associated 
controller 
 
- Displays sensors fusion images in real-time 





- Performs high-resolution depth perception 
 
- Performs 6-axis positional tracking to sense space 
and motion 
 
- Performs large-scale 3D mapping 
GPS module - Wires 
 
- Mount  
- Receives GPS data 
 
- Provides GPS data to associated controller 
 
Appendix 2.2 CSMS Item Definition 
CSMS Item Definition 
Item Sub-Item Functional Behavior 







- Acquires operator and various sensor inputs 
(APPS, gear, vehicle speed) 
 
- Controls all hybrid driving functions 
 
- Controls torque via engine/EM torque split using  
rules-based or PAE control strategy 
 
- Maintains SOC at appropriate level 
 
- Determines gear shifting 
 











- Controls engine torque output 
 
- Controls engine temperature 
 
- Controls A/F ratio 
 
- Controls idle speed 
 
- Controls electronic valve 







- Receives inputs from HSC, ECM, and various 
sensors (vehicle speed, wheel speed, throttle 
position) 
 
- Controls gear shifting 
 
- Monitors and regulates transmission thermal 
control system 







- Regulates supply of current to EM 
 
- Convert DC to AC 
 
- Controls direction of current 
 
- Monitor and regulates EM temperature 







- Powers auxiliary low-voltage systems to include 
power windows, power mirrors,  and air 
conditioning 







- Acquires operator and various sensor (wheel 
speed, brake switch) inputs 
 
- Actuates and controls the automatic braking 
system by a cycle of increasing and decreasing 
brake pressure 







- Ensure safe ESS operating conditions 
 




- Protects against over-current, over-voltage, under-
voltage, and over-temperature 
 
- Reporting data 
 




EPS - Steering angle sensor 
 












- Determines assisting steering power based on 
various inputs (driver steering torque request, 
steering wheel position, and vehicle speed) 
 
- Actuates motor to rotate steering gear which 
reduces torque required by the driver 
Low Voltage - Air bag 
 
- Windshield wipers 
 




- Entertainment system 
 
- Turn signals 
 
- Security system 
 
- Keyless entry 
 
- Power windows 
 
- Power mirrors 
 







- Acquires inputs from  the operator, environment, 
and various sensors 
 
- Controls all auxiliary functions to include air bags,  
windshield wipers, instrument cluster, lights, 
entertainment system, turn signals, haptic 
feedback, security system, pumps, fans, controller 
and DAQ 
 
- Controls thermal components 
 
- Controls data acquisition 


















- Provides list of vehicle parameters to monitor 
CAN bus - Wiring harness 
 
- Controllers 
- Transfers necessary signals such as EM speed, EM 
torque, EM temperature, EMC temperature, SOC, 





- Sensors - Monitors the position of the accelerator pedal and 
transmit a torque request 
 
Appendix 2.3 PSI HV Item Definition 
PSI HV Item Definition 








- Store and supply energy to EM 
Enclosure - Mounts 
 
- Thermal control/fans 
 
- Wiring ports 
 
- -Nema components 
- Contain HV components 
 
- Prevent horizontal and vertical free movement of 
HV components 
 
- Prevent unauthorized access to HV components 






- Nema components 
- Ease use for maintenance and consolidation of HV 
wire connections and relays 
Wiring - Mounts 
 
















- Ensure safe ESS operating conditions 
 
- Monitor ESS state (voltage, temperature, SOC, 
and current) 
 
- Reporting data 
 
- Controls/balances ESS environment 







- Controls charging to the HV battery pack 







- Regulates supply of current to EM 
 
- Convert DC to AC 
 
- Control direction of current 
 
Appendix 2.4 PSI Mechanical Item Definition 
PSI Mechanical Item Definition 
Item Sub-Item Functional Behavior 
Driveshaft - Yokes 
 










- Axle beam 
 




- Brake drum 
- Longitudinal shaft which transmits torque from 









- Provides power from driveshaft to wheels and 
allows wheels to rotate at different speeds 




- Upper arm 
 
- Stabilization bar 
 
- Radius rod 
 
- Driveshaft boot 
 
- Strut mount 
 
- Ball joint 
 
- Sway bar 
 
- Tires 
- Provides dynamic energy absorption of vertical 
force exerted on wheels by the change in road 
conditions   






- Wheel bearing 
 






- Master cylinder 
- Inhibits vehicle motion 
 
- Slows/stops moving vehicle 
 
- Keeps stopped vehicle stationary 






- Water pump 
 
- Transmission cooler 
 
- Reserve tank 
 
- Heater core 
 
- Thermostat/sensors 















- Fluid reservoir 
 
- Lines 
- Controls lateral movement of the vehicle 











- Removal of toxic gases/fumes and noise 
Engine - -Cylinder head cover 
 
- Intake/exhaust manifold 
 
- Oil filter 
 
- Water pump 
 
- Timing belt/gears 
 
- Oil pan/gasket 
 
- Engine block 
 




- Starter motor 
 
- Air intake 
 
- Furl rail/pump 
 
- Engine control module 




Motor - Fully assembled 
 




- Electric motor controller 
- Provide torque at request of operator  
 
- Allows for energy regeneration and transfer to the 
battery during negative torque events 
Transmission - Through shaft input/output 
 
- Oil pump 
 




- Transmission control module 
- Transfers power from engine to driveshaft 
 
- Gears change drive-wheel speed and torque in 
relation to engine speed and torque 










- Indicator pin 
- Enable smooth vehicle movement by transmitting 
torque from the engine to drivetrain 
Fuel - Tank/sensor gauge 
 












- Emissions canister 
- Store and supply fuel to engine 












- Allows access to and protects components in 
engine compartment 
 
- Allows operator to see in low light scenarios 
 
- Prevent debris from being thrown into air by 
rotating tire 
 
- Allows access to/from cabin and protects operator 
from environment and debris 
 




- Tail lights 
 






- Signals turning and braking 
 
- Allows for operator to have surrounding view 
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Appendix 3 HARA – Complete Documentation 
Appendix 3.01 HARA CAVs / CSMS ACC DFMEA 
CAVs / CSMS ACC DFMEA 









































































8 560 The ACC system shall 




include bend radii, heat 
shielding, EMI 
avoidance, sheathing, 







5 Ensure proper 

















identify if the 
pads are free 











3 150 ACC brake system 
shall engage in timely 
manner such that brake 
pad fatigue and 




shall ensure proper 
mounting and 




shall ensure brake pad 
bolts and mounting 















hardware are securely 
fastened and free from 
potential loosening or 
movement 
 




excessive grade) which 
may cause a high NVH 
 
Operator shall avoid 






4 Ensure proper 




























identify if the 
rotors are free 











3 120 ACC brake system 
shall engage in timely 
manner such that brake 
rotor fatigue and 




shall ensure proper 
mounting and 




shall ensure brake rotor 
bolts and mounting 
hardware are securely 
fastened and free from 
potential loosening or 
movement 
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excessive grade) which 
may cause a high NVH  
 
Operator shall avoid 
poor driving behaviors 
Debris (snow, 
mud) build-up 
on brake system 
3 Ensure brake 
system is free 
of build-up and 





identify if the 









6 180 Operator shall ensure 
brake system is free of 
build-up (snow, mud) 






















excessive grade) which 






















partial or total 
loss of 
functionality 
6 120 Operator shall avoid 
excessively adverse 
road conditions which 
may cause a high NVH 
 
Operator shall ensure 
routine inspection for 
caliper rust and 
corrosion 
 
Operator shall avoid 
poor driving behaviors 
Brake fluid line 
failure (leak, air 
in line) 






5 100 ACC brake system 
shall engage in timely 
manner such that brake 




























lines are immediately 
able to be actuated 
 
Development team 
shall ensure proper 
bleeding, mounting,  
installation, and 
routine maintenance 
and inspection of brake 




shall ensure bolts and 
mounting hardware are 
securely fastened and 
free from potential 
loosening or 
unintended movement 
Other      ACC system shall 
allow operator to 
override automated 
controls with minimal 
braking engagement 








Mode D RPN 
Functional 
Requirement 























































factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire 
















8 560 The ACC system shall 




include bend radii, heat 
shielding, EMI 
avoidance, sheathing, 
proper gauge, and 
interface connections 













clean and the 








identify if the 









lack of engine 
power, stalling, 
or misfire 
6 240 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  installation, 
and manufacturing of 
the fuel filter 
 
Development team 
shall ensure the fuel 
filter permeable 
material is clean and 
the is free of physical 
damage and leaks 
while under pressure 













partial or total 
6 240 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
installation of the fuel 
injectors 
 
















level and type 
 










of power  
Development team 
shall ensure injector 
mounting hardware is 
securely fastened and 
free from potential 
loosening or movement 
 
Operator shall ensure 
adequate fuel level and 
type 
 
Operator shall ensure 
use of fuel system 
cleaners when 
recommended 
Engine failure - 
Fuel pump 
failure 






















partial or total 







6 240 Development teams 
shall ensure proper 
mounting and 




shall ensure fuel pump 
bolts and mounting 
hardware are securely 
fastened and free from 
potential loosening or 
movement 
 
Operator shall ensure 
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Engine failure - 
Poor fuel 
quality 
2 Verify fuel 






partial or total 





6 120 Operator shall ensure 
fuel quality prior to 
filling 



























clean oil,  and 
that the oil filter 



























8 400 Development teams 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  installation, 
and manufacturing of 
oil filter and pump 
 
Development team 
shall ensure bolts, 
interface components 
(seals, gaskets), and 
mounting hardware are 
securely fastened and 
free from leaks and 
potential loosening or 
movement 
 
Operator shall ensure 
frequent oil changes, 
clean oil,  and that the 
oil filter is not 
ballooned or deformed  
 
Engine failure - 
Improper fuel 
octane number 
1 Verify prior to 
filling tank 
Combustion 
failure will lead 
to loss of 
4 40 Operator shall ensure 
proper fuel octane 
number prior to filling 
tank 






















cool the engine 
 
Ensure the fans 






















that there is 
sufficient air 
















8 320 Operator shall ensure 
thermal system 
components (radiator, 








shall ensure the fans 




shall ensure fans pull 
air from a cool source 
 
Development team 
shall ensure engine 
ventilation is sufficient 
to provide appropriate 




shall ensure thermal 
system is designed 
such that there is 





shall ensure proper 
mounting,  installation, 
and manufacturing of 






























temp is stable 




shall ensure bolts and 
mounting hardware are 
securely fastened and 
free from potential 
loosening or movement 
 
Development team 
shall ensure the ECM 
controls and mitigates 
engine overheating 
Engine failure - 
Head gasket 
failure 
























6 240 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  installation, 
and manufacturing of 




shall ensure bolts, 
interface components 
(seals, gaskets), and 
mounting hardware are 





















in the engine 
bay 
 
securely fastened and 
free from leaks and 
potential loosening or 
movement 
 
Operator shall ensure 
thermal system is 
functional 



















































8 320 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  installation, 
and manufacturing of 
the sparkplugs, fuel 




shall ensure bolts, 
interface components 
(seals, gaskets), and 
mounting hardware are 
securely fastened and 
free from leaks and 




shall ensure proper A/F 




shall ensure vacuum 
lines and manifold 
gasket are free from 






















shall ensure properly 
functioning timing belt 
 
Development team 
shall ensure properly 
functioning EGR valve 























loss of engine 
functionality 








ratio, O2 sensor 
failure) 













loss of engine 
functionality, 
rough idling, 
smell of fuel, 
3 60 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  installation, 
and manufacturing of 




shall ensure bolts, 





















and O2 sensor  
poor mpg, error 
message 
interface components 
(seals, gaskets), and 
mounting hardware are 
securely fastened and 
free from leaks and 








valve and O2 sensor 
Motor failure - 
Over-current 
7 Ensure software 
(HSC) limits 
the magnitude 





















7 490 Development team 
shall ensure software 
(HSC) limits the 




shall ensure relays and 
fuses are in place and 
functional to prevent 
over drawing of 
current 
Contamination 
(EM housing or 
coolant system 
failure) 














8 560 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  installation, 
and manufacturing of 
the EM and housing 
 
Development team 
shall ensure bolts, 






















to and from the 










hardware are securely 
fastened and free from 





shall ensure cooling 
system and its 
components are 
functioning, proper 
coolant levels, and 
hoses running to and 
from the motor are leak 
free 
Motor failure - 
Overheating 
(coolant failure) 








cool the EM 
 
Ensure the fans 











and loss of 
motor 
functionality 
8 640 Development team 
shall ensure thermal 
system components 
(radiator, coolant level, 
fans) are functional 




shall ensure the fans 




shall ensure fans pull 
air from a cool source 
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Ensure fans pull 






























temp is stable 
Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  installation, 
and manufacturing of 




shall ensure bolts, 
hoses and mounting 
hardware are securely 
fastened and free from 




shall ensure the HSC 
controls and mitigates 
overheating 
 
Operator shall avoid 
poor driving behaviors 





















and loss of 
8 560 Development team 
shall ensure thermal 
system components 
(radiator, coolant level, 
fans) are functional 
and sufficient to cool 
the EM 
 



























shall ensure bolts, 
hoses and mounting 
hardware are securely 
fastened and free from 




shall ensure the HSC 
controls and mitigates 
overheating 



























partial or  total 
functionality 
failure 




excessive grade) which 
may cause a high NVH 
 
Development team 
shall ensure thermal 
system components 
(radiator, coolant level, 
fans) are functional 












identify if the 
9 720 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  installation, 
and manufacturing of 






















































partial or  total 
functionality 
failure 




shall ensure bolts and 
mounting hardware is 
securely fastened and 







location is covered and 
free from potential 











angle is minimized 
 




excessive grade) which 
may cause a high NVH 
















































identify if the 











partial or total 
functionality 
failure 
9 720 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  installation, 
and manufacturing of 






transmission bolts and 
mounting hardware is 
securely fastened and 







location is covered and 
free from potential 












excessive grade) which 
may cause a high NVH  



































rates and ranges 
 
Ensure relays 









identify if AP 















and loss of 
functionality 
2 60 Development team 
shall ensure the AP and 
APPS mounting 
hardware are secure, 
free from unintended 
movement, and 




shall ensure software 




shall ensure relays and 
fuses are in place and 
functional to prevent 
over drawing of 
current   
Other      ACC system shall 
allow operator to 
override automated 
controls with minimal 
AP engagement 
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factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire 
















4 100 The ACC sensors shall 




include bend radii, heat 
shielding, EMI 
avoidance, sheathing, 
proper gauge, and 
interface connections 
 
ACC system shall alert 
operator prior to and 
when shutdown occurs 
 
ACC system shall only 
be operational if sensor 
performance meets a 
minimum standard 
(communication speed, 





independently and be 







7 Ensure sensor 
enclosure 
manufacturing 
















4 140 Development team 
shall ensure sensor 
enclosure 
manufacturing and use 
of materials is 
sufficient to prevent 
unintended access and 
physical damage 
 






















shall ensure sensor and 
sensor enclosure bolts 
and mounting 
hardware is securely 
fastened and free from 




7 Ensure sensors 
have clear field 
of view and are 















3 105 Operator shall ensure 
ACC system sensors 
have clear field of view 
and are free of 
visibility obstructions 
 
ACC system shall only 
be operational if sensor 
performance meets a 
minimum standard 
(communication speed, 





10 ACC sensors 
require a 
minimum 







1 50 ACC system shall 
require minimum 
vehicle speed based on 
sensor requirements 
 
Other      ACC system shall 
function according to 
operator engagement 
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quickly in the event of 
less operator 
engagement (hands on 
wheel, head tilt, eye 
deviation) 
 




quickly in the event of 
more operator 
engagement (hands on 
wheel, head tilt, eye 
deviation) 
 

















































factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire 
















3 27 The ACC sensors shall 




include bend radii, heat 
shielding, EMI 
avoidance, sheathing, 
proper gauge, and 
interface connections 
 
ACC system shall alert 
operator prior to and 
when shutdown occurs 
 
ACC system shall only 
be operational if sensor 
performance meets a 
minimum standard 
(communication speed, 
sensor availability or 
visibility) 






independently and be 




































N/A 1 10 ACC system shall 
provide warning to 
operator that velocity 
input constraint is 
required 
 
ACC system shall 
operate within a 
specified velocity 
range 


































N/A 1 10 ACC system shall 
provide warning to 
operator that distance 
input constraint is 
required 
 
The ACC system shall 
operate within a 
specified distance 
range 











































audio, or visual 
1 54 The ACC sensors shall 




include bend radii, heat 



























factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire 



























does not startle 














proper gauge, and 
interface connections 
 
ACC system shall alert 
operator prior to and 
when shutdown occurs 
 
ACC system shall alert 
operator when 
deviation from set 
distance or velocity 
occurs 
 
ACC feedback system 
shall function 
according to operator 
engagement 
 
ACC system shall 
provide audio, visual, 
and haptic feedback 
 
ACC system shall 
provide feedback in 
manner that does not 
startle the operator and 
cause greater potential 
for hazard (not overly 
loud or bright) 
 
ACC system audio 
feedback shall adjust to 




ACC system visual 
feedback shall adjust to 















ambient light (decrease 
during night, increase 
during day) 
 
ACC system shall only 
be operational if 
feedback performance 
meets a minimum 
standard 
(communication speed, 





independently and be 





Appendix 3.02 HARA CAVs / CSMS LKA DFMEA 
CAVs / CSMS LKA DFMEA 
Item:     Lane Keeping Assist 
Function Failure Type 
Potential 
Impact S Potential Cause O 
Prevention 

















10 Wiring and/or 




















8 560 The LKA system 
shall be wired and 
installed according to 
manufacturer 
specifications to 
include bend radii, 
heat shielding, EMI 










 Ensure wire bend 







proper gauge, and 
interface connections 




5 Ensure proper 



























identify if the 
pads are free 









3 150 LKA brake system 
shall engage in 
timely manner such 
that brake pad 





shall ensure proper 
mounting and 




shall ensure brake 
pad bolts and 
mounting hardware 
are securely fastened 









which may cause a 
high NVH 
 




fatigue or failure 
4 Ensure proper 
mounting and  
Vehicle technical 
inspection will 
3 120 LKA brake system 
shall engage in 


























Avoid poor drive 
behavior 
identify if the 
rotors are free 









timely manner such 
that brake rotor 





shall ensure proper 
mounting and 




shall ensure brake 
rotor bolts and 
mounting hardware 
are securely fastened 









which may cause a 
high NVH  
 




mud) build-up on 
brake system 
3 Ensure brake 
system is free of 
build-up and 




identify if the 




6 180 Operator shall ensure 
brake system is free 
of build-up (snow, 
mud) and debris 
prior to use 










excessive grade)  





































and partial or 
total loss of 
functionality 
6 120 Operator shall avoid 
excessively adverse 
road conditions 
which may cause a 
high NVH 
 
Operator shall ensure 
routine inspection for 
caliper rust and 
corrosion 
 
Operator shall avoid 
poor driving 
behaviors 
Brake fluid line 
failure (leak, air 
in line) 







hardware and its 
functionality 
 













5 100 LKA brake system 
shall engage in 
timely manner such 
that brake lines are 





shall ensure proper 
bleeding, mounting,  
installation, and 
routine maintenance 
and inspection of 
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brake line hardware 
and its functionality 
 
Development team 
shall ensure bolts and 
mounting hardware 
are securely fastened 




Other      LKA system shall 






LKA system shall 
brake the front wheel 
opposite to the side 
of deviation 
Function Failure Type 
Potential 
Impact S Potential Cause O 
Prevention 






















































identify a lack 
of, or 
3 30 Development team 









team shall ensure 
interface 
components 
















of pump and 
check for hose 
deterioration 
discolored 

















team shall ensure 
functionality of 
EPS pump and 




fluid and fluid 
leaks 
































3 60 Development team 



























correct type of 




leaks prior to 
operation 






team shall ensure 
the correct type 
of fluid is used, 
proper fluid 
levels, and check 







































5 150 Development team 




the belt (tension, 










and free from 
potential 

















































5 100 Development team 

































8 160 Development team 
































































shall ensure power 
steering motor is 
functional 
Wiring and/or 
signal failure (not 
proper gauge, 
installation or 







fatigue or failure 
 
8 560 The LKA system 
shall be wired and 
installed according to 
manufacturer 
specifications to 










Ensure wire bend 








include bend radii, 
heat shielding, EMI 
avoidance, sheathing, 
proper gauge, and 
interface connections 
Other      LKA system shall 
function according to 
operator engagement 
 
LKA system shall 
respond (feedback, 
lateral movement) 
more quickly in the 
event of less operator 
engagement (hands 
on wheel, head tilt, 
eye deviation) 
 
LKA system shall 
respond (feedback, 
lateral movement) 
less quickly in the 
event of more 
operator engagement 
(hands on wheel, 
head tilt, eye 
deviation) 
 
LKA system shall 





Function Failure Type 
Potential 
Impact S Potential Cause O 
Prevention 









6 Wiring and/or 
signal failure (not 
proper gauge, 





8 336 The LKA sensors 
shall be wired and 
installed according to 



































factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire bend 
radii are adhered 
to 
identify wiring 










include bend radii, 
heat shielding, EMI 
avoidance, sheathing, 
proper gauge, and 
interface connections 
 
LKA system shall 
alert operator prior to 
and when shutdown 
occurs 
 
LKA system shall 
only be operational if 
sensor performance 










independently and be 








6 Ensure sensor 
enclosure 
manufacturing 















4 144 Development team 
shall ensure sensor 
enclosure 
manufacturing 































team shall ensure 










 Sensor visibility 
obstruction 
7 Ensure sensors 
have clear field 
of view and are 
















3 126 Operator shall ensure 
LKA system sensors 
have clear field of 




LKA system shall 
only be operational if 
sensor performance 







LKA system shall 
have control wind 
shield wipers 
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LKA system shall 




10 ACC sensors 
require a 
minimum 







1 60 LKA system shall 
require minimum 





 Other      LKA system shall 
function according to 
operator engagement 
 




quickly in the event 
of less operator 
engagement (hands 
on wheel, head tilt, 
eye deviation) 
 




quickly in the event 
of more operator 
engagement (hands 




shall impose criteria 
for deviation and 
corrective action 
 




shall impose criteria 
for deviation and 
corrective action 
Function Failure Type 
Potential 
Impact S Potential Cause O 
Prevention 


















6 Wiring and/or 























factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire bend 













4 120 The LKA sensors 
shall be wired and 
installed according to 
manufacturer 
specifications to 
include bend radii, 
heat shielding, EMI 
avoidance, sheathing, 
proper gauge, and 
interface connections 
 
LKA system shall 
alert operator prior to 
and when shutdown 
occurs 
 
LKA system shall 
only be operational if 
sensor performance 










independently and be 
free from external 
manipulation 
Function Failure Type 
Potential 
Impact S Potential Cause O 
Prevention 
Mode Detection Mode D RPN 
Functional 
Requirement 





LKA system  
Failure of 
operator to 







initiate the LKA 
system 
10 Ensure system 
provides warning 
to operator that 
LKA requires 
manual initiation 
 1 10 LKA system shall 
provide warning to 
operator that manual 
initiation is required 
 
LKA system shall 





actuation shall be 
required for free 
movement out of 
lane, otherwise 
feedback will warn 
operator 
Function Failure Type 
Potential 
Impact S Potential Cause O 
Prevention 




























8 Wiring and/or 











Audio or visual 
system failure 













factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire bend 








audio, or visual 








3 120 The LKA sensors 
shall be wired and 
installed according to 
manufacturer 
specifications to 
include bend radii, 
heat shielding, EMI 
avoidance, sheathing, 
proper gauge, and 
interface connections 
 
LKA system shall 
alert operator prior to 
and when shutdown 
occurs 
 
LKA system shall 
alert operator when 
deviation occurs 
 























manner that does 









system audio and 
visual feedback 
adjust to ambient 
volume and light 
LKA feedback 
system shall function 
according to operator 
engagement 
 
LKA system shall 
provide audio, visual, 
and haptic feedback 
 
LKA system shall 
provide feedback in 
manner that does not 
startle the operator 
and cause greater 
potential for hazard 
(not overly loud or 
bright) 
 
LKA system audio 
feedback shall adjust 





LKA system visual 
feedback shall adjust 





LKA system shall 
only be operational if 
feedback 
performance meets a 
minimum standard 
(communication 
speed, audio, visual, 
haptic functionality) 







independently and be 





Appendix 3.03 HARA CAVs / CSMS LKA STPA 














that LKA system 
initiation is required 
 
Operator aware that 
LKA system 
initiation is required 







When the speed and operational 
environment allow, the LKA system 
will alert the operator that the LKA 
system requires operator initiation 
 
When the speed and operational 
environment allow, the LKA 
initiation procedure will be clearly 
defined to the operator via audio and 
visual alert with minimal required 
actions by the operator (single button 
initiation) 
 
Wiring will be installed according to 
manufacturer specifications to 
include EMI avoidance, gauge, and 
bend radii 
 
If LKA operating system fails, the 
LKA system will alert the operator 
via audio and visual feedback 
When the speed and operational 
environment allow, the LKA system 
shall alert the operator that the LKA 
system requires operator initiation 
 
When the speed and operational 
environment allow, the LKA 
initiation procedure shall be clearly 
defined to the operator via audio 
and visual alert with minimal 
required actions by the operator 
(single button initiation) 
 
Wiring shall be securely installed 
according to manufacturer 
specifications to include EMI 
avoidance, connections, gauge, and 
bend radii 
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If LKA operating system fails, the 
LKA system shall alert the operator 
via audio and visual feedback 





requires a minimum 
speed, reasonable 
lane-line tracking, 





the LKA system 
When the speed and operational 
environment allow, the LKA system 
will alert the operator that the LKA 
system requires operator initiation 
 
When the speed and operational 
environment allow, the LKA 
initiation procedure will be clearly 
defined to the operator via audio and 
visual alert with minimal required 




To prevent accidental disabling of the 
LKA system, the LKA system will 
have individual on/off buttons 
When the speed and operational 
environment allow, the LKA system 
shall alert the operator that the LKA 
system requires operator initiation 
 
When the speed and operational 
environment allow, the LKA 
initiation procedure shall be clearly 
defined to the operator via audio 
and visual alert with minimal 
required actions by the operator 
(single button initiation) 
 
 
To prevent accidental disabling of 
the LKA system, the LKA system 




the LKA system 








the LKA system 
when desired 
Ensure LKA system signal transfers 
through appropriate medium (type, 
gauge of wiring) and adheres to 
automotive wiring standards (twisted 
wires, EMI avoidance, shielding) 
 
Ensure the LKA system limits time 
of actuating once the operator 
initiates LKA system (ex. close loop 
after 500ms) 
 
Ensure LKA system alters operator 
once LKA system has been enabled 
 
The operator will be allowed to 
choose when LKA system will be 
enabled 
The development team shall ensure 
the LKA system signal transfers 
through an appropriate medium 
(type, gauge of wiring) and adheres 
to automotive wiring standards 
(twisted wires, EMI avoidance, 
shielding) 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the LKA system limits time of 
actuation once the operator initiates 
LKA system (ex. close loop after 
500ms) 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the LKA system alerts the operator 
once the LKA system has been 
enabled 
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The operator shall be allowed to 







Operator holds LKA 
system initiation 
button too long 
Ensure that if the LKA system “on” 
button is actuated, the LKA system 
enables, regardless of time pressed 
 
Ensure the LKA system “on” button 
is of the a reasonable quality to 
reduce bounce error 
The development team shall ensure 
that if the LKA system “on” button 
is actuated, the LKA system 
enables, regardless of pressed time 
duration 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the LKA system “on” button is of 












Required but not 
provided 



















Ensure the LKA system sensors are 
placed in a location which minimizes 
potential visibility failures 
 
Ensure LKA system radars and 
cameras are of the quality which can 
produce true data during reasonably 
poor operational conditions (rain, 
fog, snow, dirt, poor lane-line 
quality) 
 
Ensure LKA system radars and 
cameras are mounted in location free 
from visibility obstruction 
 
Ensure the LKA system wiring will 
be installed according to 
manufacturer specifications to 
include EMI avoidance, gauge, and 
bend radii 
 
If LKA operating system fails, the 
LKA system will alert the operator 
via audio and visual feedback 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the LKA system sensors are placed 
in a location which minimizes 
potential visibility failures 
 
The development team shall ensure 
LKA system radars and cameras are 
of the quality which can produce 
true data during reasonably poor 
operational conditions (rain, fog, 
snow, dirt, poor lane-line quality) 
 
The development team shall ensure 
LKA system radars and cameras are 
mounted in location free from 
visibility obstruction 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the LKA system wiring will be 
installed according to manufacturer 
specifications to include EMI 
avoidance, gauge, and bend radii 
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If LKA operating system fails, the 
LKA system shall alert the operator 
via audio and visual feedback 
Provided but not 
required 
There no LKA 
system 
operational state 







Ensure the LKA system is capable of 
processing the required amount of 
data 
The development team shall ensure 
the LKA system is capable of 




















Wiring will be installed according to 
manufacturer specifications to 
include EMI avoidance, gauge, and 
bend radii 
 
Ensure the LKA system signal 
transfers through appropriate medium 
(type, gauge of wiring) and adheres 
to automotive wiring standards 
(twisted wires, EMI avoidance, 
shielding) 
 
If the LKA operating system fails, 
the LKA system will alert the 
operator via audio and visual 
feedback 
 
The computer will be aware of signal 
latency and the LKA program will 
actuate a control action accordingly 
LKA system wiring shall be 
installed according to manufacturer 
specifications to include EMI 
avoidance, gauge, and bend radii 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the LKA system signal transfers 
through appropriate medium (type, 
gauge of wiring) and adheres to 
automotive wiring standards 
(twisted wires, EMI avoidance, 
shielding) 
 
If the LKA operating system fails, 
the LKA system shall alert the 
operator via audio and visual 
feedback 
 
The computer shall be aware of 
signal latency and the LKA program 




















If sensor signal stops in during a 
corrective control action the LKA  
system will immediately disable and 
alert operator via visual, audio, and 
haptic feedback 
 
If sensor signal stops in during a 
corrective control action the LKA  
system shall immediately disable 
and alert operator via visual, audio, 
and haptic feedback 
 







Wiring will be installed according to 
manufacturer specifications to 
include EMI avoidance, gauge, and 
bend radii 
 
Ensure the LKA system signal 
transfers through appropriate medium 
(type, gauge of wiring) and adheres 
to automotive wiring standards 
(twisted wires, EMI avoidance, 
shielding) 
The development team shall ensure 
the LKA system wiring will be 
installed according to manufacturer 
specifications to include EMI 
avoidance, gauge, and bend radii 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the LKA system signal transfers 
through appropriate medium (type, 
gauge of wiring) and adheres to 
automotive wiring standards 











Required but not 
provided 







If the LKA operating system fails, 
the LKA system will alert the 
operator via audio and visual 
feedback 
 
Wiring will be installed according to 
manufacturer specifications to 
include EMI avoidance, gauge, and 
bend radii 
 
Ensure the LKA system signal 
transfers through appropriate medium 
(type, gauge of wiring) and adheres 
to automotive wiring standards 
(twisted wires, EMI avoidance, 
shielding) 
If the LKA operating system fails, 
the LKA system shall alert the 
operator via audio and visual 
feedback 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the LKA system wiring will be 
installed according to manufacturer 
specifications to include EMI 
avoidance, gauge, and bend radii 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the LKA system signal transfers 
through appropriate medium (type, 
gauge of wiring) and adheres to 
automotive wiring standards 
(twisted wires, EMI avoidance, 
shielding) 










the LKA system is 




The LKA system will have constant 
enabled/disabled form of feedback 
(light) indicated to the operator 
The LKA system shall have 
constant enabled/disabled form of 
feedback (light) indicated to the 
operator 





engages in correct 











If the LKA operating system fails, 
the LKA system will alert the 
operator via audio and visual 
feedback 
 
Wiring will be installed according to 
manufacturer specifications to 
include EMI avoidance, gauge, and 
bend radii 
 
Ensure the LKA system signal 
transfers through appropriate medium 
(type, gauge of wiring) and adheres 
to automotive wiring standards 
(twisted wires, EMI avoidance, 
shielding) 
If the LKA operating system fails, 
the LKA system shall alert the 
operator via audio and visual 
feedback 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the LKA system wiring will be 
installed according to manufacturer 
specifications to include EMI 
avoidance, gauge, and bend radii 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the LKA system signal transfers 
through appropriate medium (type, 
gauge of wiring) and adheres to 
automotive wiring standards 
(twisted wires, EMI avoidance, 
shielding) 
 
The computer shall be aware of 
signal latency and the LKA program 

























If the LKA operating system fails, 
the LKA system will alert the 
operator via audio and visual 
feedback 
 
Wiring will be installed according to 
manufacturer specifications to 
include EMI avoidance, gauge, and 
bend radii 
 
If the LKA operating system fails, 
the LKA system shall alert the 
operator via audio and visual 
feedback 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the LKA system wiring will be 
installed according to manufacturer 
specifications to include EMI 
avoidance, gauge, and bend radii 
 







Ensure the LKA system signal 
transfers through appropriate medium 
(type, gauge of wiring) and adheres 
to automotive wiring standards 
(twisted wires, EMI avoidance, 
shielding) 
 
Ensure the LKA system sensors are 
placed in a location which minimizes 
potential visibility failures 
 
Ensure LKA system radars and 
cameras are of the quality which can 
produce true data during reasonably 
poor operational conditions (rain, 
fog, snow, dirt, poor lane-line 
quality) 
 
Ensure LKA system radars and 
cameras are mounted in location free 
from visibility obstruction 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the LKA system signal transfers 
through appropriate medium (type, 
gauge of wiring) and adheres to 
automotive wiring standards 
(twisted wires, EMI avoidance, 
shielding) 
 
The computer shall be aware of 
signal latency and the LKA program 
will actuate a control action 
accordingly 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the LKA system sensors are placed 
in a location which minimizes 
potential visibility failures 
 
The development team shall ensure 
LKA system radars and cameras are 
of the quality which can produce 
true data during reasonably poor 
operational conditions (rain, fog, 
snow, dirt, poor lane-line quality) 
 
The development team shall ensure 
LKA system radars and cameras are 






Action Potential Hazard Causal Factors Prevention/Mitigation Functional Requirement 





































or physical damage 
(liquid, puncture) 
 












Ensure wiring is securely installed 
using manufacturer installation 
specifications 
 
Ensure wiring gauge is sufficient to 
carry max operational current with 
factor of safety 
Ensure wire bend radii are adhered to 
 
Ensure computer alerts operator that 
corrective action decisions are 
disabled stating “LKA and ACC 
systems disabled” “No corrective 
action will be made” 
 
Determine fidelity of non-blended 
image and decide if corrective action 
should be applied 
 
Ensure computer only makes 
corrective action decisions when 
fidelity of image meets minimum 
specified resolution 
 
Ensure if computer system fails, it 
does not prevent vehicle from manual 
driving operations 
 
Ensure manufacturing and 
installation is sufficient to prevent 
unintended access and physical 
damage 
 
Ensure use of covering at wire-
computer interface to prevent 
unintended access 
Avoid adverse road condition which 
may produce NVH and damage 
computer 
 
To avoid wiring failure of the intel 
tank computer the development 
team shall ensure wiring is securely 
installed using manufacturer 
installation specifications 
 
To avoid wiring failure of the intel 
tank computer the development 
team shall ensure wiring gauge is 
sufficient to carry max operational 
current with factor of safety 
 
To avoid wiring failure of the intel 
tank computer the development 
team shall ensure wire bend radii 
are adhered to 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the computer alerts operator that 
corrective action decision is 
disabled 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the computer determines fidelity of 
non-blended image and decide if 
corrective action should be applied 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the computer only makes corrective 
action decisions when fidelity of 
image meets minimum specified 
resolution 
 
The development team shall ensure 
if computer system fails, it does not 
prevent vehicle from manual 
driving operations 
 
The development team shall ensure 
manufacturing and installation is 
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Ensure computer installation is inside 
cabin in a dry debris-proof location 
 
Ensure computer is inaccessible by 
passengers 
 
See wiring and unintended access 
requirements 
 
Ensure the power supplied to the 
computer is within manufacturer 
operational range 
Ensure computer NN model is 
thoroughly defined and highly 
sensitive to small variations in inputs 
 
Ensure computer NN is thoroughly 
tested and validate prior to 
implementation 
 
Ensure computer NN imposes limits 
on output to not exceed boundaries 
 
Ensure computer NNs use of hidden 
layers and neurons does not over-fit 
training data and is sufficient to fit 
new and unseen data 
  
Ensure computer program code is 
thoroughly vetted (Auto industry 
standard is one defect per 1000 
executable lines of code) 
 
Ensure computer program is 
developed using automotive coding 
standards  
 
Ensure use of multiple software 
scanning tools to identify 
vulnerability and error in computer 
sufficient to prevent unintended 
access and physical damage to the 
computer 
 
To prevent unintended access and 
physical damage to the development 
team shall ensure use of coverings 
at wire-computer interface to 
prevent unintended access 
 
To prevent physical damage to the 
computer the operator shall avoid 
adverse road conditions which may 
produce NVH  
 
To prevent unintended access and 
physical damage the development 
team shall ensure computer 
installation is inside cabin in a dry 
debris-proof location 
 
To prevent unintended access and 
physical damage the development 
team shall ensure computer is 
inaccessible by passengers 
 
To prevent power failure the 
development team shall ensure the 
power supplied to the computer is 
within manufacturer operational 
range 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the computer NN model is 
thoroughly defined and highly 
sensitive to small variations in 
inputs 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the computer NN is thoroughly 
   
 
187 
program code (industry uses Jarvis 
which analyses the binary executable 
action and not the mistakes in the 
code) 
 
Ensure control of computational 
overflow and compounding rounding 
errors 
 
Ensure understanding of computer  
input and output signal quality, noise, 
latency, and bandwidth accounting 
for measurement and control action 
error 
 
To reduce computer signal input and 
output latency, ensure use of high-
quality transmission medium 
 
To prevent computer signal input and 
output bandwidth faults, ensure 
transmission medium gauge is 
sufficient to handle expected 
throughput (load) with factor of 
safety 
 
Ensure understanding of time 
required to analyze and route 
computer signal data 
 
To reduce computer signal input and 
output noise ensure wires are as short 
as possible 
 
To reduce computer signal input and 
output noise ensure wires are kept 
away from electrical machinery 
 
tested and validate prior to 
implementation 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the computer NN imposes limits on 
output to not exceed boundaries 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the computer NNs use of hidden 
layers and neurons does not over-fit 
training data and is sufficient to fit 
new and unseen data 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the computer program code is 
thoroughly vetted (Auto industry 
standard is one defect per 1000 
executable lines of code) 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the computer program is developed 
using automotive coding standards 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the use of multiple software 
scanning tools to identify 
vulnerability and error in computer 
program code (industry uses Jarvis 
which analyses the binary 
executable action and not the 
mistakes in the code) 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the control of computational 
overflow and compounding 
rounding errors 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the understanding of computer  
input and output signal quality, 
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To reduce computer signal input and 
output noise it is recommended to 
use twisted together wires 
 
To reduce internal computer signal 
input and output noise ensure thermal 
effects on amplifiers are minimized 
 
To reduce computer signal input and 
output noise, if possible, ensure 
amplifier bandwidth matches input 
signal bandwidth 
 
To reduce computer signal input and 
output noise ensure use of proper 
filtering techniques 
 
To reduce computer signal input and 
output noise ensure use of wire 
shielding and conduit 
 
To reduce computer signal input and 
output noise ensure understanding of 
ground loops and impose proper 
grounding practices 
 
To ensure true data measurement test 
the collection with the computer 
operating at the same temperature 
that it will be operating at in real-
world scenarios 
 
Ensure understanding of potential 
computer signal input and output 
storage delays 
 
Ensure the use of software safety and 
that the system is free from external 
unintended malicious control 
 
noise, latency, and bandwidth 
accounting for measurement and 
control action error 
 
The development team shall reduce 
computer signal input and output 
latency, ensure use of high-quality 
transmission medium 
 
To prevent computer signal input 
and output bandwidth fault the 
development team shall ensure 
transmission medium gauge is 
sufficient to handle expected 
throughput (load) with factor of 
safety 
 
The development team shall ensure 
an understanding of time required to 
analyze and route computer signal 
data 
 
To reduce computer signal input 
and output noise the development 
team shall ensure wires are as short 
as possible 
 
To reduce computer signal input 
and output noise the development 
team shall  ensure wires are kept 
away from electrical machinery 
 
To reduce computer signal input 
and output noise it is recommended 
to use twisted together wires 
 
To reduce internal computer signal 
input and output noise the 
development team shall ensure 
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Ensure system software updates are 
performed over land-line and not 
through the air 
 
Ensure computer is capable of storing 
and processing the expected amount 
of data with a factor of safety 
 
To prevent memory failure ensure 
program is developed such that 
information that is too large cannot 
be written  into a memory buffer that 
is too small to contain it 
 
To prevent over-heating ensure 
computer is mounted such that there 
is proper clearance and  sufficient air 
flow to cool the computer 
 
To prevent over-heating ensure 
computer fans pull air from cool and 
dry source 
 
To prevent over-heating ensure 
computer imposes thermal self-
regulation  
 
To prevent over-heating ensure 
computer operates within specified 
temperature range 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
ensure system does not over heat 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
ensure computer is mounted such 
that there is proper clearance and  
sufficient air flow to cool the 
computer 
 
thermal effects on amplifiers are 
minimized 
 
To reduce computer signal input 
and output noise, if possible, the 
development team shall ensure the 
amplifier bandwidth matches input 
signal bandwidth 
 
To reduce computer signal input 
and output noise the development 
team shall ensure use of proper 
filtering techniques 
 
To reduce computer signal input 
and output noise the development 
team shall  ensure use of wire 
shielding and conduit 
 
To reduce computer signal input 
and output noise the development 
team shall ensure understanding of 
ground loops and impose proper 
grounding practices 
 
To ensure true data measurement 
the development team shall test the 
collection with the computer 
operating at the same temperature 
that it will be operating at in real-
world scenarios 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the understanding of potential 




The development team shall ensure 
the use of software safety and that 
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To prevent operating system crash 
ensure computer fans pull air from 
cool and dry source 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
ensure computer imposes thermal 
self-regulation  
 
To prevent operating system crash 
ensure computer operates within 
specified temperature range 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
ensure program is developed such 
that it does not attempt to access an 
incorrect memory address leading to 
general protection fault 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
ensure program is developed such 
that the OS does not enter an infinite 
loop 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
ensure program is developed such 
that information that is too large 
cannot be written  into a memory 
buffer that is too small to contain it 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
ensure program is developed such 
that deadlock is prevented (multiple 
programs having control some 
resource another program needs) 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
ensure program performs shutdown 
operations 
the system is free from external 
unintended malicious control 
 
To prevent computer memory 
failure the development team shall 
ensure the computer is capable of 
storing and processing the expected 
amount of data with a factor of 
safety 
 
To prevent computer memory 
failure ensure the program is 
developed such that information 
that is too large cannot be written  
into a memory buffer that is too 
small to contain it 
 
To prevent over-heating the 
development team shall ensure the 
computer is mounted such that there 
is proper clearance and  sufficient 
air flow to cool the computer 
 
To prevent over-heating the 
development team shall ensure the 
computer fans pull air from cool 
and dry source 
 
To prevent over-heating the 
development team shall ensure the 
computer imposes thermal self-
regulation  
 
To prevent over-heating the 
development team shall ensure the 
computer operates within specified 
temperature range 
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To prevent operating system crash 
the development team shall ensure 
the system does not over heat 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
the development team shall ensure 
the computer is mounted such that 
there is proper clearance and  
sufficient air flow to cool the 
computer 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
the development team shall ensure 
the computer fans pull air from cool 
and dry source 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
the development team shall ensure 
the computer imposes thermal self-
regulation  
 
To prevent operating system crash 
the development team shall ensure 
the computer operates within 
specified temperature range 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
the development team shall ensure 
the program is developed such that 
it does not attempt to access an 
incorrect memory address leading to 
general protection fault 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
the development team shall ensure 
the program is developed such that 
the OS does not enter an infinite 
loop 
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To prevent operating system crash 
the development team shall ensure 
the program is developed such that 
information that is too large cannot 
be written  into a memory buffer 
that is too small to contain it 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
the development team shall ensure 
the program is developed such that 
deadlock is prevented (multiple 
programs having control some 
resource another program needs) 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
the development team shall ensure 
the program performs shutdown 
operations 











engages in correct 




the LKA system is 




The LKA system will have constant 
enabled/disabled form of feedback 
(light) indicated to the operator 
The LKA system shall have 
constant enabled/disabled form of 













Required but not 
provided 
 










the LKA system is 





The LKA system will have constant 
enabled/disabled form of feedback 
(light) indicated to the operator 
 
Ensure wiring is securely installed 
using manufacturer installation 
specifications 
The LKA system shall have 
constant enabled/disabled form of 
feedback (light) indicated to the 
operator 
 
To avoid wiring failure of the intel 
tank computer the development 

















it is disabled 
 
Unintended access 
or physical damage 
(liquid, puncture) 
 














the LKA system is 




Ensure wiring gauge is sufficient to 
carry max operational current with 
factor of safety 
Ensure wire bend radii are adhered to 
 
Ensure computer alters operator that 
corrective action decisions are 
disabled stating “LKA and ACC 
systems disabled” “No corrective 
action will be made” 
 
Ensure computer only makes 
corrective action decisions when 
fidelity of image meets minimum 
specified resolution 
 
Ensure if computer system fails, it 
does not prevent vehicle from manual 
driving operations 
 
Ensure manufacturing and 
installation is sufficient to prevent 
unintended access and physical 
damage 
 
Ensure use of covering at wire-
computer interface to prevent 
unintended access 
Avoid adverse road condition which 
may produce NVH and damage 
computer 
 
Ensure computer installation is inside 
cabin in a dry debris-proof location 
 
Ensure computer is inaccessible by 
passengers 
 
team shall ensure wiring is securely 
installed using manufacturer 
installation specifications 
 
To avoid wiring failure of the intel 
tank computer the development 
team shall ensure wiring gauge is 
sufficient to carry max operational 
current with factor of safety 
 
To avoid wiring failure of the intel 
tank computer the development 
team shall ensure wire bend radii 
are adhered to 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the computer alerts operator that 
corrective action decision is 
disabled 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the computer only makes corrective 
action decisions when fidelity of 
image meets minimum specified 
resolution 
 
The development team shall ensure 
if computer system fails, it does not 
prevent vehicle from manual 
driving operations 
 
The development team shall ensure 
manufacturing and installation is 
sufficient to prevent unintended 
access and physical damage to the 
computer 
 
To prevent unintended access and 
physical damage to the development 
team shall ensure use of coverings 
   
 
194 
See wiring and unintended access 
requirements 
 
Ensure the power supplied to the 
computer is within manufacturer 
operational range 
 
To reduce computer signal input and 
output latency, ensure use of high-
quality transmission medium 
 
To prevent computer signal input and 
output bandwidth faults, ensure 
transmission medium gauge is 
sufficient to handle expected 
throughput (load) with factor of 
safety 
 
Ensure understanding of time 
required to analyze and route 
computer signal data 
 
To reduce computer signal input and 
output noise ensure wires are as short 
as possible 
 
To reduce computer signal input and 
output noise ensure wires are kept 
away from electrical machinery 
 
To reduce computer signal input and 
output noise it is recommended to 
use twisted together wires 
 
To reduce internal computer signal 
input and output noise ensure thermal 
effects on amplifiers are minimized 
 
To reduce computer signal input and 
output noise, if possible, ensure 
at wire-computer interface to 
prevent unintended access 
 
To prevent physical damage to the 
computer the operator shall avoid 
adverse road conditions which may 
produce NVH  
 
To prevent unintended access and 
physical damage the development 
team shall ensure computer 
installation is inside cabin in a dry 
debris-proof location 
 
To prevent unintended access and 
physical damage the development 
team shall ensure computer is 
inaccessible by passengers 
 
To prevent power failure the 
development team shall ensure the 
power supplied to the computer is 
within manufacturer operational 
range 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the understanding of computer  
input and output signal quality, 
noise, latency, and bandwidth 
accounting for measurement and 
control action error 
 
The development team shall reduce 
computer signal input and output 
latency, ensure use of high-quality 
transmission medium 
 
To prevent computer signal input 
and output bandwidth fault the 
development team shall ensure 
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amplifier bandwidth matches input 
signal bandwidth 
 
To reduce computer signal input and 
output noise ensure use of proper 
filtering techniques 
 
To reduce computer signal input and 
output noise ensure use of wire 
shielding and conduit 
 
To reduce computer signal input and 
output noise ensure understanding of 
ground loops and impose proper 
grounding practices 
 
To ensure true data measurement test 
the collection with the computer 
operating at the same temperature 
that it will be operating at in real-
world scenarios 
 
Ensure understanding of potential 
computer signal input and output 
storage delays 
 
Ensure the use of software safety and 
that the system is free from external 
unintended malicious control 
 
Ensure computer is capable of storing 
and processing the expected amount 
of data with a factor of safety 
 
To prevent memory failure ensure 
program is developed such that 
information that is too large cannot 
be written  into a memory buffer that 
is too small to contain it 
 
transmission medium gauge is 
sufficient to handle expected 
throughput (load) with factor of 
safety 
 
The development team shall ensure 
an understanding of time required to 
analyze and route computer signal 
data 
 
To reduce computer signal input 
and output noise the development 
team shall ensure wires are as short 
as possible 
 
To reduce computer signal input 
and output noise the development 
team shall  ensure wires are kept 
away from electrical machinery 
 
To reduce computer signal input 
and output noise it is recommended 
to use twisted together wires 
 
To reduce internal computer signal 
input and output noise the 
development team shall ensure 
thermal effects on amplifiers are 
minimized 
 
To reduce computer signal input 
and output noise, if possible, the 
development team shall ensure the 
amplifier bandwidth matches input 
signal bandwidth 
 
To reduce computer signal input 
and output noise the development 
team shall ensure use of proper 
filtering techniques 
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To prevent over-heating ensure 
computer is mounted such that there 
is proper clearance and  sufficient air 
flow to cool the computer 
 
To prevent over-heating ensure 
computer fans pull air from cool and 
dry source 
 
To prevent over-heating ensure 
computer imposes thermal self-
regulation  
 
To prevent over-heating ensure 
computer operates within specified 
temperature range 
To prevent operating system crash 
ensure system does not over heat 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
ensure computer is mounted such 
that there is proper clearance and  
sufficient air flow to cool the 
computer 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
ensure computer fans pull air from 
cool and dry source 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
ensure computer imposes thermal 
self-regulation  
 
To prevent operating system crash 
ensure computer operates within 
specified temperature range 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
ensure program is developed such 
that it does not attempt to access an 
 
To reduce computer signal input 
and output noise the development 
team shall  ensure use of wire 
shielding and conduit 
 
To reduce computer signal input 
and output noise the development 
team shall ensure understanding of 
ground loops and impose proper 
grounding practices 
 
To ensure true data measurement 
the development team shall test the 
collection with the computer 
operating at the same temperature 
that it will be operating at in real-
world scenarios 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the understanding of potential 




The development team shall ensure 
the use of software safety and that 
the system is free from external 
unintended malicious control 
 
To prevent computer memory 
failure the development team shall 
ensure the computer is capable of 
storing and processing the expected 
amount of data with a factor of 
safety 
 
To prevent computer memory 
failure ensure the program is 
developed such that information 
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incorrect memory address leading to 
general protection fault 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
ensure program is developed such 
that the OS does not enter an infinite 
loop 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
ensure program is developed such 
that information that is too large 
cannot be written  into a memory 
buffer that is too small to contain it 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
ensure program is developed such 
that deadlock is prevented (multiple 
programs having control some 
resource another program needs) 
 
To prevent operating system crash 









that is too large cannot be written  
into a memory buffer that is too 
small to contain it 
 
To prevent over-heating the 
development team shall ensure the 
computer is mounted such that there 
is proper clearance and  sufficient 
air flow to cool the computer 
 
To prevent over-heating the 
development team shall ensure the 
computer fans pull air from cool 
and dry source 
 
To prevent over-heating the 
development team shall ensure the 
computer imposes thermal self-
regulation  
 
To prevent over-heating the 
development team shall ensure the 
computer operates within specified 
temperature range 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
the development team shall ensure 
the system does not over heat 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
the development team shall ensure 
the computer is mounted such that 
there is proper clearance and  
sufficient air flow to cool the 
computer 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
the development team shall ensure 
the computer fans pull air from cool 
and dry source 




To prevent operating system crash 
the development team shall ensure 
the computer imposes thermal self-
regulation  
 
To prevent operating system crash 
the development team shall ensure 
the computer operates within 
specified temperature range 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
the development team shall ensure 
the program is developed such that 
it does not attempt to access an 
incorrect memory address leading to 
general protection fault 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
the development team shall ensure 
the program is developed such that 
the OS does not enter an infinite 
loop 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
the development team shall ensure 
the program is developed such that 
information that is too large cannot 
be written  into a memory buffer 
that is too small to contain it 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
the development team shall ensure 
the program is developed such that 
deadlock is prevented (multiple 
programs having control some 
resource another program needs) 
 
To prevent operating system crash 
the development team shall ensure 
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the program performs shutdown 
operations 
 
The LKA system shall allow the 
operator to easily override the 
corrective control action via 
actuation of steering, braking or 
accelerating 
 
The LKA system shall temporarily 
disengage when the operator 












Required but not 
provided 
Operator unaware 




Failure of one or all 




Operator unable to 









The LKA feedback system will alert 
the operator using at least two forms 
of feedback  
 
The operator will have control of the 
level of LKA system feedback 
stimuli 
 
The LKA system will perform 
feedback checks and disable 
functionality if specified minimum 
standard is not met 
 
Ensure the LKA system wiring will 
be installed according to 
manufacturer specifications to 
include EMI avoidance, gauge, and 
bend radii 
 
The LKA feedback system shall 
alert the operator using at least two 
forms of feedback  
 
The operator shall have control of 
the level of LKA system feedback 
stimuli 
 
The LKA system shall perform 
feedback checks and disable 
functionality if specified minimum 
standard is not met 
 
The development team shall ensure 
the LKA system wiring will be 
installed according to manufacturer 
specifications to include EMI 
avoidance, gauge, and bend radii 
 
Provided but not 
required 
Operator alerted 







or obstruction (dirt, 





The LKA system will check for 
sensor obstructions (validate wheel 
speed with sensor data) 
 
Ensure LKA system radars and 
cameras are of the quality which can 
produce true data during reasonably 
The LKA system shall check for 
sensor obstructions (validate wheel 
speed with sensor data) 
 
The development team shall ensure 
LKA system radars and cameras are 
of the quality which can produce 







the LKA system is 
disabled when it is 
enabled 
 
poor operational conditions (rain, 
fog, snow, dirt, poor lane-line 
quality) 
 
Ensure LKA system radars and 
cameras are mounted in location free 
from visibility obstruction 
 
The LKA system will have constant 
enabled/disabled form of feedback 
(light) indicated to the operator 
true data during reasonably poor 
operational conditions (rain, fog, 
snow, dirt, poor lane-line quality) 
 
The development team shall ensure 
LKA system radars and cameras are 
mounted in location free from 
visibility obstruction 
 
The LKA system shall have 
constant enabled/disabled form of 













False positive or 
negative 
Sensor malfunction 
or obstruction (dirt, 







the LKA system is 
disabled when it is 
enabled 
 
The LKA system will check for 
sensor obstructions (validate wheel 
speed with sensor data) 
 
Ensure LKA system radars and 
cameras are of the quality which can 
produce true data during reasonably 
poor operational conditions (rain, 
fog, snow, dirt, poor lane-line 
quality) 
 
Ensure LKA system radars and 
cameras are mounted in location free 
from visibility obstruction 
 
The LKA system will have constant 
enabled/disabled form of feedback 
(light) indicated to the operator 
The LKA system shall check for 
sensor obstructions (validate wheel 
speed with sensor data) 
 
The development team shall ensure 
LKA system radars and cameras are 
of the quality which can produce 
true data during reasonably poor 
operational conditions (rain, fog, 
snow, dirt, poor lane-line quality) 
 
The development team shall ensure 
LKA system radars and cameras are 
mounted in location free from 
visibility obstruction 
 
The LKA system shall have 
constant enabled/disabled form of 











needs to be taken 
Sensor malfunction 
or obstruction (dirt, 





The LKA system will check for 
sensor obstructions (validate wheel 
speed with sensor data) 
 
Ensure LKA system radars and 
cameras are of the quality which can 
produce true data during reasonably 
The LKA system shall check for 
sensor obstructions (validate wheel 
speed with sensor data) 
 
The development team shall ensure 
LKA system radars and cameras are 
of the quality which can produce 






poor operational conditions (rain, 
fog, snow, dirt, poor lane-line 
quality) 
 
Ensure LKA system radars and 
cameras are mounted in location free 
from visibility obstruction 
 
The operator will be capable of 
disenabling the LKA feedback 
system 
 
If LKA feedback system is disabled 
by the operator then the entire LKA 
system will disengage 
 
true data during reasonably poor 
operational conditions (rain, fog, 
snow, dirt, poor lane-line quality) 
 
The development team shall ensure 
LKA system radars and cameras are 
mounted in location free from 
visibility obstruction 
 
The operator shall be capable of 
disenabling the LKA feedback 
system 
 
If LKA feedback system is disabled 
by the operator then the entire LKA 
system shall disengage until the 




































power steering fluid 
(old, air) 
 
Power steering low 
fluid and fluid leaks 
 










EPS controls failure 
Ensure proper mounting,  
installation, and manufacturing of 
hoses, clamps, and their components 
 
Ensure interface components (seals, 
gaskets), and mounting hardware are 
securely fastened and free from 
potential loosening or movement 
 
Ensure functionality of pump and 
check for hose deterioration 
 
Ensure proper mounting,  
installation, and manufacturing of the 
belt (tension, torque specs) and its 
components 
 
Ensure proper mounting,  
installation, and manufacturing of 
pump and its components 
Development team shall ensure 
proper mounting,  installation, and 
manufacturing of EPS hoses, 
clamps, and their components 
 
Development team shall ensure 
interface components (seals, 
gaskets), and mounting hardware 
are securely fastened and free from 
potential loosening or movement 
 
Development team shall ensure 
functionality of EPS pump and 
check for hose deterioration 
 
Development team shall ensure 
proper mounting,  installation, and 
manufacturing of the EPS belt 
(tension, torque specs) and its 
components 








Development team shall ensure 
proper mounting,  installation, and 
manufacturing of pump and its 
components 
 
Development team shall ensure 




















engages in correct 




the LKA system is 




The LKA system will have constant 
enabled/disabled form of feedback 
(light) indicated to the operator 
The LKA system shall have 
constant enabled/disabled form of 
feedback (light) indicated to the 
operator 
 
Appendix 3.04 HARA CAVs PHA 
CAVs PHA 
Item:     Intel Tank Computer 
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Potential Hazard Cause Major Effect 
Corrective/Preventative 
Measure Functional Requirement 
Failure to blend various 
sensors (cameras, radars) 
data to achieve reliable, high-
definition images  
 
Failure to perform sensor 
fusion data verification & 
validation using developed 
algorithms and NNs 
 
Failure to determines if 
control action (EPS torque, 
braking, feedback) is 
required 
 
Failure to send control action 
request to associated 
controller 
 
Failure to provides real-time 
functionalities 





Wiring failure will 
cause fault in 
computer leading to no 
corrective action 
decisions 




on single point source 
information 
Less reliable image to 
which the computer 
can determine 
deviations and control 
actions 
Operator expects 







Ensure wiring is securely 
installed using manufacturer 
installation specifications 
Ensure wiring gauge is sufficient 
to carry max operational current 
with factor of safety 
Ensure wire bend radii are 
adhered to 
 
Ensure computer alters operator 
that corrective action decisions 
are disabled stating “LKA and 
ACC systems disabled” “No 
corrective action will be made” 
 
Determine fidelity of non-blended 
image and decide if corrective 
action should be applied 
 
Ensure computer only makes 
corrective action decisions when 
fidelity of image meets minimum 
specified resolution 
 
Ensure if computer system fails, it 
does not prevent vehicle from 
manual driving operations 
To avoid wiring failure of the intel tank 
computer the development team shall 
ensure wiring is securely installed using 
manufacturer installation specifications 
To avoid wiring failure of the intel tank 
computer the development team shall 
ensure wiring gauge is sufficient to carry 
max operational current with factor of 
safety 
To avoid wiring failure of the intel tank 
computer the development team shall 
ensure wire bend radii are adhered to 
 
The development team shall ensure 
computer alerts operator when corrective 
action decision is disabled 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
system determines fidelity of non-
blended image and decides if corrective 
action should be applied 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
computer only makes corrective action 
decisions when fidelity of image meets 
minimum specified resolution 
 
The development team shall ensure if 
computer system fails, it does not 
prevent vehicle from manual driving 
operations 




or physical damage 
(liquid, puncture) 
Failure of CAVs 




Ensure manufacturing and 
installation is sufficient to prevent 
unintended access and physical 
damage 
Ensure use of covering at wire-
computer interface to prevent 
unintended access 
Avoid adverse road condition 
which may produce NVH and 
damage computer 
 
Ensure computer installation is 
inside cabin in a dry debris-proof 
location 
 




The development team shall ensure 
manufacturing and installation is 
sufficient to prevent unintended access 
and physical damage to the computer 
To prevent unintended access and 
physical damage to the development 
team shall ensure use of coverings at 
wire-computer interface 
 
To prevent physical damage to the 
computer the operator shall avoid 
adverse road condition which may 
produce NVH  
 
To prevent unintended access and 
physical damage the development team 
shall ensure computer installation is 
inside cabin in a dry debris-proof 
location 
 
To prevent unintended access and 
physical damage the development team 
shall ensure computer is inaccessible by 
passengers 
Power failure See wiring and unintended access 
requirements 
 
Ensure the power supplied to the 
computer is within manufacturer 
operational range 
To prevent power failure the 
development team shall ensure the 
power supplied to the computer is within 





Ensure computer NN model is 
thoroughly defined and highly 
sensitive to small variations in 
inputs 
 
Ensure computer NN is 
thoroughly tested and validate 
prior to implementation 
 
To prevent CAVs failure the 
development team shall ensure the 
computer NN model is thoroughly 
defined and highly sensitive to small 
variations in inputs 
 
To prevent CAVs failure the 
development team shall ensure the 
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Ensure computer NN imposes 
limits on output to not exceed 
boundaries 
 
Ensure computer NNs use of 
hidden layers and neurons does 
not over-fit training data and is 
sufficient to fit new and unseen 
data 
  
Ensure computer program code is 
thoroughly vetted (Auto industry 
standard is one defect per 1000 
executable lines of code) 
 
Ensure computer program is 
developed using automotive 
coding standards  
 
Ensure use of multiple software 
scanning tools to identify 
vulnerability and error in 
computer program code (industry 
uses Jarvis which analyses the 
binary executable action and not 
the mistakes in the code) 
 
Ensure control of computational 
overflow and compounding 
rounding errors 
 
Ensure understanding of 
computer  input and output signal 
quality, noise, latency, and 
bandwidth accounting for 
measurement and control action 
error 
 
computer NN is thoroughly tested and 
validate prior to implementation 
 
To prevent CAVs failure the 
development team shall ensure the 
computer NN imposes limits on output 
to not exceed boundaries 
 
To prevent CAVs failure the 
development team shall ensure the 
computer NNs use of hidden layers and 
neurons does not over-fit training data 
and is sufficient to fit new and unseen 
data 
 
To prevent CAVs failure the 
development team shall ensure the 
computer program code is thoroughly 
vetted (Auto industry standard is one 
defect per 1000 executable lines of code) 
 
To prevent CAVs failure the 
development team shall ensure the 
computer program is developed using 
automotive coding standards 
 
To prevent CAVs failure the 
development team shall ensure the use 
of multiple software scanning tools to 
identify vulnerability and error in 
computer program code (industry uses 
Jarvis which analyses the binary 
executable action and not the mistakes in 
the code) 
 
To prevent CAVs failure the 
development team shall ensure the 
control of computational overflow and 
compounding rounding errors 
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To reduce computer signal input 
and output latency, ensure use of 
high-quality transmission medium 
 
To prevent computer signal input 
and output bandwidth faults, 
ensure transmission medium 
gauge is sufficient to handle 
expected throughput (load) with 
factor of safety 
 
Ensure understanding of time 
required to analyze and route 
computer signal data 
 
To reduce computer signal input 
and output noise ensure wires are 
as short as possible 
 
To reduce computer signal input 
and output noise ensure wires are 
kept away from electrical 
machinery 
 
To reduce computer signal input 
and output noise it is 
recommended to use twisted 
together wires 
 
To reduce internal computer 
signal input and output noise 
ensure thermal effects on 
amplifiers are minimized 
 
To reduce computer signal input 
and output noise, if possible, 
ensure amplifier bandwidth 
matches input signal bandwidth 
 
To prevent CAVs failure the 
development team shall ensure the 
understanding of computer  input and 
output signal quality, noise, latency, and 
bandwidth accounting for measurement 
and control action error 
 
To prevent CAVs failure the 
development team shall reduce computer 
signal input and output latency, ensure 
use of high-quality transmission medium 
 
To prevent computer signal input and 
output bandwidth fault the development 
team shall ensure transmission medium 
gauge is sufficient to handle expected 
throughput (load) with factor of safety 
 
To prevent CAVs failure the 
development team shall ensure an 
understanding of time required to 
analyze and route computer signal data 
 
To reduce computer signal input and 
output noise the development team shall 
ensure wires are as short as possible 
 
To reduce computer signal input and 
output noise the development team shall  
ensure wires are kept away from 
electrical machinery 
 
To reduce computer signal input and 
output noise it is recommended to use 
twisted together wires 
 
To reduce internal computer signal input 
and output noise the development team 
shall ensure thermal effects on 
amplifiers are minimized 
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To reduce computer signal input 
and output noise ensure use of 
proper filtering techniques 
 
To reduce computer signal input 
and output noise ensure use of 
wire shielding and conduit 
 
To reduce computer signal input 
and output noise ensure 
understanding of ground loops 
and impose proper grounding 
practices 
 
To ensure true data measurement 
test the collection with the 
computer operating at the same 
temperature that it will be 
operating at in real-world 
scenarios 
 
Ensure understanding of potential 
computer signal input and output 
storage delays 
 
Ensure the use of software safety 
and that the system is free from 
external unintended malicious 
control 
 
Ensure system software updates 
are performed over land-line and 
not through the air 
 
To reduce computer signal input and 
output noise, if possible, the 
development team shall ensure the 
amplifier bandwidth matches input 
signal bandwidth 
 
To reduce computer signal input and 
output noise the development team shall 
ensure use of proper filtering techniques 
 
To reduce computer signal input and 
output noise the development team shall  
ensure use of wire shielding and conduit 
 
To reduce computer signal input and 
output noise the development team shall 
ensure understanding of ground loops 
and impose proper grounding practices 
 
To ensure true data measurement the 
development team shall test the 
collection with the computer operating 
at the same temperature that it will be 
operating at in real-world scenarios 
 
To prevent CAVs failure the 
development team shall ensure the 
understanding of potential computer 
signal input and output storage delays 
 
To prevent CAVs failure the 
development team shall ensure the use 
of software safety and that the system is 
free from external unintended malicious 
control 
Memory failure Ensure computer is capable of 
storing and processing the 
expected amount of data with a 
factor of safety 
To prevent computer memory failure the 
development team shall ensure the 
computer is capable of storing and 




To prevent memory failure ensure 
program is developed such that 
information that is too large 
cannot be written  into a memory 
buffer that is too small to contain 
it 
processing the expected amount of data 
with a factor of safety 
 
To prevent computer memory failure 
ensure the program is developed such 
that information that is too large cannot 
be written  into a memory buffer that is 
too small to contain it 
Over-heating To prevent over-heating ensure 
computer is mounted such that 
there is proper clearance and  
sufficient air flow to cool the 
computer 
 
To prevent over-heating ensure 
computer fans pull air from cool 
and dry source 
 
To prevent over-heating ensure 
computer imposes thermal self-
regulation  
 
To prevent over-heating ensure 
computer operates within 
specified temperature range 
To prevent over-heating the 
development team shall ensure the 
computer is mounted such that there is 
proper clearance and  sufficient air flow 
to cool the computer 
 
To prevent over-heating the 
development team shall ensure the 
computer fans pull air from cool and dry 
source 
 
To prevent over-heating the 
development team shall ensure the 
computer imposes thermal self-
regulation  
 
To prevent over-heating the 
development team shall ensure the 




To prevent operating system 
crash ensure system does not over 
heat 
 
To prevent operating system 
crash ensure computer is mounted 
such that there is proper clearance 
and  sufficient air flow to cool the 
computer 
 
To prevent operating system crash the 
development team shall ensure the 
system does not over heat 
 
To prevent operating system crash the 
development team shall ensure the 
computer is mounted such that there is 
proper clearance and  sufficient air flow 
to cool the computer 
 
To prevent operating system crash the 
development team shall ensure the 
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To prevent operating system 
crash ensure computer fans pull 
air from cool and dry source 
 
To prevent operating system 
crash ensure computer imposes 
thermal self-regulation  
 
To prevent operating system 
crash ensure computer operates 
within specified temperature 
range 
 
To prevent operating system 
crash ensure program is 
developed such that it does not 
attempt to access an incorrect 
memory address leading to 
general protection fault 
 
To prevent operating system 
crash ensure program is 
developed such that the OS does 
not enter an infinite loop 
 
To prevent operating system 
crash ensure program is 
developed such that information 
that is too large cannot be written  
into a memory buffer that is too 
small to contain it 
 
To prevent operating system 
crash ensure program is 
developed such that deadlock is 
prevented (multiple programs 
having control some resource 
another program needs) 
 
computer fans pull air from cool and dry 
source 
 
To prevent operating system crash the 
development team shall ensure the 
computer imposes thermal self-
regulation  
 
To prevent operating system crash the 
development team shall ensure the 
computer operates within specified 
temperature range 
 
To prevent operating system crash the 
development team shall ensure the 
program is developed such that it does 
not attempt to access an incorrect 
memory address leading to general 
protection fault 
 
To prevent operating system crash the 
development team shall ensure the 
program is developed such that the OS 
does not enter an infinite loop 
 
To prevent operating system crash the 
development team shall ensure the 
program is developed such that 
information that is too large cannot be 
written  into a memory buffer that is too 
small to contain it 
 
To prevent operating system crash the 
development team shall ensure the 
program is developed such that deadlock 
is prevented (multiple programs having 
control some resource another program 
needs) 
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To prevent operating system 
crash ensure program performs 
shutdown operations 
To prevent operating system crash the 
development team shall ensure the 




sensor output; dark, 
fog, poorly painted 
or no lane lines) 
Ensure computer operates 
according to a specified minimum 
for sensor data quality 
 
Ensure computer disables 
corrective action decisions when 
minimum standard for lane-line, 
object, and traffic sign 
recognition is not met 
 
Ensure computer operates 
according to a specified minimum 
for lane-line recognition (lane 
dots, poorly painted lines, no 
lines) 
 
Ensure computer operates 
according to a specified minimum 
for low-light operations 
 




To prevent control action decision  
failure the development team shall 
ensure the computer operates according 
to a specified minimum for sensor data 
quality 
 
To prevent control action decision  
failure the development team shall 
ensure the computer disables the 
associated corrective action decisions 
when minimum standard for lane-line, 
object, and traffic sign recognition is not 
met 
 
To prevent control action decision  
failure the development team shall 
ensure the computer operates according 
to a specified minimum for lane-line 
recognition (lane dots, poorly painted 
lines, no lines) 
 
To prevent control action decision  
failure the development team shall 
ensure the computer operates according 
to a specified minimum for traffic sign 
recognition 
 
To prevent control action decision  
failure the development team shall 
ensure the computer operates according 
to a specified minimum for low-light 
operations 
 
To prevent control action decision  
failure the development team shall 
ensure the computer has control of 
headlights 
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Other Ensure system allows operator to 
increase or decrease feedback 
timing 
 
Ensure system allows operator to 
increase or decrease feedback 
volume 
 
Ensure system allows operator to 
increase or decrease feedback 
visual stimulation 
 
Ensure system allows operator to 
increase or decrease haptic 
feedback stimulation 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
computer allows the operator to increase 
or decrease feedback timing 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
computer allows the operator to increase 
or decrease feedback volume 
 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
computer allows the operator to increase 
or decrease feedback visual stimulation 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
computer allows the operator to increase 
or decrease haptic feedback stimulation 
 
 
Item:     Intel Mobileye 6 
Potential Hazard Cause Major Effect 
Corrective/Preventative 
Measure Functional Requirement 
Failure to perform multi-
feature tracking 
 
Failure to perform object and 
lane-line detection 
 
Failure to perform forward 
collision warning 
 
Failure to perform pedestrian 
collision warning 
 
Failure to perform headway 
warning 
 
Failure to perform traffic 
sign recognition 










on single point source 
information 
Operator unaware of 
system failure 
Less reliable image to 
which the computer 
can determine 
deviations and control 
actions 
Ensure Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
wiring is securely installed using 
manufacturer installation 
specifications 
Ensure Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
wiring gauge is sufficient to carry 
max operational current with 
factor of safety 
Ensure Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
wire bend radii are adhered to 
 
Ensure Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
alerts computer that system 
failure has occurred 
The development team shall ensure the 
Intel Mobileye 6 camera wiring is 
securely installed using manufacturer 
installation specifications 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
Intel Mobileye 6 camera wiring gauge is 
sufficient to carry max operational 
current with factor of safety 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
Intel Mobileye 6 camera wire bend radii 
are adhered to 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
Intel Mobileye 6 camera alerts the 
computer when failure has occurred 




Failure to transmit data to 
associated controller 
 
Failure to provide real-time 
display 
Unintended access 






Ensure Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
manufacturing and installation is 
sufficient to prevent unintended 
access and physical damage 
Ensure Intel Mobileye 6 camera is 
placed inside cabin and  top-
center of wind shield within 
operational area of windshield 
wipers 
Ensure use of covering at wire-
Intel Mobileye 6 camera interface 
to prevent unintended access 
Avoid adverse road condition 
which may produce NVH and 
damage or loosen the Intel 
Mobileye 6 camera 
 
Ensure Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
installation is inside cabin in a dry 
debris-proof location 
The development team shall ensure the 
Intel Mobileye 6 camera manufacturing 
and installation is sufficient to prevent 
unintended access and physical damage 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
Intel Mobileye 6 camera is placed inside 
cabin and  top-center of wind shield 
within operational area of windshield 
wipers 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
use of covering at wire- Intel Mobileye 6 
camera interface to prevent unintended 
access 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
Intel Mobileye 6 camera installation is 
inside cabin in a dry debris-proof 
location 
 
The operator shall avoid adverse road 
conditions which may produce NVH and 
damage or loosen the Intel Mobileye 6 
camera 
Power failure See wiring and unintended access 
requirements 
 
Ensure the power supplied to the 
Intel Mobileye 6 camera is within 
manufacturer operational range 
The development team shall ensure the 
power supplied to the Intel Mobileye 6 
camera is within manufacturer 
recommended operational range 
Signal or cyber-
security failure 
Ensure understanding of Intel 
Mobileye 6 camera signal quality, 
noise, latency, and bandwidth 
accounting for measurement and 
control action error 
 
To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 
camera signal latency, ensure use 
The development team shall ensure an 
understanding of Intel Mobileye 6 
camera signal quality, noise, latency, 
and bandwidth accounting for 
measurement and control action error 
 
To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
signal latency the development team 
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of high-quality transmission 
medium 
 
To prevent Intel Mobileye 6 
camera signal bandwidth faults, 
ensure transmission medium 
gauge is sufficient to handle 
expected throughput (load) with 
factor of safety 
 
Ensure understanding of time 
required to analyze and route Intel 
Mobileye 6 camera signal data 
 
To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 
camera signal noise ensure wires 
are as short as possible 
 
To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 
camera signal noise ensure wires 
are kept away from electrical 
machinery 
 
To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 
camera signal noise it is 
recommended to use twisted 
together wires 
 
To reduce internal Intel Mobileye 
6 camera signal noise ensure 
thermal effects on amplifiers are 
minimized 
 
To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 
camera signal noise, if possible, 
ensure amplifier bandwidth 
matches input signal bandwidth 
 
shall ensure the use of a high-quality 
transmission medium 
 
To prevent Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
signal bandwidth faults the development 
team shall ensure the transmission 
medium gauge is sufficient to handle 
expected throughput (load) with factor 
of safety 
 
The development team shall ensure an 
understanding of time required to 
analyze and route Intel Mobileye 6 
camera signal data 
 
To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
signal noise the development team shall 
ensure the wires are as short as possible 
 
To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
signal noise the development team shall 
ensure the wires are kept away from 
electrical machinery 
 
To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
signal noise it is recommended to use 
twisted together wires 
 
To reduce internal Intel Mobileye 6 
camera signal noise the development 
team shall ensure the thermal effects on 
amplifiers are minimized 
 
To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
signal noise, if possible, the 
development team shall ensure the 
amplifier bandwidth matches input 
signal bandwidth 
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To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 
camera signal noise ensure use of 
proper filtering techniques 
 
To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 
camera signal noise ensure use of 
wire shielding and conduit 
 
To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 
camera signal noise ensure 
understanding of ground loops 
and impose proper grounding 
practices 
 
Ensure understanding of potential 
Intel Mobileye 6 camera signal 
storage delays 
 
Ensure the use of software safety 
and that the Intel Mobileye 6 
camera signal is free from 
external unintended malicious 
control 
 
Ensure Intel Mobileye 6 camera  
system software updates are 
performed over land-line and not 
through the air 
To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
signal noise the development team shall 
ensure the use of proper filtering 
techniques 
 
To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
signal noise the development team shall 
ensure the use of wire shielding and 
conduit 
 
To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
signal noise the development team shall 
ensure the understanding of ground 
loops and impose proper grounding 
practices 
 
The development team shall ensure 
understanding of potential Intel 
Mobileye 6 camera signal storage delays 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
use of software safety and that the Intel 
Mobileye 6 camera signal is free from 
external unintended malicious control 
 
The development team shall ensure Intel 
Mobileye 6 camera system software 
updates are performed over land-line and 










fog, poorly painted 
or no lane lines) 
To prevent field of view failure 
ensure Intel Mobileye 6 camera is 
mounted in the operational area of 
the wind shield wipers 
 
To prevent field of view failure 
ensure Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
has control of wind shield wipers 
(debris may impede camera view 
while operator is unaware) 
 
To prevent field of view failure the 
development team shall ensure the Intel 
Mobileye 6 camera is mounted in the 
operational area of the wind shield 
wipers 
 
To prevent field of view failure the 
development team shall ensure the Intel 
Mobileye 6 camera has control of wind 
shield wipers (debris may impede 
camera view while operator is unaware) 
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Ensure Intel Mobileye 6 camera is 
of high-quality to maintain 
operations during low-light, 
poorly painted lane lines, and 
adverse weather conditions 
 
Ensure Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
indicates to computer and 






The development team shall ensure the 
Intel Mobileye 6 camera is of high-
quality to maintain operations during 
low-light, poorly painted lane lines, and 
adverse weather conditions 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
Intel Mobileye 6 camera indicates to 
computer and operator when the system 
is unavailable 
 
Item:     Bosch Front, Rear, and Corner MRR Radars 
Potential Hazard Cause Major Effect 
Corrective/Preventative 
Measure Functional Requirement 
Failure to perform early 
front, rear, and corner speed 
detection 
 
Failure to perform front, rear, 
and corner position detection 
 
Failure to send data to 
associated controller 





Wiring failure will 
cause fault in 
computer leading to no 
corrective action 
decisions 




on single point source 
information 
Less reliable image to 
which the computer 
can determine 
Ensure radar wiring is securely 
installed using manufacturer 
installation specifications 
Ensure radar wiring gauge is 
sufficient to carry max 
operational current with factor of 
safety 
Ensure radar wire bend radii are 
adhered to 
 
Ensure radar alters computer that 
system failure has occurred 
The development team shall ensure the 
radar wiring is securely installed using 
manufacturer installation specifications 
The development team shall ensure the 
radar wiring gauge is sufficient to carry 
max operational current with factor of 
safety 
The development team shall ensure the 
radar wire bend radii are adhered to 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
radar alters computer that system failure 
has occurred 
Unintended access 
or physical damage 
(liquid, puncture) 
Ensure radar manufacturing and 
installation is sufficient to prevent 
unintended access and physical 
damage 
The development team shall ensure the 
radar manufacturing and installation is 
sufficient to prevent unintended access 
and physical damage 
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deviations and control 
actions 
Operator expects 







Ensure use of covering at wire- 
radar interface to prevent 
unintended access 
Avoid adverse road condition 
which may produce NVH and 
damage the radar 
The development team shall ensure the 
use of covering at wire- radar interface 
to prevent unintended access 
The operator shall avoid adverse road 
condition which may produce NVH and 
damage or loosen the radar 
Power failure See wiring and unintended access 
requirements 
 
Ensure the power supplied to the 
radar is within manufacturer 
operational range 
The development team shall ensure the 
power supplied to the radar is within 
manufacturer operational range 
Signal or cyber-
security failure 
Ensure understanding of radar 
signal quality, noise, latency, and 
bandwidth accounting for 
measurement and control action 
error 
 
To reduce radar signal latency, 
ensure use of high-quality 
transmission medium 
 
To prevent radar signal 
bandwidth faults, ensure 
transmission medium gauge is 
sufficient to handle expected 
throughput (load) with factor of 
safety 
 
Ensure understanding of time 
required to analyze and route 
camera signal data 
 
To reduce radar signal noise 
ensure wires are as short as 
possible 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
understanding of radar signal quality, 
noise, latency, and bandwidth 
accounting for measurement and control 
action error 
 
To reduce radar signal latency, the 
development team shall ensure the use 
of high-quality transmission medium 
 
To prevent radar signal bandwidth 
faults, the development team shall 
ensure the transmission medium gauge 
is sufficient to handle expected 
throughput (load) with factor of safety 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
understanding of time required to 
analyze and route camera signal data 
 
To reduce radar signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the wires 
are as short as possible 
 
To reduce radar signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the wires 
are kept away from electrical machinery 
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To reduce radar signal noise 
ensure wires are kept away from 
electrical machinery 
 
To reduce radar signal noise it is 
recommended to use twisted 
together wires 
 
To reduce internal radar signal 
noise ensure thermal effects on 
amplifiers are minimized 
 
To reduce radar signal noise, if 
possible, ensure amplifier 
bandwidth matches input signal 
bandwidth 
 
To reduce radar signal noise 
ensure use of proper filtering 
techniques 
 
To reduce radar signal noise 
ensure use of wire shielding and 
conduit 
 
To reduce radar signal noise 
ensure understanding of ground 
loops and impose proper 
grounding practices 
 
Ensure understanding of potential 
radar signal storage delays 
 
Ensure the use of software safety 
and that the radar signal is free 




To reduce radar signal noise it is the 
development team shall ensure the to use 
twisted together wires 
 
To reduce internal radar signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the 
thermal effects on amplifiers are 
minimized 
 
To reduce radar signal noise, if possible, 
the development team shall ensure the 
amplifier bandwidth matches input 
signal bandwidth 
 
To reduce radar signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the use 
of proper filtering techniques 
 
To reduce radar signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the use 
of wire shielding and conduit 
 
To reduce radar signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the 
understanding of ground loops and 
impose proper grounding practices 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
understanding of potential radar signal 
storage delays 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
use of software safety and that the radar 
signal is free from external unintended 
malicious control 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
system software updates are performed 
over land-line and not through the air 
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Ensure system software updates 
are performed over land-line and 










fog, poorly painted 
or no lane lines) 
To prevent field of view failure 
ensure radar is mounted such that 
the signal projects unimpeded 
 
Ensure radar is of high-quality to 
maintain operations during low-
light, poorly painted lane lines, 
and adverse weather conditions 
 
Ensure radar indicates to 
computer and operator when the 
system is unavailable 
 
Ensure integrated program 
accounts for radar horizontal field 
of view and elevation (±6° 
(160m), ±6°(100m), ±10°(60m), 
±25°(36m), ±42°(12m)) 
 
Ensure integrated program 
accounts for radars speed, 
distance, and angle measurement 
accuracy (0.11 m/s, 0.12 m, ±0,3° 
) 
 
Ensure integrated program 
accounts for radars speed, 
distance, and angle object 
separation capability (0.72 m/s, 
0.66 0m, ±7° ) 
 
Ensure integrated program 
accounts for radars cycle time (60 
ms) 
 
To prevent field of view failure The 
development team shall ensure the radar 
is mounted such that the signal projects 
unimpeded 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
radar is of high-quality to maintain 
operations during low-light, poorly 
painted lane lines, and adverse weather 
conditions 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
radar indicates to computer and operator 
when the system is unavailable 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
integrated program accounts for radar 
horizontal field of view and elevation 
(±6° (160m), ±6°(100m), ±10°(60m), 
±25°(36m), ±42°(12m)) 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
integrated program accounts for radars 
speed, distance, and angle measurement 
accuracy (0.11 m/s, 0.12 m, ±0,3° ) 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
integrated program accounts for radars 
speed, distance, and angle object 
separation capability (0.72 m/s, 0.66 0m, 
±7° ) 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
integrated program accounts for radars 
cycle time (60 ms) 
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Ensure integrated program 
accounts for radars frequency 
modulation 
 
Ensure integrated program 
accounts for radars maximum 
number of detectable objects (32) 
 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
integrated program accounts for radars 
frequency modulation 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
integrated program accounts for radars 




Item:     Intel Movidius Neural Compute Stick 
Potential Hazard Cause Major Effect 
Corrective/Preventative 
Measure Functional Requirement 
Failure to perform vision 
processing tasks in assistance 
to Intel Tank computational 
capabilities 
 
Failure to assist in blending 
various sensors (cameras, 




Failure to assist in 
performing sensor fusion 
data verification & validation 
 
Failure to assist in 
determining if control action 
(EPS torque, braking, 
feedback) is required 
Power failure  Ensure compute stick is securely 
input to the computer 
The development team shall ensure the 






Ensure compute stick NN model 
thoroughly defined and highly 
sensitive to small variations in 
inputs 
 
Ensure compute stick NN is 
thoroughly tested and validate 
prior to implementation 
 
Ensure compute stick NN 
imposes limits on output to not 
exceed boundaries 
 
Ensure compute stick NNs use of 
hidden layers and neurons does 
not over-fit training data and is 
sufficient to fit new and unseen 
data 
  
Ensure compute stick program 
code is thoroughly vetted (Auto 
The development team shall ensure the 
compute stick NN model thoroughly 
defined and highly sensitive to small 
variations in inputs 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
compute stick NN is thoroughly tested 
and validate prior to implementation 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
compute stick NN imposes limits on 
output to not exceed boundaries 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
compute stick NNs use of hidden layers 
and neurons does not over-fit training 
data and is sufficient to fit new and 
unseen data 
  
The development team shall ensure the 
compute stick program code is 
thoroughly vetted (Auto industry 
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industry standard is one defect per 
1000 executable lines of code) 
 
Ensure compute stick program is 
developed using automotive 
coding standards  
 
Ensure use of multiple software 
scanning tools to identify 
vulnerability and error in compute 
stick program code (industry uses 
Jarvis which analyses the binary 
executable action and not the 
mistakes in the code) 
 
Ensure control of computational 
overflow and compounding 
rounding errors 
 
Ensure understanding of compute 
stick input and output signal 
quality, noise, latency, and 
bandwidth accounting for 
measurement and control action 
error 
 
Ensure understanding of time 
required to analyze and route 
computer signal data 
 
To reduce compute stick signal 
input and output noise ensure use 
of proper filtering techniques 
 
Ensure understanding of potential 
compute stick signal input and 
output storage delays 
 
Ensure the use of software safety 
and that the system is free from 
standard is one defect per 1000 
executable lines of code) 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
compute stick program is developed 
using automotive coding standards  
 
The development team shall ensure the 
use of multiple software scanning tools 
to identify vulnerability and error in 
compute stick program code (industry 
uses Jarvis which analyses the binary 
executable action and not the mistakes in 
the code) 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
control of computational overflow and 
compounding rounding errors 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
understanding of compute stick input 
and output signal quality, noise, latency, 
and bandwidth accounting for 
measurement and control action error 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
understanding of time required to 
analyze and route computer signal data 
 
To reduce compute stick signal input 
and output noise the development team 
shall ensure the use of proper filtering 
techniques 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
understanding of potential compute stick 
signal input and output storage delays 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
use of software safety and that the 
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external unintended malicious 
control 





Ensure compute stick is capable 
of storing and processing the 
expected amount of data with a 
factor of safety 
 
To prevent memory failure ensure 
program is developed such that 
information that is too large 
cannot be written  into a memory 
buffer that is too small to contain 
it 
 
Ensure compute stick and 
computer interface is compatible 
 
Ensure computer free storage 
space is available to allow 
compute stick to operate 
 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
compute stick is capable of storing and 
processing the expected amount of data 
with a factor of safety 
 
To prevent memory failure the 
development team shall ensure the 
program is developed such that 
information that is too large cannot be 
written  into a memory buffer that is too 
small to contain it 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
compute stick and computer interface is 
compatible 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
computer free storage space is available 
to allow compute stick to operate 
 
 
Item:     KVaser 
Potential Hazard Cause Major Effect 
Corrective/Preventative 
Measure Functional Requirement 
Failure to interface CAN 
signals to USB 
Unintended access 
or physical damage 
(liquid, puncture) 
 Ensure KVaser manufacturing 
and installation is sufficient to 
prevent unintended access and 
physical damage 
Ensure use of covering at KVaser 
interfaces to prevent unintended 
access 
Avoid adverse road condition 
which may produce NVH and 
damage KVaser or loosen 
interfaces 
The development team shall ensure 
KVaser manufacturing and installation is 
sufficient to prevent unintended access 
and physical damage to the computer 
To prevent unintended access and 
physical damage the development team 
shall ensure use of coverings at KVaser 
interfaces 
 
To prevent physical damage to the 
KVaser the operator shall avoid adverse 
road condition which may produce NVH  




Ensure KVaser installation is 
inside cabin in a dry debris-proof 
location 
 





To prevent unintended access and 
physical damage the development team 
shall ensure KVaser installation is inside 
cabin in a dry debris-proof location 
 
To prevent unintended access and 
physical damage the development team 
shall ensure KVaser is inaccessible by 
passengers 
Software failure Ensure KVaser functionality prior 
to open-road operation 
The development team shall ensure 
KVaser functionality prior to open-road 
operation 
Capacity failure Ensure the KVaser is capable of 
processing the expected amount 
pf data with a factor of safety 
The development team shall ensure the 
KVaser is capable of processing the 
expected amount pf data with a factor of 
safety 
Item:     Niles Camera Monitoring Operator 
Potential Hazard Cause Major Effect 
Corrective/Preventative 
Measure Functional Requirement 
Failure to perform real-time 
monitoring of operator 
 
Failure to send data to 
associated controller 










on single point source 
information 
Operator unaware of 
system failure 
Less reliable image to 
which the computer 
can determine 
Ensure Niles camera wiring is 
securely installed using 
manufacturer installation 
specifications 
Ensure Niles camera wiring 
gauge is sufficient to carry max 
operational current with factor of 
safety 
Ensure Niles camera wire bend 
radii are adhered to 
 
Ensure Niles camera alerts 
computer that system failure has 
occurred 
The development team shall ensure the 
Niles camera wiring is securely installed 
using manufacturer installation 
specifications 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
Niles camera wiring gauge is sufficient 
to carry max operational current with 
factor of safety 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
Niles camera wire bend radii are adhered 
to 




or physical damage 
(liquid, puncture) 






Ensure Niles camera 
manufacturing and installation is 
sufficient to prevent unintended 
access and physical damage 
Ensure Niles camera is placed 
inside cabin and  top-center of 
wind shield within operational 
area of windshield wipers 
Ensure use of covering at wire- 
Niles camera interface to prevent 
unintended access 
Avoid adverse road condition 
which may produce NVH and 
damage Niles camera 
 
Ensure Niles camera installation 
is inside cabin in a dry debris-
proof location 
The development team shall ensure the 
Niles camera manufacturing and 
installation is sufficient to prevent 
unintended access and physical damage 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
Niles camera is placed inside cabin and  
top-center of wind shield within 
operational area of windshield wipers 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
use of covering at wire- Niles camera 
interface to prevent unintended access 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
Niles camera installation is inside cabin 
in a dry debris-proof location 
 
The operator shall avoid adverse road 
conditions which may produce NVH and 
damage the camera 
Power failure See wiring and unintended access 
requirements 
 
Ensure the power supplied to the 
Niles camera is within 
manufacturer operational range 
The development team shall ensure the 
power supplied to the Niles camera is 




Ensure understanding of Niles 
camera signal quality, noise, 
latency, and bandwidth 
accounting for measurement and 
control action error 
 
To reduce Niles camera signal 
latency, ensure use of high-
quality transmission medium 
 
To prevent Niles camera signal 
bandwidth faults, ensure 
transmission medium gauge is 
The development team shall ensure an 
understanding of Niles camera signal 
quality, noise, latency, and bandwidth 
accounting for measurement and control 
action error 
 
To reduce Niles camera signal latency 
the development team shall ensure the 
use of a high-quality transmission 
medium 
 
To prevent Niles camera signal 
bandwidth faults the development team 
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sufficient to handle expected 
throughput (load) with factor of 
safety 
 
Ensure understanding of time 
required to analyze and route 
Niles camera signal data 
 
To reduce Niles camera signal 
noise ensure wires are as short as 
possible 
 
To reduce Niles camera signal 
noise ensure wires are kept away 
from electrical machinery 
 
To reduce Niles camera signal 
noise it is recommended to use 
twisted together wires 
 
To reduce internal Niles camera 
signal noise ensure thermal 
effects on amplifiers are 
minimized 
 
To reduce Niles camera signal 
noise, if possible, ensure 
amplifier bandwidth matches 
input signal bandwidth 
 
To reduce Niles camera signal 
noise ensure use of proper 
filtering techniques 
 
To reduce Niles camera signal 
noise ensure use of wire shielding 
and conduit 
 
To reduce Niles camera signal 
noise ensure understanding of 
shall ensure the transmission medium 
gauge is sufficient to handle expected 
throughput (load) with factor of safety 
 
The development team shall ensure an 
understanding of time required to 
analyze and route Niles camera signal 
data 
 
To reduce Niles camera signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the wires 
are as short as possible 
 
To reduce Niles camera signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the wires 
are kept away from electrical machinery 
 
To reduce Niles camera signal noise it is 
recommended to use twisted together 
wires 
 
To reduce internal Niles camera signal 
noise the development team shall ensure 
the thermal effects on amplifiers are 
minimized 
 
To reduce Niles camera signal noise, if 
possible, the development team shall 
ensure the amplifier bandwidth matches 
input signal bandwidth 
 
To reduce Niles camera signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the use 
of proper filtering techniques 
 
To reduce Niles camera signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the use 
of wire shielding and conduit 
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ground loops and impose proper 
grounding practices 
 
Ensure understanding of potential 
Niles camera signal storage 
delays 
 
Ensure the use of software safety 
and that the Niles camera signal is 
free from external unintended 
malicious control 
 
Ensure system software updates 
are performed over land-line and 
not through the air 
To reduce Niles camera signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the 
understanding of ground loops and 
impose proper grounding practices 
 
The development team shall ensure 
understanding of potential Niles camera 
signal storage delays 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
use of software safety and that the Niles 
camera signal is free from external 
unintended malicious control 
 
The development team shall ensure 
system software updates are performed 










fog, poorly painted 
or no lane lines) 
To prevent field of view failure 
ensure Niles camera is mounted 
in the location free of obstruction 
 
Ensure camera is of high-quality 
to maintain operations during 
low-light 
 
Ensure Niles camera indicates to 
computer and operator when the 
system is unavailable 
To prevent field of view failure the 
development team shall ensure the 
camera is mounted in a location free of 
obstruction 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
camera is of high-quality to maintain 
operations during low-light 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
Niles camera indicates to computer and 
operator when the system is unavailable 
Item:     Real-Time Display 
Potential Hazard Cause Major Effect 
Corrective/Preventative 
Measure Functional Requirement 
Failure to acquire sensor 
fusion data from associated 
controller 
 
Failure to display sensors 
fusion images in real-time 





 Ensure display wiring is securely 
installed using manufacturer 
installation specifications 
Ensure display wiring gauge is 
sufficient to carry max 
The development team shall ensure the 
display wiring is securely installed using 
manufacturer installation specifications 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
display wiring gauge is sufficient to 
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operational current with factor of 
safety 
Ensure display wire bend radii are 
adhered to 
 
Ensure display alters computer 
that system failure has occurred 
carry max operational current with factor 
of safety 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
display wire bend radii are adhered to 
Unintended access 
or physical damage 
(liquid, puncture) 
Ensure display manufacturing and 
installation is sufficient to prevent 
unintended access and physical 
damage 
Ensure display is placed inside 
cabin within view of operator 
Ensure use of covering at wire- 
display interface to prevent 
unintended access 
Avoid adverse road condition 
which may produce NVH and 
damage or loosen display 
 
Ensure display installation is 
inside cabin in a dry debris-proof 
location 
The development team shall ensure the 
camera manufacturing and installation is 
sufficient to prevent unintended access 
and physical damage 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
display is placed inside cabin within 
view of the operator 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
use of covering at wire- display interface 
to prevent unintended access 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
display installation is inside cabin in a 
dry debris-proof location 
 
The operator shall avoid adverse road 
conditions which may produce NVH and 
damage or loosen the display 
Power failure See wiring and unintended access 
requirements 
 
Ensure the power supplied to the 
display is within manufacturer 
operational range 
The development team shall ensure the 
power supplied to the display is within 




Ensure understanding of display 
signal quality, noise, latency, and 
bandwidth accounting for 
measurement and control action 
error 
 
The development team shall ensure an 
understanding of display signal quality, 
noise, latency, and bandwidth 
accounting for measurement and control 
action error 
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To reduce display signal latency, 
ensure use of high-quality 
transmission medium 
 
To prevent display signal 
bandwidth faults, ensure 
transmission medium gauge is 
sufficient to handle expected 
throughput (load) with factor of 
safety 
 
Ensure understanding of time 
required to analyze and route 
display signal data 
 
To reduce display signal noise 
ensure wires are as short as 
possible 
 
To reduce display signal noise 
ensure wires are kept away from 
electrical machinery 
 
To reduce display signal noise it 
is recommended to use twisted 
together wires 
 
To reduce internal display signal 
noise ensure thermal effects on 
amplifiers are minimized 
 
To reduce display signal noise, if 
possible, ensure amplifier 
bandwidth matches input signal 
bandwidth 
 
To reduce display signal noise 
ensure use of proper filtering 
techniques 
 
To reduce display signal latency the 
development team shall ensure the use 
of a high-quality transmission medium 
 
To prevent display signal bandwidth 
faults the development team shall ensure 
the transmission medium gauge is 
sufficient to handle expected throughput 
(load) with factor of safety 
 
The development team shall ensure an 
understanding of time required to 
analyze and route display signal data 
 
To reduce display signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the wires 
are as short as possible 
 
To reduce display signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the wires 
are kept away from electrical machinery 
 
To reduce display signal noise it is 
recommended to use twisted together 
wires 
 
To reduce internal display signal noise 
the development team shall ensure the 
thermal effects on amplifiers are 
minimized 
 
To reduce display signal noise, if 
possible, the development team shall 
ensure the amplifier bandwidth matches 
input signal bandwidth 
 
To reduce display signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the use 
of proper filtering techniques 
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To reduce display signal noise 
ensure use of wire shielding and 
conduit 
 
To reduce display signal noise 
ensure understanding of ground 
loops and impose proper 
grounding practices 
 
Ensure the use of software safety 
and that the display signal is free 
from external unintended 
malicious control 
 
Ensure system software updates 
are performed over land-line and 
not through the air 
To reduce display signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the use 
of wire shielding and conduit 
 
To reduce display signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the 
understanding of ground loops and 
impose proper grounding practices 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
use of software safety and that the 
display signal is free from external 
unintended malicious control 
 
The development team shall ensure 
display system software updates are 
performed over land-line and not 
through the air 
Item:     ZED Camera 
Potential Hazard Cause Major Effect 
Corrective/Preventative 
Measure Functional Requirement 
Failure to perform high-
resolution depth perception 
 
Failure to perform 6-axis 
positional tracking to sense 
space and motion 
 
Failure to perform large-scale 
3D mapping 










on single point source 
information 
Operator unaware of 
system failure 
Less reliable image to 
which the computer 
can determine 
deviations and control 
actions 
Ensure ZED camera wiring is 
securely installed using 
manufacturer installation 
specifications 
Ensure ZED camera wiring gauge 
is sufficient to carry max 
operational current with factor of 
safety 
Ensure ZED camera wire bend 
radii are adhered to 
 
Ensure ZED camera alters 
computer that system failure has 
occurred 
The development team shall ensure the 
ZED camera wiring is securely installed 
using manufacturer installation 
specifications 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
ZED camera wiring gauge is sufficient 
to carry max operational current with 
factor of safety 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
ZED camera wire bend radii are adhered 
to 
Power failure See wiring and unintended access 
requirements 
The development team shall ensure the 
power supplied to the ZED camera is 








Ensure the power supplied to the 
ZED camera is within 
manufacturer operational range 




Ensure understanding of ZED 
camera signal quality, noise, 
latency, and bandwidth 
accounting for measurement and 
control action error 
 
To reduce ZED camera signal 
latency, ensure use of high-
quality transmission medium 
 
To prevent ZED camera signal 
bandwidth faults, ensure 
transmission medium gauge is 
sufficient to handle expected 
throughput (load) with factor of 
safety 
 
Ensure understanding of time 
required to analyze and route 
ZED camera signal data 
 
To reduce ZED camera signal 
noise ensure wires are as short as 
possible 
 
To reduce ZED camera signal 
noise ensure wires are kept away 
from electrical machinery 
 
To reduce ZED camera signal 
noise it is recommended to use 
twisted together wires 
 
To reduce internal ZED camera 
signal noise ensure thermal 
The development team shall ensure an 
understanding of ZED camera signal 
quality, noise, latency, and bandwidth 
accounting for measurement and control 
action error 
 
To reduce ZED camera signal latency 
the development team shall ensure the 
use of a high-quality transmission 
medium 
 
To prevent ZED camera signal 
bandwidth faults the development team 
shall ensure the transmission medium 
gauge is sufficient to handle expected 
throughput (load) with factor of safety 
 
The development team shall ensure an 
understanding of time required to 
analyze and route ZED camera signal 
data 
 
To reduce ZED camera signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the wires 
are as short as possible 
 
To reduce ZED camera signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the wires 
are kept away from electrical machinery 
 
To reduce ZED camera signal noise it is 
recommended to use twisted together 
wires 
 
To reduce internal ZED camera signal 
noise the development team shall ensure 
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effects on amplifiers are 
minimized 
 
To reduce ZED camera signal 
noise, if possible, ensure 
amplifier bandwidth matches 
input signal bandwidth 
 
To reduce ZED camera signal 
noise ensure use of proper 
filtering techniques 
 
To reduce ZED camera signal 
noise ensure use of wire shielding 
and conduit 
 
To reduce ZED camera signal 
noise ensure understanding of 
ground loops and impose proper 
grounding practices 
 
Ensure understanding of potential 
ZED camera signal storage delays 
 
Ensure the use of software safety 
and that the ZED camera signal is 
free from external unintended 
malicious control 
 
Ensure system software updates 
are performed over land-line and 
not through the air 
the thermal effects on amplifiers are 
minimized 
 
To reduce ZED camera signal noise, if 
possible, the development team shall 
ensure the amplifier bandwidth matches 
input signal bandwidth 
 
To reduce ZED camera signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the use 
of proper filtering techniques 
 
To reduce ZED camera signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the use 
of wire shielding and conduit 
 
To reduce ZED camera signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the 
understanding of ground loops and 
impose proper grounding practices 
 
The development team shall ensure 
understanding of potential ZED camera 
signal storage delays 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
use of software safety and that the ZED 
camera signal is free from external 
unintended malicious control 
 
The development team shall ensure 
system software updates are performed 




Failure of field of 
view 
 
To prevent field of view failure 
ensure ZED camera is mounted in 
the operational area of the wind 
shield wipers 
 
To prevent field of view failure 
ensure ZED camera has control of 
To prevent field of view failure the 
development team shall ensure the ZED 
camera is mounted in the operational 
area of the wind shield wipers 
 
To prevent field of view failure the 
development team shall ensure the ZED 






fog, poorly painted 
or no lane lines) 
wind shield wipers (debris may 
impede camera view while 
operator is unaware) 
 
Ensure ZED camera is of high-
quality to maintain operations 
during low-light, poorly painted 
lane lines, and adverse weather 
conditions 
 
Ensure ZED camera indicates to 
computer and operator when the 




camera has control of wind shield wipers 
(debris may impede camera view while 
operator is unaware) 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
ZED camera is of high-quality to 
maintain operations during low-light, 
poorly painted lane lines, and adverse 
weather conditions 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
camera indicates to computer and 
operator when the system is unavailable 
 
Item:     GPS 
Potential Hazard Cause Major Effect 
Corrective/Preventative 
Measure Functional Requirement 
Failure to receive GPS data 
 
Failure to provide GPS data 
to associated controller 





 Ensure GPS wiring is securely 
installed using manufacturer 
installation specifications 
Ensure GPS wiring gauge is 
sufficient to carry max 
operational current with factor of 
safety 
Ensure GPS wire bend radii are 
adhered to 
 
Ensure GPS alters computer that 
system failure has occurred 
The development team shall ensure the 
GPS wiring is securely installed using 
manufacturer installation specifications 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
GPS wiring gauge is sufficient to carry 
max operational current with factor of 
safety 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
GPS wire bend radii are adhered to 
Unintended access 
or physical damage 
(liquid, puncture) 
Ensure GPS manufacturing and 
installation is sufficient to prevent 
unintended access and physical 
damage 
The development team shall ensure the 
GPS manufacturing and installation is 
sufficient to prevent unintended access, 
loosening, and physical damage 
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Ensure use of covering at wire-
GPS interface to prevent 
unintended access 
Avoid adverse road condition 
which may produce NVH and 
damage or loosen the GPS 
The development team shall ensure the 
use of covering at wire-GPS interface to 
prevent unintended access 
 
The operator shall avoid adverse road 
conditions which may produce NVH and 
damage or loosen the GPS 
Power failure See wiring and unintended access 
requirements 
 
Ensure the power supplied to the 
GPS is within manufacturer 
operational range 
The development team shall ensure the 
power supplied to the GPS is within 




Ensure understanding of GPS 
signal quality, noise, latency, and 
bandwidth accounting for 
measurement and control action 
error 
 
To reduce GPS signal latency, 
ensure use of high-quality 
transmission medium 
 
To prevent GPS signal bandwidth 
faults, ensure transmission 
medium gauge is sufficient to 
handle expected throughput (load) 
with factor of safety 
 
Ensure understanding of time 
required to analyze and route GPS 
signal data 
 
To reduce GPS signal noise 
ensure wires are as short as 
possible 
 
To reduce GPS signal noise 
ensure wires are kept away from 
electrical machinery 
The development team shall ensure an 
understanding of GPS signal quality, 
noise, latency, and bandwidth 
accounting for measurement and control 
action error 
 
To reduce GPS signal latency the 
development team shall ensure the use 
of a high-quality transmission medium 
 
To prevent GPS signal bandwidth faults 
the development team shall ensure the 
transmission medium gauge is sufficient 
to handle expected throughput (load) 
with factor of safety 
 
The development team shall ensure an 
understanding of time required to 
analyze and route GPS signal data 
 
To reduce GPS signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the wires 
are as short as possible 
 
To reduce GPS signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the wires 
are kept away from electrical machinery 




To reduce GPS signal noise it is 
recommended to use twisted 
together wires 
 
To reduce internal GPS signal 
noise ensure thermal effects on 
amplifiers are minimized 
 
To reduce GPS signal noise, if 
possible, ensure amplifier 
bandwidth matches input signal 
bandwidth 
 
To reduce GPS signal noise 
ensure use of proper filtering 
techniques 
 
To reduce GPS signal noise 
ensure use of wire shielding and 
conduit 
 
To reduce GPS signal noise 
ensure understanding of ground 
loops and impose proper 
grounding practices 
 
Ensure understanding of potential 
GPS signal storage delays 
 
Ensure the use of software safety 
and that the GPS signal is free 
from external unintended 
malicious control 
 
To reduce GPS signal noise it is 
recommended to use twisted together 
wires 
 
To reduce internal GPS signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the 
thermal effects on amplifiers are 
minimized 
 
To reduce GPS signal noise, if possible, 
the development team shall ensure the 
amplifier bandwidth matches input 
signal bandwidth 
 
To reduce GPS signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the use 
of proper filtering techniques 
 
To reduce GPS signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the use 
of wire shielding and conduit 
 
To reduce GPS signal noise the 
development team shall ensure the 
understanding of ground loops and 
impose proper grounding practices 
 
The development team shall ensure 
understanding of potential GPS signal 
storage delays 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
use of software safety and that the GPS 





Ensure GPS is of high-quality to 
maintain operations during low-
light, poorly painted lane lines, 
and adverse weather conditions 
The development team shall ensure the 
GPS is of high-quality to maintain 
operations during low-light, poorly 
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fog, poorly painted 
or no lane lines) 
 
Ensure GPS indicates to computer 





painted lane lines, and adverse weather 
conditions 
 
The development team shall ensure the 
GPS indicates to computer and operator 
when the system is unavailable 
 
 
Appendix 3.05 HARA CSMS DFMEA 
CSMS DMFEA 































































10 Wiring failure 



















factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire 
















8 560 To avoid HSC wiring 
failure the 
development team 






To avoid HSC wiring 
failure the 
development team 
shall ensure wiring 
gauge is sufficient to 
carry max operational 
current with factor of 
safety 
 























To avoid HSC wiring 
failure the 
development team 
shall ensure wire bend 
radii are adhered to 
and wiring is protected 
from heat sources 
Unintended 





























identify if  the 











and loss of 
functionality 
9 450 To avoid HSC 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, 
and manufacturing of 
the HSC 
 
To avoid HSC 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
development team 
shall ensure use of 
covering at wire-HSC 
interface  
 
To avoid HSC 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
operator shall avoid 
adverse road 
















identify if HSC 





8 560 To avoid HSC 
installation failure the 
development team 
shall ensure the 
mounting hardware are 
sufficient for max 
operational G-force 
with factor of safety 
 



















and loss of 
functionality 
To avoid HSC 
installation failure the 
development team 
shall ensure the 
mounting hardware is 
secure and free from 
potential lessening or 
unintended movement 




















and loss of 
functionality 
7 490 To avoid HSC over-
current failure the 
development team 
shall ensure software 
limits current ranges 
 
To avoid HSC over-
current failure the 
development team 
shall ensure relays and 
fuses are in place and 
functional 
 Over-heating 4 Ensure HSC is 
mounted such 
that there is 
proper 
clearance and  
sufficient air 




















9 360 To avoid HSC over-
heating failure the 
development team 
shall ensure the HSC is 
mounted such that 
there is proper 
clearance and 
sufficient air flow to 
cool the HSC 
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and loss of 
functionality 










































































10 Wiring failure 



















factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire 
















8 560 To avoid ECM wiring 
failure the 
development team 






To avoid ECM wiring 
failure the 
development team 
shall ensure wiring 
gauge is sufficient to 
carry max operational 
current with factor of 
safety 
 
To avoid ECM wiring 
failure the 
development team 
shall ensure wire bend 
radii are adhered to 
and wiring is protected 
from heat sources 
Unintended 















identify if  the 





9 450 To avoid ECM 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, 
and manufacturing of 
the ECM 
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and loss of 
functionality 
 
To avoid ECM 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
development team 
shall ensure use of 
covering at wire-ECM 
interface  
 
To avoid ECM 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
operator shall avoid 
adverse road 





































and loss of 
functionality 
8 560 To avoid ECM 
installation failure the 
development team 
shall ensure the 
mounting hardware are 
sufficient for max 
operational G-force 
with factor of safety 
 
To avoid ECM 
installation failure the 
development team 
shall ensure the 
mounting hardware is 
secure and free from 
potential lessening or 
unintended movement 








error signal and 
identifying 
7 490 To avoid ECM over-
current failure the 
development team 
shall ensure software 
limits current ranges 













and loss of 
functionality 
 
To avoid ECM over-
current failure the 
development team 
shall ensure relays and 
fuses are in place and 
functional 
Over-heating 2 Ensure ECM is 
mounted such 
that there is 
proper 
clearance and  
sufficient air 




















and loss of 
functionality 
9 180 To avoid ECM over-
heating failure the 
development team 
shall ensure the ECM 
is mounted such that 
there is proper 
clearance and 
sufficient air flow to 
cool the ECM 



































9 Wiring failure 
























8 5004 To avoid TCM wiring 
failure the 
development team 



























factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire 







To avoid TCM wiring 
failure the 
development team 
shall ensure wiring 
gauge is sufficient to 
carry max operational 
current with factor of 
safety 
 
To avoid TCM wiring 
failure the 
development team 
shall ensure wire bend 
radii are adhered to 
and wiring is protected 
from heat sources 
Unintended 





























identify if  the 













and loss of 
functionality 
9 405 To avoid TCM 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, 
and manufacturing of 
the TMC 
 
To avoid TCM 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
development team 
shall ensure use of 
covering at wire-TMC 
interface  
 
To avoid TCM 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
operator shall avoid 
adverse road 
conditions which may 
produce NVH 






































and loss of 
functionality 
8 504 To avoid TCM 
installation failure the 
development team 
shall ensure the 
mounting hardware are 
sufficient for max 
operational G-force 
with factor of safety 
 
To avoid TCM 
installation failure the 
development team 
shall ensure the 
mounting hardware is 
secure and free from 
potential lessening or 
unintended movement 




















and loss of 
functionality 
7 441 To avoid TCM over-
current failure the 
development team 
shall ensure software 
limits current ranges 
 
To avoid TCM over-
current failure the 
development team 
shall ensure relays and 
fuses are in place and 
functional 
Over-heating 2 Ensure TCM is 
mounted such 
that there is 
proper 
clearance and  
sufficient air 










9 162 To avoid TCM over-
heating failure the 
development team 
shall ensure the TCM 
is mounted such that 
there is proper 
clearance and 
sufficient air flow to 
cool the TCM 
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and loss of 
functionality 













of current to EM 
 













































10 Wiring failure 



















factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire 
















8 560 To avoid EMC wiring 
failure the 
development team 






To avoid EMC wiring 
failure the 
development team 
shall ensure wiring 
gauge is sufficient to 
carry max operational 
current with factor of 
safety 
 
To avoid EMC wiring 
failure the 
development team 
shall ensure wire bend 
radii are adhered to 










and wiring is protected 
from heat sources 
Unintended 









































9 450 To avoid EMC 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, 
and manufacturing of 
the EMC 
 
To avoid EMC 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
development team 
shall ensure use of 
covering at wire- EMC 
interface  
 
To avoid EMC 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
operator shall avoid 
adverse road 
































8 560 To avoid EMC 
installation failure the 
development team 
shall ensure the 
mounting hardware are 
sufficient for max 
operational G-force 
with factor of safety 
 
To avoid EMC 
installation failure the 
development team 
shall ensure the 
mounting hardware is 








secure and free from 
potential lessening or 
unintended movement 




















7 490 To avoid EMC over-
current failure the 
development team 
shall ensure software 
limits current ranges 
 
To avoid EMC over-
current failure the 
development team 
shall ensure relays and 




























cool the EM 
 
Ensure the fans 














or failure of 
HV 
components 
8 640 To avoid EMC 
operation outside of 
max/min temperature 
range the development 
team shall ensure the 
EMC has a thermal 






To avoid EMC 
operation outside of 
max/min temperature 
range the development 
team shall actuate 
cooling fans when 
EMC reaches specified 
temperature  
 
To avoid EMC 
operation outside of 
max/min temperature 
range the development 


















team shall ensure 
thermal system 
components (radiator, 
coolant level, fans) are 
functional and 
sufficient to cool the 
EMC 
 
To avoid EMC 
operation outside of 
max/min temperature 
range the development 
team shall ensure the 




To avoid EMC 
operation outside of 
max/min temperature 
range the development 
team shall ensure 
bolts, hoses and 
mounting hardware are 
securely fastened and 
free from potential 
loosening or 
unintended movement 









Mode D RPN 
Functional 
Requirement 























10 Wiring failure 




















8 560 To avoid BMS wiring 
failure the 
development team 

















































































factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire 










To avoid BMS wiring 
failure the 
development team 
shall ensure wiring 
gauge is sufficient to 
carry max operational 
current with factor of 
safety 
 
To avoid BMS wiring 
failure the 
development team 
shall ensure wire bend 
radii are adhered to 
and wiring is protected 
from heat sources 
Unintended 











































9 450 To avoid BMS 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, 
and manufacturing of 
the BMS 
 
To avoid BMS 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
development team 
shall ensure use of 
covering at wire- BMS 
interface  
 
To avoid BMS 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
operator shall avoid 
adverse road 
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8 560 To avoid BMS 
installation failure the 
development team 
shall ensure the 
mounting hardware are 
sufficient for max 
operational G-force 
with factor of safety 
 
To avoid BMS 
installation failure the 
development team 
shall ensure the 
mounting hardware is 
secure and free from 
potential lessening or 
unintended movement 




















7 490 To avoid BMS over-
current failure the 
development team 
shall ensure software 
limits current ranges 
 
To avoid BMS over-
current failure the 
development team 
shall ensure relays and 
fuses are in place and 
functional 
Over-heating 4 Ensure BMS is 
mounted such 
that there is 
proper 
clearance and  
sufficient air 










9 360 To avoid BMS over-
heating failure the 
development team 
shall ensure the BMS 
is mounted such that 
there is proper 
clearance and 
sufficient air flow to 
cool the BMS 
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and loss of 
functionality 













charging to the 

















Loss of motor 
functionality 








































4 200 To avoid OBC wiring 
failure the 
development team 
shall ensure charging 
port cover is sufficient 
to provide freedom 
from unintended 
access or physical 
damage 
 
To avoid OBC wiring 
failure the 
development team 
shall ensure charging 







To avoid OBC wiring 
failure the 
development team 




factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire 
bend radii are 
adhered to 
shall ensure wiring 
gauge is sufficient to 
carry max operational 
current with factor of 
safety 
 
To avoid OBC wiring 
failure the 
development team 
shall ensure wire bend 
radii are adhered to 
Wiring failure 
(not proper gauge, 
or installation) 













factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire 
















8 560 To avoid OBC wiring 
failure the 
development team 






To avoid OBC wiring 
failure the 
development team 
shall ensure wiring 
gauge is sufficient to 
carry max operational 
current with factor of 
safety 
 
To avoid OBC wiring 
failure the 
development team 
shall ensure wire bend 
radii are adhered to 
and wiring is protected 
from heat sources 
Unintended 











9 450 To avoid OBC 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
development team 












































shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, 
and manufacturing of 
the OBC 
 
To avoid OBC 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
development team 
shall ensure use of 
covering at wire- OBC 
interface  
 
To avoid OBC 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
operator shall avoid 
adverse road 
















identify if OBC 






8 560 To avoid OBC 
installation failure the 
development team 
shall ensure the 
mounting hardware are 
sufficient for max 
operational G-force 
with factor of safety 
 


















To avoid OBC 
installation failure the 
development team 
shall ensure the 
mounting hardware is 
secure and free from 
potential lessening or 
unintended movement 




















7 490 To avoid OBC over-
current failure the 
development team 
shall ensure software 
limits current ranges 
 
To avoid OBC over-
current failure the 
development team 
shall ensure relays and 








































or failure of 
HV 
components 
8 640 To avoid OBC 
operation outside of 
max/min temperature 
range the development 
team shall ensure the 
OBC has a thermal 






To avoid OBC 
operation outside of 
max/min temperature 
range the development 
team shall actuate 
cooling fans when 
OBC reaches specified 
temperature  





cool the EM 
 
Ensure the fans 

















To avoid OBC 
operation outside of 
max/min temperature 
range the development 
team shall ensure 
thermal system 
components (radiator, 
coolant level, fans) are 
functional and 
sufficient to cool the 
OBC 
 
To avoid OBC 
operation outside of 
max/min temperature 
range the development 
team shall ensure the 




To avoid OBC 
operation outside of 
max/min temperature 
range the development 
team shall ensure 
bolts, hoses and 
mounting hardware are 
securely fastened and 
free from potential 
loosening or 
unintended movement 




















2 Wiring failure 
(not proper gauge, 
installation or 






8 112 To avoid OBD II 
wiring failure the 
development team 






























factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire 













and loss of 
DAQ 






To avoid OBD II 
wiring failure the 
development team 
shall ensure wiring 
gauge is sufficient to 
carry max operational 
current with factor of 
safety 
 
To avoid OBD II 
wiring failure the 
development team 
shall ensure wire bend 
radii are adhered to 
and wiring is protected 
from heat sources 
Unintended 
access or physical 














identify if the 








eventual loss of 
DAQ 
9 90 To avoid OBD II 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, 
and manufacturing of 











identify if the 
8 112 To avoid OBD II 
installation failure the 
development team 
shall ensure the 









a factor of 
safety 











eventual loss of 
DAQ 
mounting hardware is 
secure, free from 
unintended movement, 
and sufficient for open 
road conditions with a 
factor of safety 















error signal and 
eventual loss of 
DAQ 
7 98 To avoid OBD II over-
current failure the 
development team 
shall ensure software 
limits current ranges 
 
To avoid OBD II over-
current failure the 
development team 
shall ensure relays and 
fuses are in place and 
functional 














signals such as 






























9 Wiring failure 




























8 504 To avoid CAN bus 
wiring failure the 
development team 






To avoid CAN bus 
wiring failure the 
































a loss of their 
functionality 
 






factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire 









and loss of 
DAQ 
development team 
shall ensure wiring 
gauge is sufficient to 
carry max operational 
current with factor of 
safety 
 
To avoid CAN bus 
wiring failure the 
development team 
shall ensure wire bend 
radii are adhered to 
and wiring is protected 
from heat sources 
Unintended 
access or physical 












Ensure use of  
CAN bus 










CAN bus is 










and loss of 
DAQ 
9 405 To avoid CAN bus 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, 
and manufacturing of 
the CAN bus 
 
To avoid CAN bus 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
development team 
shall ensure use of 
covering at wire- CAN 
bus interface  
 
To avoid CAN bus 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
operator shall avoid 
adverse road 








8 504 To avoid CAN bus 
installation failure the 












a factor of 
safety 
inspection will 
identify if the 














and loss of 
DAQ 
development team 
shall ensure the 
mounting hardware are 
sufficient for max 
operational G-force 
with factor of safety 
 
To avoid CAN bus 
installation failure the 
development team 
shall ensure the 
mounting hardware is 
secure and free from 
potential lessening or 
unintended movement 




















7 441 To avoid CAN bus 
over-current failure the 
development team 
shall ensure software 
limits current ranges 
 
To avoid CAN bus 
over-current failure the 
development team 
shall ensure relays and 
fuses are in place and 
functional 
 Over-heating 2 Ensure the 
CAN bus is 
mounted such 
that there is 
proper 
clearance and  
sufficient air 
flow to cool 




identify if the 




natural air flow 
cooling 
9 162 To avoid CAN bus 
over-heating failure the 
development team 
shall ensure the CAN 
bus is mounted such 
that there is proper 
clearance and 
sufficient air flow to 
cool the CAN bus 











and loss of 
functionality 













position of the 
accelerator pedal 



































10 Wiring failure 



















factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire 


















8 160 To avoid AP/APPS 
wiring failure the 
development team 






To avoid AP/APPS 
wiring failure the 
development team 
shall ensure wiring 
gauge is sufficient to 
carry max operational 
current with factor of 
safety 
 
To avoid AP/APPS 
wiring failure the 
development team 
shall ensure wire bend 
radii are adhered to 
and wiring is protected 
from heat sources 






access or physical 
damage to pedal 













identify if  the 
AP and APPS 














and loss of 
functionality 
9 180 To avoid AP/APPS 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, 
and manufacturing of 
the AP/APPS 
 
To avoid AP/APPS 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
development team 
shall ensure use of 
covering at wire-
AP/APPS interface  
 
To avoid AP/APPS 
unintended access or 
physical damage the 
operator shall avoid 
adverse road 




















identify if AP 












8 160 To avoid AP/APPS 
installation failure the 
development team 
shall ensure the 
mounting hardware are 
sufficient for max 
operational G-force 
with factor of safety 
 
To avoid AP/APPS 
installation failure the 
development team 
shall ensure the 
mounting hardware is 
secure and free from 






and loss of 
functionality 
potential lessening or 
unintended movement 




















and loss of 
functionality 
7 140 To avoid AP/APPS 
over-current failure the 
development team 
shall ensure software 
limits current ranges 
 
To avoid AP/APPS 
over-current failure the 
development team 
shall ensure relays and 
fuses are in place and 
functional 
Over-heating 2 Ensure APPS 
is mounted 
such that there 
is proper 
clearance and  
sufficient air 



















and loss of 
functionality 
9 180 To avoid AP/APPS 
over-heating failure the 
development team 
shall ensure the 
AP/APPS is mounted 
such that there is 
proper clearance and 
sufficient air flow to 
cool the AP/APPS 
Item:     Low Voltage System 











Mode D RPN 
Functional 
Requirement 
Control of all 
auxiliary 
functions to 





















































































10 Wiring failure 



















factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire 
































shall ensure wiring 
gauge is sufficient to 
carry max operational 
current with factor of 
safety 
 




shall ensure wire bend 
radii are adhered to 
and wiring is protected 
from heat sources 
Unintended 














identify if  the 
low voltage 
components 
are free of 
unintended 
access and 
9 180 To avoid low voltage 
component unintended 
access or physical 
damage the 
development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, 
and manufacturing of 
the low voltage 
systems 














and loss of 
functionality 
 
To avoid low voltage 
component unintended 
access or physical 
damage the 
development team 
shall ensure use of 




To avoid low voltage 
component unintended 
access or physical 
damage the operator 
shall avoid adverse 
road conditions which 
may produce NVH 
Installation failure 
(wire, mounting) 

















identify if low 
voltage 
components 














and loss of 
functionality 




shall ensure the 
mounting hardware are 
sufficient for max 
operational G-force 
with factor of safety 
 




shall ensure the 
mounting hardware is 
secure and free from 
potential lessening or 
unintended movement 
   
 
262 




















and loss of 
functionality 
7 140 To avoid low voltage 
component over-
current failure the 
development team 
shall ensure software 
limits current ranges 
 
To avoid low voltage 
component over-
current failure the 
development team 
shall ensure relays and 
fuses are in place and 
functional 




such that there 
is proper 
clearance and  
sufficient air 




















and loss of 
functionality 
9 180 To avoid low voltage 
over-heating failure the 
development team 
shall ensure the low 
voltage component is 
mounted such that 
there is proper 
clearance and 
sufficient air flow to 
cool the low voltage 













identify if low 
voltage 
8 240 To avoid low voltage 
component failure the 
operator shall ensure 
low voltage 
components are 

















and loss of 
functionality 
functional and replace 
fatigued components 
 
Appendix 3.06 HARA PSI HV DFMEA 
PSI HV DFMEA 











Mode D RPN 
Functional 
Requirement 
Store and supply 























































or failure of HV 
components 
8 640 To prevent the HV 
battery pack from 
operating outside of the 
max/min temperature 
range the development 
team shall ensure 
specified temperature 
limits are controlled by 
the BMS 
 
To prevent the HV 
battery pack from 
operating outside of the 
max/min temperature 






























range the development 
team shall ensure 
actuation of battery 
pack thermal control 




To prevent the HV 
battery pack from 
operating outside of the 
max/min temperature 
range the development 






clearances and wire 
bend radii 
 
To prevent the HV 
battery pack from 
operating outside of the 
max/min temperature 
range the development 
team shall ensure a 
limit to charging and 













and sends SOC 
data in real time 
6 420 To prevent the HV 
battery pack from 
operating while 
undercharged the 
development team shall 
ensure the BMS 
monitors and controls 
the SOC in real-time 
 




minimum SOC  
To prevent the HV 
battery pack from 
operating while 
undercharged the 
development team shall 
ensure controls 
software will only draw 
current at specified 
minimum SOC 
Unintended 





























debris, dust, or 
insects 
 
Ensure fans are 












failure of HV 
components 
9 720 To prevent the HV 
battery pack from 
unintended access the 
development team shall 
ensure proper 
mounting,  installation, 
and manufacturing of 
enclosure and HV 
components 
 
To prevent the HV 
battery pack from 
unintended access the 
development team shall 
ensure bolts and 
mounting hardware is 
securely fastened and 
free from potential 
loosening or movement 
 
To prevent the HV 
battery pack from 
unintended access the 
development team shall 
ensure all HV enclosure 
vents are covered with 
appropriate screening to 
prevent access from 
liquid, debris, dust, or 
insects 
 










vehicle is not in 
use 
To prevent the HV 
battery pack from 
unintended access the 
development team shall 
ensure HV thermal 
control system fans are 
pulling air from dry 
particulate-free source 
 
To prevent the HV 
battery pack from 
unintended access the 
development team shall 
ensure the enclosure 
location is covered and 
free from the external 
environment when 






































identifying a  
failure of HV 
components 
8 640 To ensure the HV 
battery pack is properly 
installed the 




(clearance, bend radii, 
and soldering) 
 
To ensure the HV 
battery pack is properly 
installed the 
development team shall 
ensure the wires, bus 
bars, and all interfacing 
components are 
securely mounted and 
adequate clearance used 














rates and ranges 
 
Ensure relays 

















vehicle is not in 
operation 
8 560 To prevent the HV 
battery pack failure 
from excess charging or 
discharging of current 
the development team 
shall ensure software 
(HSC, OBC, EMC) 
limits charging and 
discharging rates and 
ranges 
 
To prevent the HV 
battery pack failure 
from excess charging or 
discharging of current 
the development team 
shall ensure relays and 
fuses are in place and 
functional to prevent 
over drawing of current 
















































































failure of HV 
components 
9 720 To prevent the HV 
enclosure failure from 
unintended access the 
development team shall 
ensure proper 
mounting,  installation, 
and manufacturing of 
enclosure (sealing, 
welds, bolt holes) 
 
To prevent the HV 
enclosure failure from 
unintended access the 







































Ensure fans are 








vehicle is not in 
use 
development team shall 
ensure bolts and 
mounting hardware is 
securely fastened and 
free from potential 
loosening or movement 
 
To prevent the HV 
enclosure from 
unintended access the 
development team shall 




To prevent the HV 
enclosure failure from 
unintended access the 
development team shall 
ensure the enclosure 
location is covered and 
free from the external 
environment when 






7 Use existing 
mount locations 
on vehicle 

























failure of HV 
components 
8 560 To prevent the HV 
enclosure failure from 
improper mounting to 
the vehicle frame the 
development team shall 
ensure the use of 
existing mount 
locations on vehicle 
frame 
 
To prevent the HV 
enclosure failure from 
improper mounting to 
the vehicle frame the 
development team shall 
ensure mounting 





engagement )  
hardware is sufficient 
for max operational G-
force with factor of 
safety 
 
To prevent the HV 
enclosure failure from 
improper mounting to 
the vehicle frame the 
development team shall 
ensure proper enclosure 
manufacturing (welds, 













































failure of HV 
components 
8 560 To prevent the HV 
enclosure failure from 
improper installation 
and mounting of 
components the 
development team shall 
ensure 
 
To prevent the HV 
enclosure failure from 
improper installation 
and mounting of 
components the 
development team shall 
ensure component 
mounting hardware is 
fire retardant 
 
To prevent the HV 
enclosure failure from 
improper installation 
and mounting of 
components the 
development team shall 
ensure component 
mounting hardware is 
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and sufficient to 



























that there is 
sufficient air 
flow to cool 
HV 
components 
and that the 

















9 720 To prevent a HV 
enclosure cooling 
failure the development 
team shall ensure the 
enclosure fans are 
operational and 
sufficient to cool that 
battery pack 
 
To prevent a HV 
enclosure cooling 
failure the development 
team shall ensure the 
enclosure fans are free 
from potential physical 
damage 
 
To prevent a HV 
enclosure cooling 
failure the development 
team shall ensure the 
enclosure fans pull air 
from a dry and 
particulate free source 
 
To prevent a HV 
enclosure cooling 
failure the development 
team shall ensure the 
enclosure ventilation is 
sufficient to cool HV 
components 
 
To prevent a HV 
enclosure cooling 
failure the development 
team shall ensure the 
enclosure is designed 





such that there is 
sufficient air flow to 
cool HV components 






3 Do not operate 








3 90 To prevent a HV 
enclosure failure the 
operator shall not 
operate vehicle during 
adverse environmental 
conditions (excessively 









































8 640 To prevent a HV 
enclosure 
manufacturing failure 
the development team 
shall ensure materials 
used in enclosure 
manufacturing are 
capable of withstanding 
high NVH 
 
To prevent a HV 
enclosure 
manufacturing failure 
the development team 





To prevent a HV 
enclosure failure the 
development team shall 
ensure materials used in 
manufacturing of 
enclosure are fire 
retardant 
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Mode D RPN 
Functional 
Requirement 






























































factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire 

















8 560 To prevent junction box 
wiring failure the 
development team shall 
ensure wiring is 





To prevent junction box 
wiring failure the 
development team shall 
ensure wiring gauge is 
sufficient to carry max 
operational current with 
factor of safety 
 
To prevent junction box 
wiring failure the 
development team shall 
ensure wire bend radii 







5 Ensure box 
manufacturing 


























9 450 To prevent junction box  
failure from unintended 
access the development 
team shall ensure the 
box manufacturing is 
sufficient to prevent 
unintended access, 
loosening, and physical 
damage 
 
To prevent junction box  
failure from unintended 
access the development 
team shall ensure the 
























































8 560 To prevent junction box 
failure the development 
team shall ensure the 
junction box and 
mounting hardware is 
sufficient for max 
operational G-force 
with factor of safety 
 
To prevent junction box 
failure the development 
team shall ensure the 
junction box and 
mounting hardware is 
fire retardant 
 
To prevent junction box 
failure the development 
team shall ensure the 
junction box and 
mounting hardware is 
secure and free from 
unintended movement 





















7 490 To prevent junction box 
over-current failure the 
development team shall 
ensure software (HSC, 
OBC, EMC) limits 
current magnitude 
 
To prevent junction box 
over-current failure the 
development team shall 
ensure relays and fuses 
are in place and 
   
 
274 
functional to prevent 
over drawing of current 
Environmental 
conditions 
outside of IP67 
ratings 
2 Ensure the 
environmental 
conditions do 










2 40 To prevent junction box 
failure the development 
team shall ensure box 
minimum rating of IP67 











Mode D RPN 
Functional 
Requirement 



















































factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire 
















8 560 To prevent HV wiring 
harness failure the 
development team shall 
ensure wiring is 





To prevent HV wiring 
harness failure the 
development team shall 
ensure wiring gauge is 
sufficient to carry max 
operational current with 
factor of safety 
 
To prevent HV wiring 
harness failure the 
development team shall 
ensure wire bend radii 





7 Ensure harness 
manufacturing 







harness is free 
9 630 To prevent HV wiring 
harness failure the 
development team shall 
ensure the harness 
manufacturing is 









































sufficient to prevent 
unintended access and 
physical damage 
 
To prevent HV wiring 
harness failure the 
development team shall 
ensure the use of covers 
and shielding to prevent 
unintended access and 
physical damage 
 
To prevent HV wiring 
harness failure the 
operator shall avoid 
adverse road condition 
which may project 













































8 560 To prevent HV wiring 
harness installation 
failure the development 
team shall ensure the 
harness and mounting 
hardware is sufficient 
for max operational G-
force with factor of 
safety 
 
To prevent HV wiring 
harness installation 
failure the development 
team shall ensure the 
harness and mounting 
hardware is secure and 
free from unintended 
movement 
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7 490 To prevent HV wiring 
harness over-current 
failure the development 
team shall ensure 
software (HSC, OBC, 
EMC) limits current 
rates and ranges 
 
To prevent HV wiring 
harness over-current 
failure the development 
team shall ensure relays 
and fuses are in place 
and functional to 
prevent over drawing of 
current 











Mode D RPN 
Functional 
Requirement 
















































































factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire 
















8 560 To prevent BMS wiring 
failure the development 
team shall ensure the 






To prevent BMS wiring 
failure the development 
team shall ensure the 
wiring gauge is 
sufficient to carry max 
operational current with 
factor of safety 
 
To prevent BMS wiring 
failure the development 
team shall ensure wire 


















































































9 450 To prevent BMS failure 
the development team 
shall ensure the  
manufacturing is 
sufficient to prevent 
unintended access and 
physical damage 
 
To prevent BMS 
unintended access or 
physical damage failure 
the development team 
shall ensure use of 




To prevent BMS 
unintended access or 
physical damage failure 
the operator  shall avoid 
adverse road condition 
which may produce 




















identify if BMS 










8 560 To prevent BMS 
installation failure the 
development team shall 
ensure the BMS and 
mounting hardware are 
sufficient for max 
operational G-force 
with factor of safety 
 
To prevent BMS 
installation failure the 
development team shall 
ensure the BMS and 
mounting hardware is 








secure and free from 
unintended movement 
Over-current 7 Ensure software 
limits current 
rates and ranges 
 
Ensure relays 














7 490 To prevent BMS over-
current failure the 
development team shall 
ensure software limits 
current rates and ranges 
 
To prevent BMS over-
current failure the 
development team shall 
ensure relays and fuses 
are in place and 
functional to prevent 
over drawing of current 
 
Over-heating 4 Ensure BMS is 
mounted such 
that there is 
proper 
clearance and  
sufficient air 





identify if the 
BMS has proper 
clearance to 
allow for 












9 360 To prevent BMS over-
heating failure the 
development team shall 
ensure the BMS is 
mounted such that there 
is proper clearance and  
sufficient air flow to 
cool the BMS 
 









Mode Detection Mode D RPN 
Functional 
Requirement 




charging to the 


















Loss of motor 
functionality 



























factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire 













4 200 To prevent OBC 
charging port failure the 
development team shall 
ensure the charging port 
cover is sufficient to 
provide freedom from 
unintended access or 
physical damage 
 
To prevent OBC 
charging port failure the 
development team shall 
ensure the charging port 





To prevent OBC 
charging port failure the 
development team shall 
ensure wiring gauge is 
sufficient to carry max 
operational current with 
factor of safety 
 
To prevent OBC 
charging port failure the 
development team shall 
ensure wire bend radii 























8 560 To prevent OBC wiring 
failure the development 
team shall ensure the 













factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire 




To prevent OBC wiring 
failure the development 
team shall ensure 
wiring gauge is 
sufficient to carry max 
operational current with 
factor of safety 
 
To prevent OBC wiring 
failure the development 
team shall ensure wire 
bend radii are adhered 
to 
Unintended 

































identify the OBC 










9 450 To prevent OBC failure 
the development team 
shall ensure 
manufacturing is 
sufficient to prevent 
unintended access and 
physical damage 
 
To prevent OBC 
unintended access or 
physical damage failure 
the development team 
shall ensure the use of 




To prevent OBC 
unintended access or 
physical damage failure 
the development team 
shall ensure charging 
port cover is sufficient 
to provide freedom 
from unintended access 
or physical damage 
 










To prevent OBC 
unintended access or 
physical damage failure 
the operator shall avoid 
adverse road condition 
which may produce 






















identify if OBC 
is free of 
manufacturing or 
installation 








8 560 To prevent OBC 
installation failure the 
development team shall 
ensure the OBC and 
mounting hardware are 
sufficient for max 
operational G-force 
with factor of safety 
 
To prevent OBC 
installation failure the 
development team shall 
ensure the OBC, 
charging port, and 
mounting hardware are 
secure and free from 
unintended movement 
Over-current 7 Ensure software 
limits current 
rates and ranges 
 
Ensure relays 













7 490 To prevent OBC over-
current failure the 
development team shall 
ensure software limits 
current rates and ranges 
 
To prevent OBC over-
current failure the 
development team shall 
ensure relays and fuses 
are in place and 
functional to prevent 









8 640 To prevent OBC over-
heating failure the 
development team shall 

























signal sends data 




by identifying a  
thermal event, 
error message of 
overheating, or 
failure of HV 
components 






To prevent OBC over-
heating failure the 
development team shall 
ensure actuation of 
thermal control system 





To prevent OBC over-
heating failure the 




(clearance, bend radii) 













of current to EM 
 
































































8 560 To prevent EMC wiring 
failure the development 
team shall ensure the 






To prevent EMC wiring 
failure the development 
team shall ensure 
wiring gauge is 






















factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire 
bend radii are 
adhered to 
sufficient to carry max 
operational current with 
factor of safety 
 
To prevent EMC wiring 
failure the development 
team shall ensure wire 
































identify the EMC 










9 450 To prevent EMC failure 
the development team 
shall ensure 
manufacturing is 
sufficient to prevent 
unintended access and 
physical damage 
 
To prevent EMC 
unintended access 
failure the development 
team shall ensure the 
use of covering at wire-




To prevent EMC 
unintended access 
failure the operator  
shall avoid adverse road 
condition which may 











factor of safety 
Vehicle technical 
inspection will 
identify if EMC 
is free of 
manufacturing or 
installation 
fatigue or failure  
8 560 To prevent EMC 
installation failure the 
development team shall 
ensure the EMC and 
mounting hardware are 
sufficient for max 



















with factor of safety 
 
To prevent EMC 
installation failure the 
development team shall 
ensure the EMC and 
mounting hardware is 
secure and free from 
unintended movement 
Over-current 7 Ensure software 
limits current 
rates and ranges 
 
Ensure relays 













7 490 To prevent EMC over-
current failure the 
development team shall 
ensure software limits 
current rates and ranges 
 
To prevent EMC over-
current failure the 
development team shall 
ensure relays and fuses 
are in place and 
functional to prevent 

































by identifying a  
thermal event, 
error message of 
overheating, or 
failure of HV 
components 
8 640 To prevent EMC over-
heating failure the 
development team shall 
ensure software limits 
operation within 
specified EMC temp 
range 
 
To prevent EMC over-
heating failure the 
development team shall 
ensure actuation of 
thermal control system 









To prevent EMC over-
heating failure the 





(clearance, bend radii) 
 
Appendix 3.07 HARA PSI HV HazOP 




No As well 
as 
Part of Reverse Other Early Late Before After Faster Slower More Less 
NVH          X  X  
Temperature            X X 
Current X  X X  X X     X X 
Clearance            X X 
Unauthorized 
Access 
           X  
PSI HV HazOP 
FUNCTION:          Apply NVH Stimuli to High Voltage System  
Guide 
Word Deviation Consequences Causes Safeguards Functional Requirement 






Adverse road conditions. 
Inadequate installation, factor 
of safety, or mounting 
hardware 
Proper installation, factor 
of safety, soldering, 
component security and 
mounting hardware. 
 
TVP ESS shall be capable of 
withstanding a high road vibrational 
frequency 
ESS components 
disconnect from each 
other 
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disconnect from each 
other 
Adverse road conditions. 
Inadequate installation, factor 
of safety, or mounting 
hardware 
Proper installation, factor 
of safety, soldering, 
component security and 
mounting hardware. 
 
TVP ESS shall be capable of 
withstanding a high road vibrational 
amplitude 
Potential thermal runaway 
- Fire 
ESS components 
disconnect from each 
other 
FUNCTION:          Apply Temperature Stimuli to High Voltage System 
Guide 









ESS component error, cooling 
system error, software controls 
error 
Controls software 
validation during SIL. 
ESS controls validation. 
E-stop validation. ESS 
thermal control validation. 
Thorough testing during 
SIL, zero velocity and 
closed course phases  
The TVP ESS shall operate within a 
safe and specified temperature range 








Item damage or lost 
functionality 
Extremely cold environmental 
conditions.  





FUNCTION:          Apply Current Stimuli to High Voltage System 
Guide 
Word Deviation Consequences Causes Safeguards Functional Requirement 




ESS does not function OBC failure. Controls 
software/hardware error. 
Ensure ESS components, 
control software/hardware 
are installed properly. 
Thoroughly test during 
SIL, zero velocity, and 
closed course phases 
The current applied to the ESS when 
charging shall match the current 
requested 







EM/ESS does not function Power supply error. Controls 
software/hardware error. EM 
malfunction. Contactors 
disengaged 
Ensure ESS components, 
control 
software/hardware, APPS, 
and EM are installed 
properly. Thoroughly test 
during SIL, zero velocity, 
and closed course phases 
The current applied by the ESS when 
discharging shall match the current 
requested 
Torque request not met 





ESS does not charge as 
fast as intended 
OBC failure. Controls 
software/hardware error. 
Ensure ESS components, 
control software/hardware 
are installed properly. 
Thoroughly test during 
SIL, zero velocity, and 
closed course phases 
The current applied to the ESS when 
charging shall match the current 
requested 





EM/ESS does not function 
as intended 
Power supply error. Controls 
software/hardware error. EM 
malfunction. Contactors 
disengaged 
Ensure ESS components, 
control 
software/hardware, APPS, 
and EM are installed 
properly. Thoroughly test 
during SIL, zero velocity, 
and closed course phases 
The current applied by the ESS when 
discharging shall match the current 
requested 
TVP does not accelerate as 
intended 





TVP accelerates in 
direction other than 
intended 
Power supply error. Controls 
software/hardware error. EM 
malfunction. APPS error 
Ensure ESS components, 
control 
software/hardware, APPS, 
and EM are installed and 
functioning properly. 
Thoroughly test during 
SIL, zero velocity, and 
closed course phases 
The current applied shall match the 
direction of the current requested 







TVP accelerates earlier 
than intended 
Power supply error. Controls 
software/hardware error. EM 
malfunction. APPS error 
Ensure ESS components, 
control 
software/hardware, APPS, 
and EM are installed and 
functioning properly. 
Thoroughly test during 
SIL, zero velocity, and 
closed course phases 
The current applied shall be delivered 
at the time intended 
TVP collides with object 
TVP/operator 
damage/injury 







TVP accelerates later than 
intended 
Power supply error. Controls 
software/hardware error. EM 
malfunction. APPS error 
Ensure ESS components, 
control 
software/hardware, APPS, 
and EM are installed and 
functioning properly. 
Thoroughly test during 
SIL, zero velocity, and 





TVP accelerates faster 
than intended 
Power supply error. Controls 
software/hardware error. EM 
malfunction. APPS error 
Ensure ESS components, 
control 
software/hardware, APPS, 
and EM are installed and 
functioning properly. 
Thoroughly test during 
SIL, zero velocity, and 
closed course phases 
The magnitude of the current applied 
shall match the magnitude of the 
current requested 








EM/ESS does not function 
as intended 
Power supply error. Controls 
software/hardware error. EM 
malfunction. APPS error 
Ensure ESS components, 
control 
software/hardware, APPS, 
and EM are installed and 
functioning properly. 
Thoroughly test during 
SIL, zero velocity, and 
closed course phases 
TVP does not accelerate as 
intended 
Torque request not met 
FUNCTION:          Apply Clearance To High Voltage Components 
Guide 






Limits the space to make 
future modifications 
Poor design. Over 
compensation. 
Ensure manufacturer 
clearance and installation 
specifications are met.  
High voltage component clearance 
requirements shall be minimized to 





Thermal transfer leading 
to over heating 
Poor design. Lack 
understanding of clearance 
requirements 
Ensure manufacturer 
clearance and installation 
specifications are met. 
High voltage component clearance 
requirements shall be met to ensure 
safe TVP operation 
TVP/operator 
damage/injury 





Difficulty installing and 
maintaining the high 
voltage components 
FUNCTION:          Apply Unauthorized Access Stimuli To The High Voltage System 
Guide 







Short circuit Animals, insects, fingers, 
liquid, snow, dust, and debris. 
Poor design of ESS enclosure 
Ensure ESS enclosure 
ventilation and ports are 
secured using mesh or 
other impassable filter. 
The ESS enclosure and high voltage 
system shall prevent unauthorized 
access and physical damage to the 





Appendix 3.08 HARA PSI Mechanical Controls Hardware HazOP 




No As well 
as 
Part of Reverse Other Early Late Before After Faster Slower More Less 
NVH          X  X  
Temperature            X X 
Current X     X X     X X 
Clearance            X X 
PSI Mechanical HazOP of the Controls Hardware System 
FUNCTION:          Apply NVH Stimuli to Controls Hardware System  
Guide 
Word Deviation Consequences Causes Safeguards Functional Requirement 











Adverse road conditions. 
Inadequate installation, factor 
of safety, or mounting 
hardware 
Proper installation, factor 
of safety, soldering, 
component security and 
mounting hardware. 
 
Vehicle controls hardware shall be 
capable of withstanding a high NVH 














Adverse road conditions. 
Inadequate installation, factor 
of safety, or mounting 
hardware 
Proper installation, factor 
of safety, soldering, 
component security and 
mounting hardware. 
 
Vehicle controls hardware shall be 







FUNCTION:          Apply Temperature Stimuli to Controls Hardware System 
Guide 











ESS component error, 
inadequate cooling, poor 
design, software controls error 
E-stop validation. 
Controls hardware thermal 
control validation. 
Thorough testing during 
zero velocity and closed 
course phases  
The controls hardware shall operate 














Extremely cold environmental 
conditions.  





FUNCTION:          Apply Current Stimuli to Controls Hardware System 




Word Deviation Consequences Causes Safeguards Functional Requirement 












Thoroughly test during 
SIL, zero velocity, and 
closed course phases 
The current applied to the controls 






Vehicle actuates earlier 
than intended 
Power supply, ESS, or controls 
software/hardware error. 
APPS error 
Ensure ESS components, 
control 
software/hardware, and 
APPS are installed and 
functioning properly. 
Thoroughly test during 
SIL, zero velocity, and 
closed course phases 
The current applied to the controls 
hardware shall be delivered at the time 
intended 







Vehicle actuates later than 
intended 
Power supply, ESS, or controls 
software/hardware error. 
APPS error 
Ensure ESS components, 
control 
software/hardware, APPS, 
and EM are installed and 
functioning properly. 
Thoroughly test during 
SIL, zero velocity, and 








Power supply, controls 
software/hardware,  or ESS 
malfunction 
Ensure ESS components, 
control 
software/hardware, and 
power supply are installed 
and functioning properly. 
Thoroughly test during 
SIL, zero velocity, and 
closed course phases 
The magnitude of the current applied 
to controls hardware shall match the 
magnitude of the current requested 
Controls hardware actuates 
vehicle components in 
manner other than intended 














Power supply, controls 
software/hardware,  or ESS 
malfunction 
Ensure ESS components, 
control 
software/hardware, and 
power supply are installed 
and functioning properly. 
Thoroughly test during 
SIL, zero velocity, and 
closed course phases 
Controls hardware actuates 
vehicle components in 
manner other than intended 
Vehicle does not accelerate 
as intended 
Torque request not met 
FUNCTION:          Apply Clearance To Controls Hardware Components 
Guide 






Limits the space to make 
future modifications 
Poor design. Over 
compensation. 
Ensure manufacturer 
clearance and installation 
specifications are met.  
Controls hardware component 
clearance requirements shall be 







Thermal transfer leading to 
over heating 
Poor design. Lack 
understanding of clearance 
requirements 
Ensure manufacturer 
clearance and installation 
specifications are met. 
Controls hardware component 
clearance requirements shall be met to 
ensure safe vehicle operation 
Vehicle/operator 
damage/injury 
Difficulty installing and 
maintaining the controls 
hardware components 
 
Appendix 3.09 HARA PSI Mechanical DFMEA 
PSI Mechanical DFMEA 
Item:     Modified Driveshaft 
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rear of vehicle 













Damage to or 


















































identify if the 











partial or  total 
functionality 
failure 
9 720 Development team 





and its components 
 
Development team 
shall ensure driveshaft 
bolts and mounting 
hardware is securely 
fastened and free from 






interface location is 
covered and free from 
potential unintended 





2 Ensure proper 
manufacturing 









5 100 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
manufacturing and 









prior to or 
3 90 Operator shall avoid 
adverse road condition 
which may produce 

































































9 720 Development team 





and its components 
 
Development team 
shall ensure driveshaft 
bolts and mounting 
hardware is securely 
fastened and free from 






interface location is 
covered and free from 
potential unintended 

















9 270 Development team 
shall ensure driveshaft 
manufacturing and use 
of materials is 
sufficient to prevent 










free of physical 
damage 
unintended access and 
physical damage 
Item:     Differential 











to wheels and 
allows wheels 
to rotate at 
different speeds 
Loss of  

























































identify if the 











partial or total 
functionality 
failure 
9 648 Development team 









shall ensure driveshaft 
bolts and mounting 
hardware is securely 
fastened and free from 






interface location is 
covered and free from 
potential unintended 
access or physical 
damage 






















which may cause a 



































identify if the 











partial or total 
functionality 
failure 
9 162 Development team 





and its components 
 
Development team 
shall ensure bolts and 
mounting hardware is 
securely fastened and 







interface location is 
free from potential 
unintended access or 
physical damage 
Gear fatigue 
failure - slip 
 




partial or total 
8 72  





Item:     Suspension 



























Pulling to one side  
 
Difficult to steer 
 











7 Uneven tire 
pressure and 
tire wear 





























and uneven tire 
wear 
2 70 Operator shall ensure 
proper tire pressure 
prior to operation 
 
Operator shall ensure 
proper tire alignment 
 
Operator shall ensure 
tire quality 
 
Operator shall ensure 
wheels are balanced 
and suspension is free 
of ben tor broken 
wheels 
 
Operator shall avoid 
poor driving behaviors 
 
























3 42 Development team 
shall ensure 
suspension radius rods 
are free from fatigue 
and corrosion 







































6 168 Operator shall ensure 
proper tire alignment 
 
Operator shall avoid 


















































calibrated and that 
springs are free of 
fatigue and corrosion 










































3 63 Development team 
shall ensure the 
suspensions system 
and components have 
proper mounting,  
installation, and 
routine maintenance 




shall ensure the 
suspensions system 
bolts and mounting 
hardware is securely 
fastened and free from 

















6 42 Development team 












unstable  (nose 
dive during 
braking, or lean 
6 Spring fatigue 1 Routine 
maintenance 
and inspection 





















calibrated and that 
springs are free of 
fatigue and corrosion 




















Strut fatigue 1 Routine 
maintenance 
and inspection 




















strut or shock 
6 36 Development team 
shall ensure struts are 





Damage to or loss 
of property 
 






















3 15 Development team 
shall ensure shock 
absorbers are free of 
fatigue and leaks 
Spring fatigue 1 Routine 
maintenance 
and inspection 
















calibrated and that 
springs are free of 
fatigue and corrosion 
































which may cause a 
high NVH 
Item:     Brakes 









































Damage to or 















5 Ensure proper 























identify if the 
pads are free 











3 135 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting and  
installation of pads 
 
Development team 
shall ensure brake pad 
bolts and mounting 
hardware is securely 
fastened and free from 
potential loosening or 
unintended movement 
 





which may cause a 
high NVH  
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Operator shall perform 
routine inspection of 
brake system to check 
for rust, fatigue, and 
corrosion 
 
Operator shall avoid 






4 Ensure proper 




























identify if the 
rotors are free 











3 108 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting and  
installation of rotors 
 
Development team 
shall ensure rotor bolts 
and mounting 
hardware is securely 
fastened and free from 
potential loosening or 
unintended movement 
 









shall perform routine 
maintenance and 
inspection for rotor  
rust and corrosion 
 
Operator shall avoid 
poor driving behaviors 
Debris (snow, 
mud) build-up 
3 Ensure brake 
system is free 




6 162 Operator shall ensure 
brake system is free of 





debris prior to 
use 
identify if the 









build-up and debris 













































partial or total 
loss of 
functionality 









shall perform routine 
maintenance and 
inspection for caliper  
rust and corrosion 
 
Brake fluid line 
failure (leak, 
air in line) 

















5 90 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
bleeding, mounting,  
installation, and 
routine maintenance 























shall ensure bolts and 
mounting hardware is 
securely fastened and 


















vehicle motion  
8 72 Development team 
shall ensure routine 
maintenance and 
inspection parking 
brake  hardware and 
verify functionality 
Item:     Thermal 




























Damage to or 











ECM failure or 
aggressive 
driving) 








cool the engine 
 
Ensure the fans 


















8 240 Development team 
shall ensure thermal 
system components 
(radiator, coolant 
level, fans) are 
functional and 




shall ensure the 
thermal systems fans 
are free from potential 
physical damage 
 




















that there is 
sufficient air 






















shall ensure thermal 
system fans pull air 
from a cool source 
 
Development team 
shall ensure engine 
ventilation is 






shall ensure thermal 
system is designed 
such that there is 













shall ensure thermal 
system bolts and 
mounting hardware 
are securely fastened 
and free from 




shall ensure the ECM 












temp is stable 
controls and mitigates 
overheating 
 
Operator shall avoid 
poor driving behaviors 
Insufficient 
coolant levels 
2 Ensure proper 
coolant levels 
and check for 

















3 60 Operator shall ensure 
proper coolant levels 
and check for leaks 
prior to operation 






























5 150 Development team 








shall ensure thermal 
system pump bolts, 
interface components 
(seals, gaskets), and 
mounting hardware 
are securely fastened 










correct type of 
coolant is used, 
proper coolant 
levels, and 











and free from 




shall ensure the 
correct type of coolant 
is used, proper coolant 
levels, and check for 




shall ensure thermal 





































5 150 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, 
and manufacturing of 
radiator, clamps, hoses 
and their components 
 
Development team 





are securely fastened 
and free from 
potential loosening or 
movement 
 








correct type of 
coolant is used, 
proper coolant 
levels, and 
check for rust 
and leaks prior 
to operation  
Development team 
shall ensure the 
correct type of coolant 
is used, proper coolant 
levels, and check for 
rust and leaks prior to 
operation 























correct type of 
coolant is used, 
proper coolant 
levels, and 













4 120 Development team 








shall ensure thermal 




are securely fastened 
and free from 




shall ensure the 
correct type of coolant 
is used, proper coolant 
levels, and check for 
leaks prior to 
operation 































the event the 
thermostat is 
stuck shut, and 
low 
temperature in 




5 100 Development team 











are securely fastened 
and free from 
potential loosening or 
movement 

































5 100 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  
installation, and 
manufacturing of the 
thermal system fans 
and its components 
 
Development team 
shall ensure the 




are securely fastened 
and free from 
potential loosening or 
unintended movement 
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Ensure that the 
thermostat, 
fuse, fan wires, 
coolant level 
and fan clutch 
are  functional 
Development team 
shall ensure that the 
thermostat, fuse, fan 
wires, coolant level 
and fan clutch are  
functional 
Item:     Steering 



























Damage to or 













































identify a lack 
of, or 
discolored 







3 30 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  
installation, and 
manufacturing of EPS 
system hoses, clamps, 
and their components 
 
Development team 





are securely fastened 
and free from 




shall ensure EPS 
system  functionality 
of pump and check for 
hose deterioration 
Low fluid and 
fluid leaks 






3 60 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  























correct type of 
fluid is used, 
proper fluid 
levels, and 















manufacturing of EPS 
system hoses, clamps, 
and their components 
 
Development team 





are securely fastened 
and free from 
potential loosening or 
unintended movement 
 
Operator shall ensure 
the correct type of 
EPS fluid is used, 
proper fluid levels, 
and check for leaks 










of the belt 
(tension, torque 

















loss in steering 
functionality 
 
5 150 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  
installation, and 
manufacturing of the 
power steering belt 
(tension, torque specs) 
and its components 
 
Development team 
shall ensure EPS belt 
bolts, interface 
components, and 












are securely fastened 
and free from 
potential loosening or 
unintended movement 


































5 100 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  
installation, and 
manufacturing of EPS 




shall ensure EPS 




are securely fastened 
and free from 
potential loosening or 
movement 
Item:     Exhaust 















































6 216 Development team 




intake manifold and 
its components 
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Force engine to 





NVH in driver 



































are securely fastened 
































are no leaky 






























test and or leak-
down test 
 
4 144 Development team 













are securely fastened 






shall ensure there are 
no leaky fuel injectors 
or engine misfires 
 
Development team 
shall ensure engine 
operates at correct A/F 































ratio (running lean 








valve and O2 sensor 
 
Operator shall ensure 
routine oil changes 
 





which may cause a 
high NVH 
Mounting 
failure (loose or 
broken hangers 
or clamps) 






























or smell of 
exhaust fumes 
3 135 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  
installation, and 
manufacturing of the 




shall ensure exhaust 




are securely fastened 
and free from leaks 
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2 72 Development team 













are securely fastened 


































6 162 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  
installation, and 




shall ensure O2 sensor  




are securely fastened 
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mpg), or smell 
of exhaust 
fumes 





failure (loose or 
broken 
connectors) 
















































3 108 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  
installation, and 




shall ensure exhaust 




are securely fastened 






shall ensure exhaust 
pipes are free from 
corrosion and physical 
damage 
 





which may cause a 
high NVH 
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Item:     Engine 












at request of 
operator 


















Damage to or 






































clean oil,  and 
that the oil 




























8 400 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  
installation, and 
manufacturing of the 
oil filter and pump 
 
Development team 
shall ensure oil filter 
and pump bolts, 
interface components 
(seals, gaskets), and 
mounting hardware 
are securely fastened 





Operator shall ensure 
frequent oil changes, 
clean oil,  and that the 
oil filter is not 
ballooned or deformed 
Improper fuel 
octane number 
1 Verify prior to 
filling tank 
Combustion 
failure will lead 
to loss of 
vehicle 
functionality.  
4 40 Operator shall ensure 
proper fuel octane 











8 320 Development team 
shall ensure thermal 
system components 













cool the engine 
 
Ensure the fans 






















that there is 
sufficient air 



















level, fans) are 
functional and 




shall ensure the 
thermal systems fans 




shall ensure thermal 
system fans pull air 
from a cool source 
 
Development team 
shall ensure engine 
ventilation is 






shall ensure thermal 
system is designed 
such that there is 









thermal system and its 
components 

























temp is stable 
 
Development team 
shall ensure thermal 
system bolts and 
mounting hardware 
are securely fastened 
and free from 




shall ensure the ECM 
controls and mitigates 
overheating 
 
Operator shall avoid 
poor driving behaviors 
Head gasket 
failure 


































6 240 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, 
and manufacturing of 
head gasket. intake 




shall ensure head 
gasket components 
and mounting 
hardware are securely 
fastened and free from 
leaks and potential 
loosening or 
unintended movement 
















shall ensure the 

























































8 320 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  
installation, and 
manufacturing of the 
sparkplugs, fuel 










hardware are securely 
fastened and free from 





shall ensure proper 
A/F ratio and 
functioning O2 sensor 
 
Development team 
shall ensure vacuum 
lines and manifold 
gasket are free from 
cracks and physical 
damage 

















































3 180 Operator shall avoid 




ratio, O2 sensor 
failure) 




















smell of fuel, 
poor mpg, error 
message 
3 60 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  
installation, and 
manufacturing of EGR 




shall ensure EGR 
system bolts, 
interface, and 

















and O2 sensor  
mounting hardware 
are securely fastened 










valve and O2 sensor 
Item:     Motor 












at request of 
operator 


















Damage to or 





























7 490 Development team 
shall ensure software 
(HSC) limits the 
magnitude of current 
to the EM 
 
Development team 
shall ensure relays and 
fuses are in place and 
functional to prevent 
over drawing of 
current 
Contamination 
(EM housing or 
coolant system 
failure) 














8 560 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  
installation, and 
manufacturing of the 
EM and housing 
 





























to and from the 









shall ensure EM 
housing and coolant 
system bolts, interface 
components, and 
mounting hardware 
are securely fastened 






shall ensure EM 
cooling system and its 
components are 
functioning, proper 
coolant levels, and 
hoses running to and 













cool the EM 
 
Ensure the fans 













and loss of 
motor 
functionality 
8 640 Development team 
shall ensure EM 
thermal system 
components (radiator, 
coolant level, fans) are 
functional and 




shall ensure EM 
coolant system fans 




shall ensure EM 
coolant system fans 
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temp is stable 




shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, 
and manufacturing of 
EM coolant system 
and its components 
 
Development team 
shall ensure EM 
coolant system bolts, 
hoses and mounting 
hardware are securely 
fastened and free from 




shall ensure the HSC 
controls and mitigates 
EM overheating 
 
Operator shall drive 
appropriately to 


























and loss of 
motor 
functionality 
8 560 Development team 
shall ensure EM 
thermal system 
components (radiator, 
coolant level, fans) are 
functional and 
sufficient to cool the 
EM 
 




















shall ensure EM bolts, 
hoses and mounting 
hardware are securely 
fastened and free from 




shall ensure the HSC 





























partial or  total 
functionality 
failure 
8 240 Operator shall avoid 
adverse road condition 
which may produce 




shall ensure EM 
thermal system 
components (radiator, 
coolant level, fans) are 
functional and 
sufficient to cool the 
EM 
 
    EM-driveshaft 
interface failure 









identify if the 
interface is free 
of 
manufacturing 
9 720 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  
installation, and 
manufacturing of EM, 
driveshaft, and its 




























































bolts and mounting 
hardware is securely 
fastened and free from 






location is covered 
and free from 
potential unintended 











angle is minimized 
 
Operator shall avoid 
adverse road 
conditions which may 
produce NVH and 
damage EM-
driveshaft interface 





    EM-
transmission 
failure 









































identify if the 











partial or total 
functionality 
failure 
9 720 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  
installation, and 
manufacturing of EM, 







bolts and mounting 
hardware are securely 
fastened and free from 






location is covered 
and free from 
potential unintended 








Operator shall avoid 
adverse road 
conditions which may 
produce NVH and 
damage EM-
transmission interface 











Item:     Fuel 












supply fuel to 
engine 
Failure to store 















Damage to or 












10 Fuel filter 
failure 
(clogged, leak) 









clean and the 
fuel filter is 







identify if the 









lack of engine 
power, stalling, 
or misfire 
6 240 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  
installation, and 




shall ensure the 
permeable material is 
clean and the fuel 
filter is free of 
physical damage and 





















partial or total 






of power  
6 240 Development team 
shall ensure proper 




shall ensure fuel 
injector mounting 
hardware is securely 
fastened and free from 
potential loosening or 
unintended movement 








level and type 
 





Operator shall ensure 
adequate fuel level 
and type 
 
Operator shall ensure 



























partial or total 







6 240 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting and 




shall ensure fuel pump 
mounting hardware is 
securely fastened and 




Operator shall ensure 




2 Verify correct 
fuel quality 





partial or total 





6 120 Operator shall verify 
correct fuel quality 
prior to filling 
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Item:     Transmission 






























gears to  
change drive-
wheel speed 




















Damage to or 











age, low fluids) 






















correct type of 
coolant is used, 
proper coolant 
levels, and 
























8 240 Development team 











(seals, gaskets), and 
mounting hardware 
are securely fastened 
and free from 
potential loosening or 
movement 
 
Operator shall ensure 
the correct type of 
coolant (ATF) is used, 
proper coolant levels, 
and check for leaks 
prior to operation 
 
Development team 





















Ensure the fans 































and loss of 
functionality 





level, fans) are 
functional and 













system fans pull air 
from a cool source 
 
Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, 
and manufacturing of 
transmission thermal 






system bolts, hoses 
and mounting 
hardware are securely 
fastened and free from 





















shall ensure the TCM 
controls and mitigates 
overheating 
 
Operator shall drive 
appropriately to 
ensure transmission 
temperature is stable 
Transmission-
EM  failure 





























identify if the 











partial or total 
functionality 
failure 
9 720 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  
installation, and 
manufacturing of EM, 







interface bolts and 
mounting hardware 
are securely fastened 
and free from 






interface location is 
covered and free from 
potential unintended 





























Operator shall avoid 
adverse road 
conditions which may 
produce NVH and 
damage transmission-
EM interface 
Item:     Body 


















operator to see 





thrown into air 




















Damage to or 











































8 40 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting,  
installation, and 
manufacturing of the 
hood, and latch 
 
Development team 




are securely fastened 
and free from 
potential loosening or 
unintended movement. 












































Ensure grill is 















signs of over 
heating 
2 10 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, 




shall ensure grill bolts, 
interface components, 
and mounting 
hardware are securely 
fastened and free from 




Operator shall ensure 





















8 120 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, 
and manufacturing of 
head and tail lights 
 
Operator shall ensure 
functionality of lights 
prior to use 











































damage, loss of 
functionality, 




2 30 Development team 
shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, 
and manufacturing of 
the body panels, 
windows, and doors 
 
Development team 
shall ensure body 




hardware are securely 
fastened and free from 




Operator shall ensure 
body panels, windows, 
and doors are free of 
physical damage prior 
to use 
 
Operator shall ensure 
window and door 
functionality prior to 
use 




Appendix 3.10 HARA PSI Mechanical HazOP 





No As well 
as 
Part of Reverse Other Early Late Before After Faster Slower More Less 
NVH          X X X  
Torque   X X  X X     X X 
Temperature            X X 
Current X  X X  X X     X X 
Clearance            X X 
Angle            X  
PSI Mechanical HazOP 
FUNCTION:          Apply NVH Stimuli to EM 
Guide 
Word Deviation Consequences Causes Safeguards Functional Requirement 
Faster NVH stimuli 





Adverse road conditions. 
Inadequate installation, factor 
of safety, or mounting 
hardware 
Proper installation, torque 
specs, factor of safety on 
bolts, interfaces, and 
mounting hardware 
 
TVP mechanical systems shall be 
capable of withstanding a high NVH 
frequency 
EM disconnects from 
driveshaft 
EM disconnects from 
transmission 
Slower NVH stimuli 
applied too 
slowly 
EM approaches natural 
frequency causing 
mounting/interface 
instability and increased 
vibratory amplitude 
Adverse road conditions. 
Inadequate installation, factor 
of safety, or mounting 
hardware 
Proper installation, torque 
specs, factor of safety on 
bolts, interfaces, and 
mounting hardware 
 
TVP mechanical systems shall be 
capable of withstanding a high NVH 
amplitude 
EM disconnects from 
transmission 
EM disconnects from 
driveshaft 










Adverse road conditions. 
Inadequate installation, factor 
of safety, or mounting 
hardware 
Proper installation, torque 
specs, factor of safety on 
bolts, interfaces, and 
mounting hardware EM disconnects from 
transmission 
EM disconnects from 
driveshaft 
FUNCTION:          Apply Torque Stimuli to EM 
Guide 
Word Deviation Consequences Causes Safeguards Functional Requirement 
Part of Only part of 
intended 
torque applied 
TVP acceleration is less 
than expected 
Control software error. APPS 
error. Power supply error. 
EM/engine malfunction. 
Transmission controller error. 
Torque request 
magnitude/direction 
testing, APPS validation, 
and gear selection control 
testing during zero velocity 
and closed course phases 
The applied torque magnitude shall 






TVP accelerates in 
direction other than 
intend 
Control software error. APPS 
error. Power supply error. 
EM/engine malfunction. 
Transmission controller error.  
Controls software 
validation during SIL. 
Torque request 
magnitude/direction 
testing, APPS validation, 
and gear selection control 
testing during zero velocity 
and closed course phases  
The applied torque direction shall 
match the torque request intended 
direction 







TVP accelerates sooner 
than intended 
Control software error. APPS 
error. Power supply error. 
EM/engine malfunction. 
Transmission controller error. 
Controls software 
validation during SIL. 
Torque request 
magnitude/direction 
testing, APPS validation, 
and gear selection control 
testing during zero velocity 
and closed course phases 
The applied torque shall actuate at the 
time intended 






TVP accelerates later 
than intended 
Control software error. APPS 
error. Power supply error. 
EM/engine malfunction. 
Transmission controller error. 
Controls software 
validation during SIL. 
Torque request 
magnitude/direction 
testing, APPS validation, 
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and gear selection control 
testing during zero velocity 





TVP accelerates faster 
than intended 
Control software error. APPS 
error. Power supply error. 
EM/engine malfunction. 
Transmission controller error. 
Controls software 
validation during SIL. 
Torque request 
magnitude/direction 
testing, APPS validation, 
and gear selection control 
testing during zero velocity 
and closed course phases 
The applied torque magnitude shall 
match the torque request intended 
magnitude 




applied is less 
than intended 
TVP accelerates slower 
than intended 
Control software error. APPS 
error. Power supply error. 
EM/engine malfunction. 
Transmission controller error. 
Controls software 
validation during SIL. 
Torque request 
magnitude/direction 
testing, APPS validation, 
and gear selection control 
testing during zero velocity 
and closed course phases 
FUNCTION:          Apply Temperature Stimuli to EM 
Guide 






Fire ESS malfunction. Control 
software error. Thermal 
control system error. 
Controls software 
validation during SIL. ESS 
controls validation. E-stop 
validation. Thorough 
testing during SIL, zero 
velocity and closed course 
phases 
The EM shall operate with in a safe 
and specified temperature range 










Item damage or lost 
functionality 
Extremely cold 
environmental conditions.  
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FUNCTION:          Apply Current Stimuli to EM 
Guide 
Word Deviation Consequences Causes Safeguards Functional Requirement 




EM does not function Power supply error. Controls 
software/hardware error. APPS 
error. EM malfunction. 
Ensure ESS, control 
software, APPS, and 
EM are installed 
properly. 
Thoroughly test 
during SIL zero 
velocity, and closed 
course testing 
The current applied shall match the 
current necessary to meet EM torque 
request 





EM does not function as 
intended 
Power supply error. Controls 
software/hardware error. APPS 
error. EM malfunction. 
Ensure ESS, control 
software, APPS, and 
EM are installed 
properly. 
Thoroughly test 
during SIL zero 
velocity, and closed 
course testing 






TVP accelerates in 
direction other than 
intend 
Control software error. APPS error. 
Power supply error. EM 
malfunction.  
Ensure ESS, control 
software, APPS, and 
EM are installed 
properly. 
Thoroughly test 
during SIL zero 
velocity, and closed 
course testing 
The applied current direction shall 
match the direction necessary to meet 
the EM torque request 







TVP accelerates sooner 
than intended 
Power supply error. Controls 
software/hardware error. APPS 
error. EM malfunction. 
Ensure ESS, control 
software, APPS, and 
EM are installed 
properly. 
Thoroughly test 
during SIL zero 
velocity, and closed 
course testing 
The applied current shall actuate at the 
time intended 






TVP accelerates later 
than intended 
Power supply error. Controls 
software/hardware error. APPS 
error. EM malfunction. 
Ensure ESS, control 
software, APPS, and 
EM are installed 





during SIL zero 







Fire ESS/power supply error. Controls 
software/hardware error. EM 
malfunction. 
Ensure ESS, control 
software, APPS, and 
EM are installed 
properly. 
Thoroughly test 
during SIL zero 
velocity, and closed 
course testing 
The current applied shall not exceed 
max operating parameter 





applied is less 
than intended 
EM does not function as 
intended 
Power supply error. Controls 
software/hardware error. APPS 
error. EM malfunction. 
Ensure ESS, control 
software, APPS, and 
EM are installed 
properly. 
Thoroughly test 
during SIL zero 
velocity, and closed 
course testing 
The current applied shall match the 
current necessary to meet EM torque 
request TVP does not accelerate 
as intended 
FUNCTION:          Clearance Applied To Mechanical Components 
Guide 







Limits the space to make 
future additions 
Excess clearance between 








Mechanical component clearance 
requirements shall be met and 








Thermal transfer leading 
to overheating 
Lack of clearance between 
components leads to heat transfer. 
NVH with a lack of clearance 
causes destructive component 








Mechanical component clearance 
requirements shall be met to ensure 
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Difficulty installing and 
maintaining the 
mechanical components 
FUNCTION:          Interface Angle Applied to Driveshaft/EM 
Guide 







NVH to powertrain 
system 
Minimization of driveshaft/EM 
interface angle was not performed 
during development and installation 
Ensure 
driveshaft/EM 
interface angle is 
minimized 
The driveshaft shall be properly 







Appendix 3.11 HARA PSI SEFA 







(P,R,N,D) Item Functions 
Item Operating States 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Driveshaft Longitudinal shaft which 
transmits torque from 
engine/transmission to rear of 
vehicle 










2 Motor Provides torque at user 
request by converting 
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 No torque 
generated from 
Vehicle motion 
slowed or stopped 
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onboard stored electrical 
energy into rotational motion.  
 
Allows for energy 
regeneration and transfer to 
the battery during negative 
events 
electrical energy 





capability based on 
engine functionality 
3 Engine Provides torque at the request 
of operator  
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 No engine torque 
generation  
Vehicle motion 
slowed or stopped 
 
Possible propulsive 
capability based on 
EM functionality 
4 Suspension Provides dynamic energy 
absorption of vertical force 
exerted on wheels by the 
change in road conditions   




Non stable ride 
height causing 
damage to other 
components   
Vehicle motion 
slowed or stopped 
possibly in an 
uncontrolled fashion 
 
Possible damage to 




5 Differential Provides power from 
driveshaft to wheels  
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 No torque 
transfer to wheels 
from engine/EM 
Vehicle motion 
slowed or stopped 





6 Brakes Inhibits vehicle motion 
 
Slows/stops moving vehicle 
 
Keeps stopped vehicle 
stationary 




If the vehicle is in 
motion, it will 
uncontrollably 












7 Transmission Transfers power from engine 
to driveshaft 
 
Gears change drive-wheel 
speed and torque in relation 
to engine speed and torque 





Wrong amount of 
torque transferred 





Lack of speed 




8 Battery Pack Stores energy in the form of 
electric potential for the 
purpose of powering the 
electric motor and storing 
energy regenerated from the 
motor 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 No Storage or 
discharge of 
electric energy  
Vehicle motion 








9 BMS Ensure safe ESS operating 
conditions 
 
Monitor ESS state (voltage, 







1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 Loss of battery 
pack conditions 
 
Triggers fault on 
HSC, EMC 
Vehicle motion 







10 HSC Acquires operator and 
various sensor inputs (APPS, 
gear, vehicle speed) 
 
Controls all hybrid driving 
functions 
 
Controls torque via 
engine/EM torque split using 
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rules-based or PAE control 
strategy 
 
Maintains SOC at appropriate 
level 
 
Determines gear shifting 
 
Modifies stock signals 
If the vehicle is not 
in operation, it will 
not function 
11 EMC Regulates supply of current to 
EM 
 
Convert DC to AC 
 
Controls direction of current 
 
Monitor and regulates EM 
temperature 











12 TCM Receives inputs from HSC, 
ECM, and various sensors 
(vehicle speed, wheel speed, 
throttle position) 
 
Controls gear shifting 
 
Monitors and regulates 
transmission thermal control 
system 










Wrong amount of 
torque transferred 
from engine to 
differential 
Vehicle motion 







13 ECM Controls engine torque output 
 
Controls engine temperature 
 
Controls A/F ratio 
 
Controls idle speed 
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Controls electronic valve 
SEFA Part 2 of 2 
Item No. Potential Safety Hazard 
Diagnostic 
Method Mitigation Method 
System 
State After 
Mitigation Functional Requirement 






Operator and/or passenger 
injury 
 
Damage to or loss of 
property 
 
Damage to environment 
 
Unintended lateral motion 
 
Partial torque transmission 
 




identify if the 
interface is free of 
manufacturing or 
installation fatigue 





partial or  total 
functionality 
failure 
Ensure proper mounting,  
installation, and 
manufacturing of modified 
driveshaft and its 
components 
 
Ensure bolts and mounting 
hardware is securely 
fastened and free from 




interface location is covered 
and free from potential 




manufacturing and design 






Development team shall ensure proper 
mounting,  installation, and manufacturing 
of modified driveshaft and its components 
 
Development team shall ensure driveshaft 
bolts and mounting hardware is securely 
fastened and free from potential loosening 
or movement 
 
Development team shall ensure driveshaft-
EM interface location is covered and free 
from potential unintended access or 
physical damage 
 
Development team shall ensure proper 
manufacturing and design for minimal 
driveshaft-EM interface angle 
Item No. Potential Safety Hazard 
Diagnostic 
Method Mitigation Method 
System 
State After 
Mitigation Functional Requirement 











response to torque 
request, potential 
EM over-heat or 
failure 
 
Provide real time feedback 
to operator of motor state 
(current, torque, temp, 
speed) 
 
Actuate motor thermal 
controls when motor 











To prevent motor failure due to 
overheating the EMC shall actuate thermal 
controls to maintain motor temperature 
within a specified limit  
 
To prevent motor failure due to over-
torque or over-speed, the HSC shall 
impose a governor to regulate to motor 
torque and speed to specified limits 
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Operator and/or passenger 
injury 
 
Damage to or loss of 
property 
 
Damage to environment 
 
Potential for overheating 
 




identify leaks or 
physical damage 


















identify if the 
interface is free of 
manufacturing or 
installation fatigue 
or failure  
 
 
Actuate motor speed and 
torque governor when motor 
speed and torque exceed 
specified limits 
 
Actuate EMC current 
governor via HSC when 
motor, battery pack, or 
EMC exceeds specified 
current limits 
 
Allow operator  override to 
discontinue motor operation 
 
Ensure software (HSC) 
limits the magnitude of 
current to the EM 
 
Ensure relays and fuses are 
in place and functional to 
prevent over drawing of 
current 
 
Ensure proper mounting,  
installation, and 
manufacturing of the EM 
and housing 
 
Ensure bolts, interface 
components, and mounting 
hardware are securely 
fastened and free from leaks 
and potential loosening or 
movement 
 
Ensure cooling system and 
its components are 
functioning, proper coolant 












To prevent motor failure due to over-
current the EMC shall impose a governor 
to regulate the flow of current within 
specified limits of the motor and battery 
pack 
 
To prevent motor failure the operator shall 
be provided real-time diagnostics and have 
the capability to discontinue motor 
operations 
 
Development team shall ensure software 
(HSC) limits the magnitude of current to 
the EM 
 
Development team shall ensure relays and 
fuses are in place and functional to prevent 
over drawing of current 
 
Development team shall ensure proper 
mounting,  installation, and manufacturing 
of the EM and housing 
 
Development team shall ensure EM 
housing and coolant system bolts, interface 
components, and mounting hardware are 
securely fastened and free from leaks and 
potential loosening or unintended 
movement 
 
Development team shall ensure EM 
cooling system and its components are 
functioning, proper coolant levels, and 
hoses running to and from the motor are 
leak free 
 
Development team shall ensure EM 
thermal system components (radiator, 
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and from the motor are leak 
free 
 
Ensure thermal system 
components (radiator, 
coolant level, fans) are 
functional and sufficient to 
cool the EM 
 
Ensure the fans are free 
from potential physical 
damage 
 
Ensure enclosure fans pull 
air from a cool source 
 
Ensure proper mounting, 
installation, and 
manufacturing of coolant 
system and its components 
 
Ensure bolts, hoses and 
mounting hardware are 
securely fastened and free 
from potential loosening or 
movement 
 
Ensure the HSC controls 
and mitigates overheating 
 
Operator drives 
appropriately to ensure EM 
temp is stable 
coolant level, fans) are functional and 
sufficient to cool the EM 
 
Development team shall ensure EM 
coolant system fans are free from potential 
physical damage 
 
Development team shall ensure EM 
coolant system fans pull air from a cool 
source 
 
Development team shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, and manufacturing 
of EM coolant system and its components 
 
Development team shall ensure EM 
coolant system bolts, hoses and mounting 
hardware are securely fastened and free 
from potential loosening or unintended 
movement 
 
Development team shall ensure the HSC 
controls and mitigates EM overheating 
 
Operator shall drive appropriately to 
ensure EM temp is stable 
Item No. Potential Safety Hazard 
Diagnostic 
Method Mitigation Method 
System 
State After 
Mitigation Functional Requirement 







Ensure proper mounting,  
installation, and 
manufacturing of the oil 





Development team shall ensure proper 
mounting,  installation, and manufacturing 
of the oil filter and pump 
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damage and/or injury to 
passenger/ personnel 










exhaust, or a drop 
in pressure 
 













Ensure bolts, interface 
components (seals, gaskets), 
and mounting hardware are 
securely fastened and free 
from leaks and potential 
loosening or movement 
 
Ensure frequent oil changes, 
clean oil,  and that the oil 
filter is not  
 
Ensure thermal system 
components (radiator, 
coolant level, fans) are 
functional and sufficient to 
cool the engine 
 
Ensure the fans are free 
from potential physical 
damage 
 
Ensure enclosure fans pull 
air from a cool source 
 
Ensure engine ventilation is 
sufficient to provide 
appropriate air movement 
through engine bay 
 
Ensure thermal system is 
designed such that there is 
sufficient air flow to cool 
engine components 
 
Ensure proper mounting,  
installation, and 
manufacturing of thermal 





Development team shall ensure oil filter 
and pump bolts, interface components 
(seals, gaskets), and mounting hardware 
are securely fastened and free from leaks 
and potential loosening or unintended 
movement 
 
Operator shall ensure frequent oil changes, 
clean oil,  and that the oil filter is not 
ballooned or deformed 
 
Development team shall ensure thermal 
system components (radiator, coolant 
level, fans) are functional and sufficient to 
cool the engine 
 
Development team shall ensure the 
thermal systems fans are free from 
potential physical damage 
 
Development team shall ensure thermal 
system fans pull air from a cool source 
 
Development team shall ensure engine 
ventilation is sufficient to provide 
appropriate air movement through engine 
bay 
 
Development teams shall ensure thermal 
system is designed such that there is 
sufficient air flow to cool engine 
components 
 
Development team shall ensure proper 
mounting,  installation, and manufacturing 
of thermal system and its components 
 
Development team shall ensure thermal 
system bolts and mounting hardware are 
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Ensure bolts and mounting 
hardware are securely 
fastened and free from 
potential loosening or 
movement 
 
Ensure  the ECM controls 
and mitigates overheating 
 
Operator drives 
appropriately to ensure 
engine temp is stable 
securely fastened and free from potential 
loosening or movement 
 
Development team shall ensure the ECM 
controls and mitigates overheating 
 
Operator shall avoid poor driving 
behaviors 
Item No. Potential Safety Hazard 
Diagnostic 
Method Mitigation Method 
System 
State After 
Mitigation Functional Requirement 
4 Suspension  Unintended lateral 
movement 
 
Pulling to one side  
 
Difficult to steer 
 
Vehicle corner sits low 
 
Operator and/or passenger 
injury 
 
Damage to or loss of 
property 
 
Damage to environment 





identify low tire 
pressure and 


















Ensure proper tire pressure 
prior to operation 
 
Ensure proper tire alignment 
 
Ensure tire quality 
 
Ensure balanced, bent, or 
broken wheels 
 
Avoid poor drive behavior 
 
Ensure to rotate tires 
regularly 
 
Routine maintenance and 
inspection for rust 
 
Avoid adverse road 
conditions 
 
Ensure proper mounting,  
installation, and routine 









Operator shall ensure proper tire pressure 
prior to operation 
 
Operator shall ensure proper tire alignment 
 
Operator shall ensure tire quality 
 
Operator shall ensure wheels are balanced 
and suspension is free of ben tor broken 
wheels 
 
Operator shall avoid poor driving 
behaviors 
 
Operator shall ensure manufacturer 
recommended tire rotation 
 
Development team shall ensure suspension 
spring compression is calibrated and that 
springs are free of fatigue and corrosion 
 
Development team shall ensure the 
suspensions system and components have 
proper mounting,  installation, and routine 
maintenance and inspection of hardware 







Ensure bolts and mounting 
hardware is securely 
fastened and free from 
potential loosening or 
unintended movement 
 
Development team shall ensure the 
suspensions system bolts and mounting 
hardware is securely fastened and free 
from potential loosening or unintended 
movement 
Item No. Potential Safety Hazard 
Diagnostic 
Method Mitigation Method 
System 
State After 
Mitigation Functional Requirement 






Operator and/or passenger 
injury 
 
Damage to or loss of 
property 
 
Damage to environment 
 
Partial torque transmission 
Vehicle technical 
inspection will 
identify if the 
interface is free of 
manufacturing or 
installation fatigue 





partial or total 
functionality 
failure 
Ensure proper mounting,  
installation, and 
manufacturing of modified 
driveshaft and its 
components 
 
Ensure bolts and mounting 
hardware is securely 
fastened and free from 




driveshaft  interface location 
is free from potential 







Development team shall ensure proper 
mounting,  installation, and manufacturing 
of modified driveshaft, differential and 
their components 
 
Development team shall ensure driveshaft 
bolts and mounting hardware is securely 
fastened and free from potential loosening 
or movement 
 
Development team shall ensure 
differential-driveshaft interface location is 
covered and free from potential 
unintended access or physical damage 
Item No. Potential Safety Hazard 
Diagnostic 
Method Mitigation Method 
System 
State After 
Mitigation Functional Requirement 
6 Brakes Unintended  loss of 
longitudinal motion 
  
Operator and/or passenger 
injury 
 
Damage to or loss of 
property 
 




identify if the pads 








Ensure proper mounting and  
installation of pads 
 
Ensure bolts and mounting 
hardware is securely 
fastened and free from 
potential loosening or 
movement 
 









Development team shall ensure proper 
mounting and  installation of pads 
 
Development team shall ensure brake pad 
bolts and mounting hardware is securely 
fastened and free from potential loosening 
or unintended movement 
 
Operator shall avoid excessively adverse 
road conditions (bumpy terrain, excessive 
grade) which may cause a high NVH  
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Unintended vehicle motion 




Routine maintenance and 
inspection for rust and 
corrosion 
 
Avoid poor drive behavior 
 
Ensure brake system is free 
of build-up and debris prior 
to use 
 
Ensure proper bleeding, 
mounting,  installation, and 
routine maintenance and 
inspection of hardware and 
functionality 
 
Ensure bolts and mounting 
hardware is securely 
fastened and free from 
potential loosening or 
unintended movement 
 
Operator shall perform routine inspection 
of brake system to check for rust, fatigue, 
and corrosion 
 
Operator shall avoid poor driving 
behaviors 
 
Operator shall ensure brake system is free 
of build-up and debris prior to use 
 
ensure proper bleeding, mounting,  
installation, and routine maintenance and 
inspection of hardware and functionality 
 
Development team shall ensure bolts and 
mounting hardware is securely fastened 
and free from potential loosening or 
unintended movement 
Item No. Potential Safety Hazard 
Diagnostic 
Method Mitigation Method 
System 
State After 








Loss or degradation of 
propulsion system 
 
Operator and/or passenger 
injury 
 
Damage to or loss of 
property 
 
Damage to environment 
Vehicle technical 
inspection will 
identify low fluid 









Ensure proper mounting,  
installation, and 
manufacturing of 
transmission and its 
components 
 
Ensure bolts, interface 
components (seals, gaskets), 
and mounting hardware are 
securely fastened and free 
from potential loosening or 
movement 
 
Ensure the correct type of 






Development team shall ensure proper 
mounting,  installation, and manufacturing 
of transmission and its components 
 
Development team shall ensure 
transmission bolts, interface components 
(seals, gaskets), and mounting hardware 
are securely fastened and free from 
potential loosening or movement 
 
Operator shall ensure the correct type of 
coolant (ATF) is used, proper coolant 
levels, and check for leaks prior to 
operation 
 




Potential for overheating 
coolant levels, and check for 
leaks prior to operation  
 
Ensure belt drive 
components are properly 
installed (tensioning, torque 
specs) 
 
Ensure thermal system 
components (radiator, 
coolant level, fans) are 
functional and sufficient to 
cool the transmission 
 
Ensure the fans are free 
from potential physical 
damage 
 
Ensure fans pull air from a 
cool source 
 
Ensure proper mounting, 
installation, and 
manufacturing of coolant 
system and its components 
 
Ensure bolts, hoses and 
mounting hardware are 
securely fastened and free 
from potential loosening or 
movement 
 
Ensure the TCM controls 
and mitigates overheating 
 
Operator drives 
appropriately to ensure 
transmission temperature is 
stable 
Development team shall ensure belt drive 
components are properly installed 
(tensioning, torque specs) 
 
Development team shall ensure 
transmission thermal system components 
(radiator, coolant level, fans) are 
functional and sufficient to cool the 
transmission 
 
Development team shall ensure 
transmission thermal system fans are free 
from potential physical damage 
 
Development team shall ensure 
transmission thermal system fans pull air 
from a cool source 
 
Development team shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, and manufacturing 
of transmission thermal system and its 
components 
 
Development team shall ensure 
transmission thermal system bolts, hoses 
and mounting hardware are securely 
fastened and free from potential loosening 
or unintended movement 
 
Development team shall ensure the TCM 
controls and mitigates overheating 
 
Operator shall drive appropriately to 
ensure transmission temperature is stable 
   
 
353 
Item No. Potential Safety Hazard 
Diagnostic 
Method Mitigation Method 
System 
State After 
















Operator and/or passenger 
injury 
 
Damage to or loss of 
property 
 
Loss of HV power 
 








by identifying a  
thermal event, 
error message of 
overheating, or 




and sends SOC 







OBC controls and 
mitigates charging 
while vehicle is 
not in operation 
Operate vehicle within 
specified battery temp range 
 
Actuate cooling fans when 





instructions (clearance, bend 
radii) 
 
Limit charge and discharge 
current to specified range 
 
BMS monitors and controls 
SOC.  
 
Controls software will only 
draw current at specified 
minimum SOC 
 
Ensure proper mounting,  
installation, and 
manufacturing of enclosure 
and HV components 
 
Ensure bolts and mounting 
hardware is securely 
fastened and free from 
potential loosening or 
movement 
 
Ensure all vents are covered 
with appropriate screening 














To prevent the HV battery pack from 
operating outside of the max/min 
temperature range the development team 
shall ensure specified temperature limits 
are controlled by the BMS 
 
To prevent the HV battery pack from 
operating outside of the max/min 
temperature range the development team 
shall ensure actuation of battery pack 
thermal control system (fans) when the 
temperature reaches limit 
 
To prevent the HV battery pack from 
operating outside of the max/min 
temperature range the development team 
shall ensure proper installation using 
manufacturer recommended specifications 
to include component clearances and wire 
bend radii 
 
To prevent the HV battery pack from 
operating outside of the max/min 
temperature range the development team 
shall ensure a limit to charging and 
discharging current to a specified range 
 
To prevent the HV battery pack from 
operating while undercharged the 
development team shall ensure the BMS 
monitors and controls the SOC in real-time 
 
To prevent the HV battery pack from 
operating while undercharged the 
development team shall ensure controls 
software will only draw current at 
specified minimum SOC 
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liquid, debris, dust, or 
insects 
 
Ensure fans are pulling air 
from dry particulate-free 
source 
 
Ensure enclosure location is 
covered when vehicle is not 
in use 
 
Ensure software (HSC, 
OBC, EMC) limits charging 
and discharging rates and 
ranges 
 
Ensure relays and fuses are 
in place and functional to 
prevent over drawing of 
current 
 
To prevent the HV battery pack from 
unintended access the development team 
shall ensure proper mounting,  installation, 
and manufacturing of enclosure and HV 
components 
 
To prevent the HV battery pack from 
unintended access the development team 
shall ensure bolts and mounting hardware 
is securely fastened and free from potential 
loosening or movement 
 
To prevent the HV battery pack from 
unintended access the development team 
shall ensure all HV enclosure vents are 
covered with appropriate screening to 
prevent access from liquid, debris, dust, or 
insects 
 
To prevent the HV battery pack from 
unintended access the development team 
shall ensure HV thermal control system 
fans are pulling air from dry particulate-
free source 
 
To prevent the HV battery pack from 
unintended access the development team 
shall ensure the enclosure location is 
covered and free from the external 
environment when vehicle is not in use 
 
To prevent the HV battery pack failure 
from excess charging or discharging of 
current the development team shall ensure 
software (HSC, OBC, EMC) limits 
charging and discharging rates and ranges 
 
To prevent the HV battery pack failure 
from excess charging or discharging of 
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current the development team shall ensure 
relays and fuses are in place and functional 
to prevent over drawing of current 
Item No. Potential Safety Hazard 
Diagnostic 
Method Mitigation Method 
System 
State After 
Mitigation Functional Requirement 
9 BMS Unintended longitudinal 
motion 
 
Loss or degradation of 
propulsion system 
 
Operator and/or passenger 
injury 
 
Damage to or loss of 
property 
 
Damage to environment 
 
Potential for overheating 
 























identify the BMS 








eventual failure of 
HV components 
Ensure wiring is securely 
installed using manufacturer 
installation specifications 
 
Ensure wiring gauge is 
sufficient to carry max 
operational current with 
factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire bend radii are 
adhered to 
 
Ensure manufacturing is 
sufficient to prevent 
unintended access and 
physical damage 
 
Ensure use of covering at 
wire-BMS interface prevent 
unintended access 
 
Avoid adverse road 
condition which may 
produce NVH and damage 
BMS 
 
Ensure BMS and mounting 
hardware are sufficient for 
max operational G-force 
with factor of safety 
 
Ensure BMS and mounting 
hardware is secure and free 














To prevent BMS wiring failure the 
development team shall ensure the wiring 
is securely installed using manufacturer 
installation specifications 
 
To prevent BMS wiring failure the 
development team shall ensure the wiring 
gauge is sufficient to carry max 
operational current with factor of safety 
 
To prevent BMS wiring failure the 
development team shall ensure wire bend 
radii are adhered to 
 
To prevent BMS failure the development 
team shall ensure the  manufacturing is 
sufficient to prevent unintended access and 
physical damage 
 
To prevent BMS unintended access or 
physical damage failure the development 
team shall ensure use of covering at wire-
BMS interface prevent unintended access 
 
To prevent BMS unintended access or 
physical damage failure the operator  shall 
avoid adverse road condition which may 
produce NVH and damage BMS 
 
To prevent BMS installation failure the 
development team shall ensure the BMS 
and mounting hardware are sufficient for 
max operational G-force with factor of 
safety 




To prevent BMS installation failure the 
development team shall ensure the BMS 
and mounting hardware is secure and free 
from unintended movement 
Item No. Potential Safety Hazard 
Diagnostic 
Method Mitigation Method 
System 
State After 
Mitigation Functional Requirement 





Loss or degradation of 
propulsion system 
 
Operator and/or passenger 
injury 
 
Damage to or loss of 
property 
 
Damage to environment 
 
Potential for overheating 
 
















identify if  the 
HSC is free of 













identify if HSC is 
free of 
manufacturing or 
Ensure wiring is securely 
installed using manufacturer 
installation specifications 
 
Ensure wiring gauge is 
sufficient to carry max 
operational current with 
factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire bend radii are 
adhered to 
 
Ensure manufacturing is 
sufficient to prevent 
unintended access and 
physical damage 
 
Ensure use of covering at 
wire-HSC interface to 
prevent unintended access 
 
Avoid adverse road 
condition which may 
produce NVH and damage 
the HSC 
 
Ensure HSC and mounting 
hardware are sufficient for 
max operational G-force 









To avoid HSC wiring failure the 
development team shall ensure wiring is 
securely installed using manufacturer 
installation specifications 
 
To avoid HSC wiring failure the 
development team shall ensure wiring 
gauge is sufficient to carry max 
operational current with factor of safety 
 
To avoid HSC wiring failure the 
development team shall ensure wire bend 
radii are adhered to and wiring is protected 
from heat sources 
 
To avoid HSC unintended access or 
physical damage the development team 
shall ensure proper mounting, installation, 
and manufacturing of the HSC 
 
To avoid HSC unintended access or 
physical damage the development team 
shall ensure use of covering at wire-HSC 
interface  
 
To avoid HSC unintended access or 
physical damage the operator shall avoid 
adverse road conditions which may 
produce NVH 
 
To avoid HSC installation failure the 
development team shall ensure the 














Ensure HSC and mounting 
hardware are secure and free 
from potential lessening or 
unintended movement 
mounting hardware are sufficient for max 
operational G-force with factor of safety 
 
To avoid HSC installation failure the 
development team shall ensure the 
mounting hardware is secure and free from 
potential lessening or unintended 
movement 
Item No. Potential Safety Hazard 
Diagnostic 
Method Mitigation Method 
System 
State After 
Mitigation Functional Requirement 





Loss or degradation of 
propulsion system 
 
Operator and/or passenger 
injury 
 
Damage to or loss of 
property 
 
Damage to environment 
 
Potential for overheating 
 




























Ensure wiring is securely 
installed using manufacturer 
installation specifications 
 
Ensure wiring gauge is 
sufficient to carry max 
operational current with 
factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire bend radii are 
adhered to 
 
Ensure EMC and mounting 
hardware are sufficient for 
max operational G-force 
with factor of safety 
 
Ensure EMC and mounting 
hardware is secure and free 
from unintended movement 
 
Ensure operation within 









To avoid EMC wiring failure the 
development team shall ensure wiring is 
securely installed using manufacturer 
installation specifications 
 
To avoid EMC wiring failure the 
development team shall ensure wiring 
gauge is sufficient to carry max 
operational current with factor of safety 
 
To avoid EMC wiring failure the 
development team shall ensure wire bend 
radii are adhered to and wiring is protected 
from heat sources 
 
To avoid EMC installation failure the 
development team shall ensure the 
mounting hardware are sufficient for max 
operational G-force with factor of safety 
 
To avoid EMC installation failure the 
development team shall ensure the 
mounting hardware is secure and free from 
potential lessening or unintended 
movement 
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by identifying a  
thermal event, 
error message of 
overheating, or 
failure of HV 
components 
Actuate thermal system 
when EMC reaches 
specified temperature 
 
Ensure thermal system 
components (radiator, 
coolant level, fans) are 
functional and sufficient to 
cool the EM 
 
Ensure the fans are free 
from potential physical 
damage 
 
Ensure bolts, hoses and 
mounting hardware are 
securely fastened and free 
from potential loosening or 
movement 
 
To avoid EMC operation outside of 
max/min temperature range the 
development team shall ensure the EMC 
has a thermal controls system and software 
forces operation within specified EMC 
temperature range 
 
To avoid EMC operation outside of 
max/min temperature range the 
development team shall actuate cooling 
fans when EMC reaches specified 
temperature  
 
To avoid EMC operation outside of 
max/min temperature range the 
development team shall ensure thermal 
system components (radiator, coolant 
level, fans) are functional and sufficient to 
cool the EMC 
 
To avoid EMC operation outside of 
max/min temperature range the 
development team shall ensure the fans are 
free from potential physical damage 
 
To avoid EMC operation outside of 
max/min temperature range the 
development team shall ensure bolts, hoses 
and mounting hardware are securely 
fastened and free from potential loosening 
or unintended movement 
Item No. Potential Safety Hazard 
Diagnostic 
Method Mitigation Method 
System 
State After 
Mitigation Functional Requirement 
12 TCM Unintended longitudinal 
motion 
 






fatigue or failure 
 
Ensure wiring is securely 
installed using manufacturer 
installation specifications 
 
Ensure wiring gauge is 







To avoid TCM wiring failure the 
development team shall ensure wiring is 
securely installed using manufacturer 
installation specifications 
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Operator and/or passenger 
injury 
 
Damage to or loss of 
property 
 
Damage to environment 
 
























operational current with 
factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire bend radii are 
adhered to 
 
Ensure TCM and mounting 
hardware are sufficient for 
max operational G-force 
with factor of safety 
 
Ensure TCM and mounting 
hardware are secure and free 








To avoid TCM wiring failure the 
development team shall ensure wiring 
gauge is sufficient to carry max 
operational current with factor of safety 
 
To avoid TCM wiring failure the 
development team shall ensure wire bend 
radii are adhered to and wiring is protected 
from heat sources 
 
To avoid TCM installation failure the 
development team shall ensure the 
mounting hardware are sufficient for max 
operational G-force with factor of safety 
 
To avoid TCM installation failure the 
development team shall ensure the 
mounting hardware is secure and free from 
potential lessening or unintended 
movement 
Item No. Potential Safety Hazard 
Diagnostic 
Method Mitigation Method 
System 
State After 
Mitigation Functional Requirement 





Loss or degradation of 
propulsion system 
 
Operator and/or passenger 
injury 
 

















Ensure wiring is securely 
installed using manufacturer 
installation specifications 
 
Ensure wiring gauge is 
sufficient to carry max 
operational current with 
factor of safety 
 
Ensure wire bend radii are 
adhered to 
 
Ensure ECM and mounting 








To avoid ECM wiring failure the 
development team shall ensure wiring is 
securely installed using manufacturer 
installation specifications 
 
To avoid ECM wiring failure the 
development team shall ensure wiring 
gauge is sufficient to carry max 
operational current with factor of safety 
 
To avoid ECM wiring failure the 
development team shall ensure wire bend 
radii are adhered to and wiring is protected 
from heat sources 
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Damage to environment 
 
Potential for overheating 














max operational G-force 
with factor of safety 
 
Ensure ECM and mounting 
hardware are secure and free 
from unintended movement 
 
Ensure ECM is mounted 
such that there is proper 
clearance and  sufficient air 
flow to cool the ECM 
 
To avoid ECM installation failure the 
development team shall ensure the 
mounting hardware are sufficient for max 
operational G-force with factor of safety 
 
To avoid ECM installation failure the 
development team shall ensure the 
mounting hardware is secure and free from 
potential lessening or unintended 
movement 
 
To avoid ECM over-heating failure the 
development team shall ensure the ECM is 
mounted such that there is proper 








Appendix 4 Safety Goals and Functional Requirements – Complete Documentation 
 
Appendix 4.1 ACC Safety Goals and Functional Requirements 
CAVs / CSMS ACC Safety Goals and Functional Requirements 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGA01 The ACC system shall control 
longitudinal velocity via braking 
FSRA01.01 The ACC system shall allow operator to override automated controls with minimal 
braking engagement 
FSRA01.02 To avoid wiring failures the ACC system shall be wired and installed according to 
manufacturer specifications to include bend radii, heat shielding, EMI avoidance, 
sheathing, proper gauge, and interface connections 
FSRA01.03 The ACC brake system shall engage in timely manner such that brake pad and rotor 
fatigue and passenger discomfort is minimized 
FSRA01.04 The operator shall avoid excessively adverse road conditions (bumpy terrain, excessive 
grade) which may cause a high NVH 
FSRA01.05 Operator shall avoid poor driving behaviors 
FSRA01.06 To avoid brake rotor failures the development teams shall ensure proper mounting and 
installation of brake rotors 
FSRA01.07 To avoid brake rotor failures the development teams shall ensure brake rotor bolts and 
mounting hardware are securely fastened and free from potential loosening or 
unintended movement 
FSRA01.08 The operator shall ensure brake system is free of build-up (snow, mud) and debris prior 
to use 
FSRA01.09 To avoid caliper failures the operator shall ensure routine inspection for caliper rust and 
corrosion 
FSRA01.10 ACC brake system shall engage in timely manner such that brake lines are immediately 
able to be actuated 
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FSRA01.11 To avoid brake fluid line failure the development team shall ensure proper bleeding, 
mounting,  installation, and routine maintenance and inspection of brake line hardware 
and its functionality 
FSRA01.12 To avoid brake fluid line failure the development team shall ensure lines, bolts and 
mounting hardware are securely fastened and free from potential loosening or 
unintended movement 
FSRA01.13 The ACC brake response system shall function according to operator engagement 
FSRA01.14 The ACC brake response system shall respond (feedback, longitudinal movement) more 
quickly in the event of less operator engagement (hands on wheel, head tilt, eye 
deviation) 
FSRA01.15 The ACC brake response system shall respond (feedback, lateral movement) less 
quickly in the event of more operator engagement (hands on wheel, head tilt, eye 
deviation) 
FSRA01.16 To avoid brake pad failures the development teams shall ensure proper mounting and 
installation of brake pads 
FSRA01.17 To avoid brake pad failures the development teams shall ensure brake pad bolts and 
mounting hardware are securely fastened and free from potential loosening or 
unintended movement 
FSRA01.18 To avoid brake pad failures the operator shall avoid excessively adverse road conditions 
(bumpy terrain, excessive grade) which may cause a high NVH 
FSRA01.19 To avoid brake pad failures the operator shall avoid poor driving behaviors 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGA02 The ACC system shall control 
longitudinal velocity via throttle 
position or APP 
FSRA02.01 The ACC system shall allow operator to override automated controls with minimal AP 
engagement 
FSRA02.02 The ACC system shall be wired and installed according to manufacturer specifications 
to include bend radii, heat shielding, EMI avoidance, sheathing, proper gauge, and 
interface connections 
FSRA02.03 The development team shall ensure proper mounting, installation, and manufacturing of 
the fuel filter, and pump 
FSRA02.04 The development team shall ensure the fuel filter permeable material is clean and the is 
free of physical damage and leaks while under pressure 
FSRA02.05 The operator shall ensure adequate fuel level and type 
FSRA02.06 The operator shall ensure use of fuel system cleaners when recommended 
FSRA02.07 The operator shall ensure fuel quality prior to filling 
FSRA02.08 The development teams shall ensure proper mounting, installation, and manufacturing 
of oil filter and pump 
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FSRA02.09 The operator shall ensure frequent oil changes, clean oil,  and that the oil filter is not 
ballooned or deformed  
FSRA02.10 The operator shall ensure proper fuel octane number prior to filling tank 
FSRA02.11 The operator shall ensure thermal system components (radiator, coolant level, fans, 
water pump, thermostat) are functional and sufficient to cool the engine 
FSRA02.12 The development team shall ensure the fans are free from potential physical damage 
FSRA02.13 The development team shall ensure fans pull air from a cool source 
FSRA02.14 The development team shall ensure engine ventilation is sufficient to provide 
appropriate air movement through engine bay 
FSRA02.15 The development team shall ensure thermal system is designed such that there is 
sufficient air flow to cool engine components 
FSRA02.16 The development team shall ensure the ECM controls and mitigates engine overheating 
FSRA02.17 The development team shall ensure proper mounting, installation, and manufacturing of 
intake manifold, thermal system, spark plugs, EGR system, fuel injectors, coolant 
system, EM, driveshaft, transmission, AP, APPS and their components 
FSRA02.18 The development team shall ensure powertrain components to include bolts, interface 
components, seals, gaskets, injectors, fuel pump, EGR valve, coolant system, EM-
driveshaft interface, transmission-EM interface and all associated mounting hardware 
are securely fastened and free from leaks and potential loosening or movement 
FSRA02.19 The operator shall ensure thermal system is functional 
FSRA02.20 The development team shall ensure proper A/F ratio and functioning O2 sensor 
FSRA02.21 The development team shall ensure vacuum lines and manifold gasket are free from 
cracks and physical damage 
FSRA02.22 The development team shall ensure properly functioning timing belt 
FSRA02.23 The development team shall ensure properly functioning EGR valve 
FSRA02.24 The development team shall ensure software (HSC) limits the magnitude of current to 
the EM 
FSRA02.25 The development team shall ensure relays and fuses are in place and functional to 
prevent over drawing of current 
FSRA02.26 The development team shall ensure proper mounting,  installation, and manufacturing of 
the EM and housing 
FSRA02.27 The development team shall ensure EM cooling system and its components are 
functioning, proper coolant levels, and hoses running to and from the motor are leak free 
FSRA02.28 The development team shall ensure thermal system components (radiator, coolant level, 
fans) are functional and sufficient to cool the EM 
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FSRA02.29 The development team shall ensure the fans are free from potential physical damage 
FSRA02.30 The development team shall ensure the HSC controls and mitigates EM overheating 
FSRA02.31 The operator shall avoid excessively adverse road conditions (bumpy terrain, excessive 
grade) which may cause a high NVH 
FSRA02.32 The development team shall ensure EM-driveshaft interface location is covered and free 
from potential unintended access or physical damage 
FSRA02.33 The development team shall ensure proper EM-driveshaft alignment 
FSRA02.34 The development team shall ensure EM-driveshaft interface angle is minimized 
FSRA02.35 The development team shall ensure EM-transmission interface location is covered and 
free from potential unintended access or physical damage 
FSRA02.36 The development team shall ensure proper EM-transmission alignment 
FSRA02.37 The development team shall ensure software limits APPS current range 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGA03 ACC sensors shall observe 
surrounding traffic/objects distance, 
velocity, size and position to include 
operator engagement 
FSRA03.01 The ACC sensors shall be wired and installed according to manufacturer specifications 
to include bend radii, heat shielding, EMI avoidance, sheathing, proper gauge, and 
interface connections 
FSRA03.02 The ACC system shall alert operator prior to and when shutdown occurs 
FSRA03.03 The ACC system shall only be operational if sensor performance meets a minimum 
standard (communication speed, sensor availability or visibility) 
FSRA03.04 The ACC communications shall operate independently and be free from external 
manipulation 
FSRA03.05 The development team shall ensure sensor enclosure manufacturing and use of materials 
is sufficient to prevent unintended access and physical damage 
FSRA03.06 The development team shall ensure sensor and sensor enclosure bolts and mounting 
hardware is securely fastened and free from potential loosening or unintended 
movement 
FSRA03.07 The operator shall ensure ACC system sensors have clear field of view and are free of 
visibility obstructions 
FSRA03.08 The ACC system shall require minimum vehicle speed based on sensor requirements 
FSRA03.09 The ACC system shall function according to operator engagement 
FSRA03.10 The ACC system shall respond (feedback, acceleration, deceleration) more quickly in 
the event of less operator engagement (hands on wheel, head tilt, eye deviation) 
FSRA03.11 The ACC system shall respond (feedback, acceleration, deceleration) less quickly in the 
event of more operator engagement (hands on wheel, head tilt, eye deviation) 
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SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGA04 ACC system shall transmit sensor 
data to associated controller 
FSRA04.01 The ACC sensors shall be wired and installed according to manufacturer specifications 
to include bend radii, heat shielding, EMI avoidance, sheathing, proper gauge, and 
interface connections 
FSRA04.02 The ACC system shall alert operator prior to and when shutdown occurs 
FSRA04.03 The ACC system shall only be operational if sensor performance meets a minimum 
standard (communication speed, sensor availability or visibility) 
FSRA04.04 The ACC communications shall operate independently and be free from external 
manipulation (malicious intrusion, EMI) 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGA05 Operator shall determine and set the 
ACC system velocity constraint 
FSRA05.01 The ACC system shall operate within a specified velocity range 
FSRA05.02 The ACC system shall provide warning to operator that velocity input constraint is 
required 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGA06 Operator shall determine and set the 
ACC system distance constraint 
FSRA06.01 The ACC system shall operate within a specified distance range 
FSRA06.02 The ACC system shall provide warning to operator that distance input constraint is 
required 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGA07 ACC shall  provide feedback to the 
operator (ACC status, haptic, visual, 
audio) 
FSRA07.01 The ACC sensors shall be wired and installed according to manufacturer specifications 
to include bend radii, heat shielding, EMI avoidance, sheathing, proper gauge, and 
interface connections 
FSRA07.02 The ACC system shall alert operator prior to and when shutdown occurs 
FSRA07.03 The ACC system shall alert operator when deviation from set distance or velocity occurs 
FSRA07.04 The ACC feedback system shall function according to operator engagement 
FSRA07.05 The ACC system shall provide audio, visual, and haptic feedback 
FSRA07.06 The ACC system shall provide feedback in manner that does not startle the operator and 
cause greater potential for hazard (not overly loud or bright) 
FSRA07.07 The ACC system audio feedback shall adjust to ambient volume (stereo system, 
excessive cabin noise) 
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FSRA07.08 The ACC system visual feedback shall adjust to ambient light (decrease during night, 
increase during day) 
FSRA07.09 The ACC system shall only be operational if feedback performance meets a minimum 
standard (communication speed, audio, visual, haptic functionality) 
FSRA07.10 The ACC communications shall operate independently and be free from external 
manipulation (malicious intrusion, EMI) 
 
Appendix 4.2 CAVs Safety Goals and Functional Requirements 
CAVs Safety Goals and Functional Requirements 






The Intel Tank Computer shall 
be responsible for blending 
various sensors (cameras, 
radars) data to achieve reliable, 
high-definition images 
 
The Intel Tank Computer shall 
be responsible for performing 
sensor fusion data verification 
& validation using developed 
algorithms and NNs 
 
The Intel Tank Computer shall be 
responsible for determining if control 
action (EPS torque, braking, 
feedback) is required 
 
 
FSRC01.01 To avoid wiring failure of the intel tank computer the development 
team shall ensure wiring is securely installed using manufacturer 
installation specifications 
FSRC01.02 To avoid wiring failure of the intel tank computer the development 
team shall ensure wiring gauge is sufficient to carry max operational 
current with factor of safety 
FSRC01.03 To avoid wiring failure of the intel tank computer the development team shall ensure 
wire bend radii are adhered to 
FSRC01.04 The development team shall ensure computer alerts operator when corrective action 
decision is disabled 
FSRC01.05 The development team shall ensure the system determines fidelity of non-blended 
image and decides if corrective action should be applied 
FSRC01.06 The development team shall ensure the computer only makes corrective action 
decisions when fidelity of image meets minimum specified resolution 
FSRC01.07 The development team shall ensure if computer system fails, it does not 
prevent vehicle from manual driving operations 
FSRC01.08 The development team shall ensure manufacturing and installation is 
sufficient to prevent unintended access and physical damage to the 
computer 
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The Intel Tank Computer shall be 
responsible for sending control action 
request to associated controller 
 
 
The Intel Tank Computer shall 
be responsible for provides 
real-time functionalities 
FSRC01.09 To prevent unintended access and physical damage to the development team shall 
ensure use of coverings at wire-computer interface 
FSRC01.10 To prevent physical damage to the computer the operator shall avoid adverse road 
condition which may produce NVH  
FSRC01.11 To prevent unintended access and physical damage the development team shall 
ensure computer installation is inside cabin in a dry debris-proof location 
FSRC01.12 To prevent unintended access and physical damage the development 
team shall ensure computer is inaccessible by passengers 
FSRC01.13 To prevent power failure the development team shall ensure the power supplied to the 
computer is within manufacturer operational range 
FSRC01.14 To prevent CAVs failure the development team shall ensure the computer NN model 
is thoroughly defined and highly sensitive to small variations in inputs 
FSRC01.15 To prevent CAVs failure the development team shall ensure the computer NN is 
thoroughly tested and validate prior to implementation 
FSRC01.16 To prevent CAVs failure the development team shall ensure the computer NN 
imposes limits on output to not exceed boundaries 
FSRC01.17 To prevent CAVs failure the development team shall ensure the computer NNs use of 
hidden layers and neurons does not over-fit training data and is sufficient to fit new 
and unseen data 
FSRC01.18 To prevent CAVs failure the development team shall ensure the computer program 
code is thoroughly vetted (Auto industry standard is one defect per 1000 executable 
lines of code) 
FSRC01.19 To prevent CAVs failure the development team shall ensure the computer program is 
developed using automotive coding standards 
FSRC01.20 To prevent CAVs failure the development team shall ensure the use of multiple 
software scanning tools to identify vulnerability and error in computer program code 
(industry uses Jarvis which analyses the binary executable action and not the mistakes 
in the code) 
FSRC01.21 To prevent CAVs failure the development team shall ensure the control of 
computational overflow and compounding rounding errors 
FSRC01.22 To prevent CAVs failure the development team shall ensure the understanding of 
computer input and output signal quality, noise, latency, and bandwidth accounting 
for measurement and control action error 
FSRC01.23 To prevent CAVs failure the development team shall reduce computer signal input 
and output latency, ensure use of high-quality transmission medium 
FSRC01.24 To prevent computer signal input and output bandwidth fault the development team 
shall ensure transmission medium gauge is sufficient to handle expected throughput 
(load) with factor of safety 
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FSRC01.25 To prevent CAVs failure the development team shall ensure an understanding of time 
required to analyze and route computer signal data 
FSRC01.26 To reduce computer signal input and output noise the development team shall ensure 
wires are as short as possible 
FSRC01.27 To reduce computer signal input and output noise the development team shall  ensure 
wires are kept away from electrical machinery 
FSRC01.28 To reduce computer signal input and output noise it is recommended to use twisted 
together wires 
FSRC01.29 To reduce internal computer signal input and output noise the development team shall 
ensure thermal effects on amplifiers are minimized 
FSRC01.30 To reduce computer signal input and output noise, if possible, the development team 
shall ensure the amplifier bandwidth matches input signal bandwidth 
FSRC01.31 To reduce computer signal input and output noise the development team shall ensure 
use of proper filtering techniques 
FSRC01.32 To reduce computer signal input and output noise the development team shall  ensure 
use of wire shielding and conduit 
FSRC01.33 To reduce computer signal input and output noise the development team shall ensure 
understanding of ground loops and impose proper grounding practices 
FSRC01.34 To ensure true data measurement the development team shall test the collection with 
the computer operating at the same temperature that it will be operating at in real-
world scenarios 
FSRC01.35 To prevent CAVs failure the development team shall ensure the understanding of 
potential computer signal input and output storage delays 
FSRC01.36 To prevent computer memory failure the development team shall ensure the computer 
is capable of storing and processing the expected amount of data with a factor of 
safety 
FSRC01.37 To prevent computer memory failure ensure the program is developed 
such that information that is too large cannot be written  into a memory 
buffer that is too small to contain it 
FSRC01.38 To prevent over-heating the development team shall ensure the computer is mounted 
such that there is proper clearance and  sufficient air flow to cool the computer 
FSRC01.39 To prevent over-heating the development team shall ensure the computer fans pull air 
from cool and dry source 
FSRC01.40 To prevent over-heating the development team shall ensure the computer imposes 
thermal self-regulation  
FSRC01.41 To prevent over-heating the development team shall ensure the 
computer operates within specified temperature range 
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FSRC01.42 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the system does 
not over heat 
FSRC01.43 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the computer is 
mounted such that there is proper clearance and  sufficient air flow to cool the 
computer 
FSRC01.44 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the computer 
fans pull air from cool and dry source 
FSRC01.45 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the computer 
imposes thermal self-regulation  
FSRC01.46 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the computer 
operates within specified temperature range 
FSRC01.47 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the program is 
developed such that it does not attempt to access an incorrect memory address leading 
to general protection fault 
FSRC01.48 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the program is 
developed such that the OS does not enter an infinite loop 
FSRC01.49 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the program is 
developed such that information that is too large cannot be written  into a memory 
buffer that is too small to contain it 
FSRC01.50 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the program is 
developed such that deadlock is prevented (multiple programs having control some 
resource another program needs) 
FSRC01.51 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure 
the program performs shutdown operations 
FSRC01.52 To prevent control action decision  failure the development team shall ensure the 
computer operates according to a specified minimum for sensor data quality 
FSRC01.53 To prevent control action decision  failure the development team shall ensure the 
computer disables the associated corrective action decisions when minimum standard 
for lane-line, object, and traffic sign recognition is not met 
FSRC01.54 To prevent control action decision  failure the development team shall ensure the 
computer operates according to a specified minimum for lane-line recognition (lane 
dots, poorly painted lines, no lines) 
FSRC01.55 To prevent control action decision  failure the development team shall ensure the 
computer operates according to a specified minimum for traffic sign recognition 
FSRC01.56 To prevent control action decision  failure the development team shall ensure the 
computer operates according to a specified minimum for low-light operations 
FSRC01.57 To prevent control action decision  failure the development team shall 
ensure the computer has control of headlights 
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FSRC01.58 The development team shall ensure the computer allows the operator to increase or 
decrease feedback timing 
FSRC01.59 The development team shall ensure the computer allows the operator to increase or 
decrease feedback volume 
FSRC01.60 The development team shall ensure the computer allows the operator to increase or 
decrease feedback visual stimulation 
FSRC01.61 The development team shall ensure the computer allows the operator to increase or 
decrease haptic feedback stimulation 
FSRC01.62 To prevent CAVs failure the development team shall ensure the use of software 
safety and that the system is free from external unintended malicious control 









The Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
shall perform multi-feature 
tracking 
 
The Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
shall perform object and lane-
line detection 
 
The Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
shall perform forward collision 
warning 
 
The Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
shall perform pedestrian 
collision warning 
 
The Intel Mobileye 6 camera shall 
perform headway warning 
 
 
The Intel Mobileye 6 camera shall 
perform traffic sign recognition 
FSRC02.01 The development team shall ensure the Intel Mobileye 6 camera wiring is securely 
installed using manufacturer installation specifications 
FSRC02.02 The development team shall ensure the Intel Mobileye 6 camera wiring gauge is 
sufficient to carry max operational current with factor of safety 
FSRC02.03 The development team shall ensure the Intel Mobileye 6 camera wire bend radii are 
adhered to 
FSRC02.04 The development team shall ensure the Intel Mobileye 6 camera alerts 
the computer when failure has occurred 
FSRC02.05 The development team shall ensure the Intel Mobileye 6 camera manufacturing and 
installation is sufficient to prevent unintended access and physical damage 
FSRC02.06 The development team shall ensure the Intel Mobileye 6 camera is placed inside 
cabin and  top-center of wind shield within operational area of windshield wipers 
FSRC02.07 The development team shall ensure the use of covering at wire- Intel Mobileye 6 
camera interface to prevent unintended access 
FSRC02.08 The development team shall ensure the Intel Mobileye 6 camera installation is inside 
cabin in a dry debris-proof location 
FSRC02.09 The operator shall avoid adverse road conditions which may produce 
NVH and damage or loosen the Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
FSRC02.10 The development team shall ensure the power supplied to the Intel Mobileye 6 
camera is within manufacturer recommended operational range 
FSRC02.11 The development team shall ensure an understanding of Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
signal quality, noise, latency, and bandwidth accounting for measurement and control 
action error 
FSRC02.12 To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 camera signal latency the development team shall ensure 
the use of a high-quality transmission medium 





The Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
shall transmit data to associated 
controller 
 
The Intel Mobileye 6 camera 
shall provide real-time display 
FSRC02.13 To prevent Intel Mobileye 6 camera signal bandwidth faults the development team 
shall ensure the transmission medium gauge is sufficient to handle expected 
throughput (load) with factor of safety 
FSRC02.14 The development team shall ensure an understanding of time required to analyze and 
route Intel Mobileye 6 camera signal data 
FSRC02.15 To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 camera signal noise the development team shall ensure 
the wires are as short as possible 
FSRC02.16 To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 camera signal noise the development team shall ensure 
the wires are kept away from electrical machinery 
FSRC02.17 To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 camera signal noise it is recommended to use twisted 
together wires 
FSRC02.18 To reduce internal Intel Mobileye 6 camera signal noise the development team shall 
ensure the thermal effects on amplifiers are minimized 
FSRC02.19 To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 camera signal noise, if possible, the development team 
shall ensure the amplifier bandwidth matches input signal bandwidth 
FSRC02.20 To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 camera signal noise the development team shall ensure 
the use of proper filtering techniques 
FSRC02.21 To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 camera signal noise the development team shall ensure 
the use of wire shielding and conduit 
FSRC02.22 To reduce Intel Mobileye 6 camera signal noise the development team shall ensure 
the understanding of ground loops and impose proper grounding practices 
FSRC02.23 The development team shall ensure understanding of potential Intel Mobileye 6 
camera signal storage delays 
FSRC02.24 The development team shall ensure the use of software safety and that the Intel 
Mobileye 6 camera signal is free from external unintended malicious control 
FSRC02.25 The development team shall ensure Intel Mobileye 6 camera system 
software updates are performed over land-line and not through the air 
FSRC02.26 To prevent field of view failure the development team shall ensure the Intel Mobileye 
6 camera is mounted in the operational area of the wind shield wipers 
FSRC02.27 To prevent field of view failure the development team shall ensure the Intel Mobileye 
6 camera has control of wind shield wipers (debris may impede camera view while 
operator is unaware) 
FSRC02.28 The development team shall ensure the Intel Mobileye 6 camera is of high-quality to 
maintain operations during low-light, poorly painted lane lines, and adverse weather 
conditions 
FSRC02.29 The development team shall ensure the Intel Mobileye 6 camera indicates to 
computer and operator when the system is unavailable 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 






The Bosch Front, Rear, and Corner 
MRR Radars shall perform early 
front, rear, and corner speed detection 
 
The Bosch Front, Rear, and 
Corner MRR Radars shall send 
data to associated controller 
 
FSRC03.01 The development team shall ensure the radar wiring is securely 
installed using manufacturer installation specifications 
FSRC03.02 The development team shall ensure the radar wiring gauge is sufficient 
to carry max operational current with factor of safety 
FSRC03.03 The development team shall ensure the radar wire bend radii are adhered to 
FSRC03.04 The development team shall ensure the radar alters computer that 
system failure has occurred 
FSRC03.05 The development team shall ensure the radar manufacturing and 
installation is sufficient to prevent unintended access and physical 
damage 
FSRC03.06 The development team shall ensure the use of covering at wire- radar 
interface to prevent unintended access 
FSRC03.07 The operator shall avoid adverse road condition which may produce 
NVH and damage or loosen the radar 
FSRC03.08 The development team shall ensure the power supplied to the radar is within 
manufacturer operational range 
FSRC03.09 The development team shall ensure the understanding of radar signal quality, noise, 
latency, and bandwidth accounting for measurement and control action error 
FSRC03.10 To reduce radar signal latency, the development team shall ensure the use of high-
quality transmission medium 
FSRC03.11 To prevent radar signal bandwidth faults, the development team shall ensure the 
transmission medium gauge is sufficient to handle expected throughput (load) with 
factor of safety 
FSRC03.12 The development team shall ensure the understanding of time required to analyze and 
route camera signal data 
FSRC03.13 To reduce radar signal noise the development team shall ensure the wires are as short 
as possible 
FSRC03.14 To reduce radar signal noise the development team shall ensure the wires are kept 
away from electrical machinery 
FSRC03.15 To reduce radar signal noise it is the development team shall ensure the to use twisted 
together wires 
FSRC03.16 To reduce internal radar signal noise the development team shall ensure the thermal 
effects on amplifiers are minimized 
FSRC03.17 To reduce radar signal noise, if possible, the development team shall ensure the 
amplifier bandwidth matches input signal bandwidth 
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FSRC03.18 To reduce radar signal noise the development team shall ensure the use of proper 
filtering techniques 
FSRC03.19 To reduce radar signal noise the development team shall ensure the use of wire 
shielding and conduit 
FSRC03.20 To reduce radar signal noise the development team shall ensure the understanding of 
ground loops and impose proper grounding practices 
FSRC03.21 The development team shall ensure the understanding of potential radar signal storage 
delays 
FSRC03.22 The development team shall ensure the use of software safety and that the radar signal 
is free from external unintended malicious control 
FSRC03.23 The development team shall ensure the system software updates are 
performed over land-line and not through the air 
FSRC03.24 To prevent field of view failure The development team shall ensure the radar is 
mounted such that the signal projects unimpeded 
FSRC03.25 The development team shall ensure the radar is of high-quality to maintain operations 
during low-light, poorly painted lane lines, and adverse weather conditions2 
FSRC03.26 The development team shall ensure the radar indicates to 2omputer and operator 
when the system is unavailable 
FSRC03.27 The development team shall ensure the integrated program accounts for radar 
horizontal field of view and elevation (±6° (160m), ±6°(100m), ±10°(60m), 
±25°(36m), ±42°(12m)) 
FSRC03.28 The development team shall ensure the integrated program accounts for radars speed, 
distance, and angle measurement accuracy (0.11 m/s, 0.12 m, ±0,3° ) 
FSRC03.29 The development team shall ensure the integrated program accounts for radars speed, 
distance, and angle object separation capability (0.72 m/s, 0.66 0m, ±7° ) 
FSRC03.30 The development team shall ensure the integrated program accounts for radars cycle 
time (60 ms) 
FSRC03.31 The development team shall ensure the integrated program accounts for radars 
frequency modulation 
FSRC03.32 The development team shall ensure the integrated program accounts for radars 
maximum number of detectable objects (32) 






The Intel Movidius Neural 
Compute Stick shall perform 
vision processing tasks in 
assistance to Intel Tank 
computational capabilities 
FSRC04.01 The development team shall ensure the compute stick is securely input to the 
computer 
FSRC04.02 The development team shall ensure the compute stick NN model thoroughly defined 
and highly sensitive to small variations in inputs 
FSRC04.03 The development team shall ensure the compute stick NN is thoroughly tested and 
validate prior to implementation 





The Intel Movidius Neural 
Compute Stick shall assist in 
blending various sensors 
(cameras, radars) data to 




The Intel Movidius Neural 
Compute Stick shall assist in 
performing sensor fusion data 
verification & validation 
 
The Intel Movidius Neural 
Compute Stick shall assist in 
determining if control action 
(EPS torque, braking, feedback) 
is required 
 
FSRC04.04 The development team shall ensure the compute stick NN imposes limits on output to 
not exceed boundaries 
FSRC04.05 The development team shall ensure the compute stick NNs use of hidden layers and 
neurons does not over-fit training data and is sufficient to fit new and unseen data 
FSRC04.06 The development team shall ensure the compute stick program code is thoroughly 
vetted (Auto industry standard is one defect per 1000 executable lines of code) 
FSRC04.07 The development team shall ensure the compute stick program is developed using 
automotive coding standards  
FSRC04.08 The development team shall ensure the use of multiple software scanning tools to 
identify vulnerability and error in compute stick program code (industry uses Jarvis 
which analyses the binary executable action and not the mistakes in the code) 
FSRC04.09 The development team shall ensure the control of computational overflow and 
compounding rounding errors 
FSRC04.10 The development team shall ensure the understanding of compute stick input and 
output signal quality, noise, latency, and bandwidth accounting for measurement and 
control action error 
FSRC04.11 The development team shall ensure the understanding of time required to analyze and 
route computer signal data 
FSRC04.12 To reduce compute stick signal input and output noise the development team shall 
ensure the use of proper filtering techniques 
FSRC04.13 The development team shall ensure the understanding of potential compute stick 
signal input and output storage delays 
FSRC04.14 The development team shall ensure the use of software safety and that 
the system is free from external unintended malicious control 
FSRC04.15 The development team shall ensure the compute stick is capable of storing and 
processing the expected amount of data with a factor of safety 
FSRC04.16 To prevent memory failure the development team shall ensure the program is 
developed such that information that is too large cannot be written  into a memory 
buffer that is too small to contain it 
FSRC04.17 The development team shall ensure the compute stick and computer interface is 
compatible 
FSRC04.18 The development team shall ensure the computer free storage space is available to 
allow compute stick to operate 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGC05.1 The KVaser shall interface and 
transfer CAN signals to USB 
FSRC05.01 The development team shall ensure KVaser manufacturing and 
installation is sufficient to prevent unintended access and physical 
damage to the computer 
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FSRC05.02 To prevent unintended access and physical damage the development team shall 
ensure use of coverings at KVaser interfaces 
FSRC05.03 To prevent physical damage to the KVaser the operator shall avoid adverse road 
condition which may produce NVH  
FSRC05.04 To prevent unintended access and physical damage the development team shall 
ensure KVaser installation is inside cabin in a dry debris-proof location 
FSRC05.05 To prevent unintended access and physical damage the development 
team shall ensure KVaser is inaccessible by passengers 
FSRC05.06 The development team shall ensure KVaser functionality prior to open-
road operation 
FSRC05.07 The development team shall ensure the KVaser is capable of 
processing the expected amount pf data with a factor of safety 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGC06.1 
SGC06.2 
The Niles camera shall perform 
real-time monitoring of 
operator 
 
The Niles operator monitoring 
camera shall send data to 
associated controller 
FSRC06.01 The development team shall ensure the Niles camera wiring is securely installed 
using manufacturer installation specifications 
FSRC06.02 The development team shall ensure the Niles camera wiring gauge is sufficient to 
carry max operational current with factor of safety 
FSRC06.03 The development team shall ensure the Niles camera wire bend radii 
are adhered to 
FSRC06.04 The development team shall ensure the Niles camera manufacturing and installation 
is sufficient to prevent unintended access and physical damage 
FSRC06.05 The development team shall ensure the Niles camera is placed inside the cabin within 
unobstructed operational view of the operator 
FSRC06.06 The development team shall ensure the use of covering at wire- Niles camera 
interface to prevent unintended access 
FSRC06.07 The development team shall ensure the Niles camera installation is inside cabin in a 
dry debris-proof location 
FSRC06.08 The operator shall avoid adverse road conditions which may produce 
NVH and damage the camera 
FSRC06.09 The development team shall ensure the power supplied to the Niles 
camera is within manufacturer recommended operational range 
FSRC06.10 The development team shall ensure an understanding of Niles camera signal quality, 
noise, latency, and bandwidth accounting for measurement and control action error 
FSRC06.11 To reduce Niles camera signal latency the development team shall ensure the use of a 
high-quality transmission medium 
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FSRC06.12 To prevent Niles camera signal bandwidth faults the development team shall ensure 
the transmission medium gauge is sufficient to handle expected throughput (load) 
with factor of safety 
FSRC06.13 The development team shall ensure an understanding of time required to analyze and 
route Niles camera signal data 
FSRC06.14 To reduce Niles camera signal noise the development team shall ensure the wires are 
as short as possible 
FSRC06.15 To reduce Niles camera signal noise the development team shall ensure the wires are 
kept away from electrical machinery 
FSRC06.16 To reduce Niles camera signal noise it is recommended to use twisted together wires 
FSRC06.17 To reduce internal Niles camera signal noise the development team shall ensure the 
thermal effects on amplifiers are minimized 
FSRC06.18 To reduce Niles camera signal noise, if possible, the development team shall ensure 
the amplifier bandwidth matches input signal bandwidth 
FSRC06.19 To reduce Niles camera signal noise the development team shall ensure the use of 
proper filtering techniques 
FSRC06.20 To reduce Niles camera signal noise the development team shall ensure the use of 
wire shielding and conduit 
FSRC06.21 To reduce Niles camera signal noise the development team shall ensure the 
understanding of ground loops and impose proper grounding practices 
FSRC06.22 The development team shall ensure understanding of potential Niles camera signal 
storage delays 
FSRC06.23 The development team shall ensure the use of software safety and that the Niles 
camera signal is free from external unintended malicious control 
FSRC06.24 The development team shall ensure system software updates are 
performed over land-line and not through the air 
FSRC06.25 To prevent field of view failure the development team shall ensure the camera is 
mounted in a location free of obstruction 
FSRC06.26 The development team shall ensure the camera is of high-quality to maintain 
operations during low-light 
FSRC06.27 The development team shall ensure the Niles camera indicates to computer and 
operator when the system is unavailable 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGC07.1 
SGC07.2 
The real-time display shall 
acquire sensor fusion data from 
associated controller 
FSRC07.01 The development team shall ensure the display wiring is securely installed using 
manufacturer installation specifications 
FSRC07.02 The development team shall ensure the display wiring gauge is sufficient to carry 
max operational current with factor of safety 





The real-time display shall 
display sensors fusion images 
in real-time 
FSRC07.03 The development team shall ensure the display wire bend radii are 
adhered to 
FSRC07.04 The development team shall ensure the camera manufacturing and installation is 
sufficient to prevent unintended access and physical damage 
FSRC07.05 The development team shall ensure the display is placed inside cabin within view of 
the operator 
FSRC07.06 The development team shall ensure the use of covering at wire- display interface to 
prevent unintended access 
FSRC07.07 The development team shall ensure the display installation is inside cabin in a dry 
debris-proof location 
FSRC07.08 The operator shall avoid adverse road conditions which may produce 
NVH and damage or loosen the display 
FSRC07.09 The development team shall ensure the power supplied to the display is within 
manufacturer recommended operational range 
FSRC07.10 The development team shall ensure an understanding of display signal quality, noise, 
latency, and bandwidth accounting for measurement and control action error 
FSRC07.11 To reduce display signal latency the development team shall ensure the use of a high-
quality transmission medium 
FSRC07.12 To prevent display signal bandwidth faults the development team shall ensure the 
transmission medium gauge is sufficient to handle expected throughput (load) with 
factor of safety 
FSRC07.13 The development team shall ensure an understanding of time required to analyze and 
route display signal data 
FSRC07.14 To reduce display signal noise the development team shall ensure the wires are as 
short as possible 
FSRC07.15 To reduce display signal noise the development team shall ensure the wires are kept 
away from electrical machinery 
FSRC07.16 To reduce display signal noise it is recommended to use twisted together wires 
FSRC07.17 To reduce internal display signal noise the development team shall ensure the thermal 
effects on amplifiers are minimized 
FSRC07.18 To reduce display signal noise, if possible, the development team shall ensure the 
amplifier bandwidth matches input signal bandwidth 
FSRC07.19 To reduce display signal noise the development team shall ensure the use of proper 
filtering techniques 
FSRC07.20 To reduce display signal noise the development team shall ensure the use of wire 
shielding and conduit 
FSRC07.21 To reduce display signal noise the development team shall ensure the understanding 
of ground loops and impose proper grounding practices 
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FSRC07.22 The development team shall ensure the use of software safety and that the display 
signal is free from external unintended malicious control 
FSRC07.23 The development team shall ensure display system software updates 
are performed over land-line and not through the air 








The Zed camera shall perform 
6-axis positional tracking to 
sense space and motion  
 
The Zed camera shall perform 
large-scale 3D mapping 
FSRC08.01 The development team shall ensure the ZED camera wiring is securely installed using 
manufacturer installation specifications 
FSRC08.02 The development team shall ensure the ZED camera wiring gauge is sufficient to 
carry max operational current with factor of safety 
FSRC08.03 The development team shall ensure the ZED camera wire bend radii are 
adhered to 
FSRC08.04 The development team shall ensure the power supplied to the ZED camera is within 
manufacturer recommended operational range 
FSRC08.05 The development team shall ensure an understanding of ZED camera signal quality, 
noise, latency, and bandwidth accounting for measurement and control action error 
FSRC08.06 To reduce ZED camera signal latency the development team shall ensure the use of a 
high-quality transmission medium 
FSRC08.07 To prevent ZED camera signal bandwidth faults the development team shall ensure 
the transmission medium gauge is sufficient to handle expected throughput (load) 
with factor of safety 
FSRC08.08 The development team shall ensure an understanding of time required to analyze and 
route ZED camera signal data 
FSRC08.09 To reduce ZED camera signal noise the development team shall ensure the wires are 
as short as possible 
FSRC08.10 To reduce ZED camera signal noise the development team shall ensure the wires are 
kept away from electrical machinery 
FSRC08.11 To reduce ZED camera signal noise it is recommended to use twisted together wires 
FSRC08.12 To reduce internal ZED camera signal noise the development team shall ensure the 
thermal effects on amplifiers are minimized 
FSRC08.13 To reduce ZED camera signal noise, if possible, the development team shall ensure 
the amplifier bandwidth matches input signal bandwidth 
FSRC08.14 To reduce ZED camera signal noise the development team shall ensure the use of 
proper filtering techniques 
FSRC08.15 To reduce ZED camera signal noise the development team shall ensure the use of 
wire shielding and conduit 
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FSRC08.16 To reduce ZED camera signal noise the development team shall ensure the 
understanding of ground loops and impose proper grounding practices 
FSRC08.17 The development team shall ensure understanding of potential ZED camera signal 
storage delays 
FSRC08.18 The development team shall ensure the use of software safety and that the ZED 
camera signal is free from external unintended malicious control 
FSRC08.19 The development team shall ensure system software updates are 
performed over land-line and not through the air 
FSRC08.20 To prevent field of view failure the development team shall ensure the ZED camera is 
mounted in the operational area of the wind shield wipers 
FSRC08.21 To prevent field of view failure the development team shall ensure the ZED camera 
has control of wind shield wipers (debris may impede camera view while operator is 
unaware) 
FSRC08.22 The development team shall ensure the ZED camera is of high-quality to maintain 
operations during low-light, poorly painted lane lines, and adverse weather conditions 
FSRC08.23 The development team shall ensure the camera indicates to computer and operator 
when the system is unavailable 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGC09.1 
SGC09.2 
The GPS shall receive global 
positioning data 
 
The GPS shall provide data to 
associated controller 
FSRC09.01 The development team shall ensure the GPS wiring is securely installed using 
manufacturer installation specifications 
FSRC09.02 The development team shall ensure the GPS wiring gauge is sufficient to carry max 
operational current with factor of safety 
FSRC09.03 The development team shall ensure the GPS wire bend radii are 
adhered to 
FSRC09.04 The development team shall ensure the GPS manufacturing and installation is 
sufficient to prevent unintended access, loosening, and physical damage 
FSRC09.05 The development team shall ensure the use of covering at wire-GPS interface to 
prevent unintended access 
FSRC09.06 The operator shall avoid adverse road conditions which may produce 
NVH and damage or loosen the GPS 
FSRC09.07 The development team shall ensure the power supplied to the GPS is 
within manufacturer recommended operational range 
FSRC09.08 The development team shall ensure an understanding of GPS signal quality, noise, 
latency, and bandwidth accounting for measurement and control action error 
FSRC09.09 To reduce GPS signal latency the development team shall ensure the use of a high-
quality transmission medium 
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FSRC09.10 To prevent GPS signal bandwidth faults the development team shall ensure the 
transmission medium gauge is sufficient to handle expected throughput (load) with 
factor of safety 
FSRC09.11 The development team shall ensure an understanding of time required to analyze and 
route GPS signal data 
FSRC09.12 To reduce GPS signal noise the development team shall ensure the wires are as short 
as possible 
FSRC09.13 To reduce GPS signal noise the development team shall ensure the wires are kept 
away from electrical machinery 
FSRC09.14 To reduce GPS signal noise it is recommended to use twisted together wires 
FSRC09.15 To reduce internal GPS signal noise the development team shall ensure the thermal 
effects on amplifiers are minimized 
FSRC09.16 To reduce GPS signal noise, if possible, the development team shall ensure the 
amplifier bandwidth matches input signal bandwidth 
FSRC09.17 To reduce GPS signal noise the development team shall ensure the use of proper 
filtering techniques 
FSRC09.18 To reduce GPS signal noise the development team shall ensure the use of wire 
shielding and conduit 
FSRC09.19 To reduce GPS signal noise the development team shall ensure the understanding of 
ground loops and impose proper grounding practices 
FSRC09.20 The development team shall ensure understanding of potential GPS signal storage 
delays 
FSRC09.21 The development team shall ensure the use of software safety and that 
the GPS signal is free from external unintended malicious control 
FSRC09.22 The development team shall ensure the GPS is of high-quality to maintain operations 
during low-light, poorly painted lane lines, and adverse weather conditions 
FSRC09.23 The development team shall ensure the GPS indicates to computer and operator when 
the system is unavailable 
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Appendix 4.3 CSMS Safety Goals and Functional Requirements 
CSMS Safety Goals and Functional Requirements 






The HSC shall control all 
hybrid functions 
 
The HSC shall control 
engine/EM torque split 
 
The HSC shall maintain SOC 
at appropriate level 
 
The HSC shall control gear 
shifting 
 
The HSC shall modify stock 
signals 
FSRS01.01 To avoid HSC wiring failure the development team shall ensure wiring is 
securely installed using manufacturer installation specifications 
FSRS01.02 To avoid HSC wiring failure the development team shall ensure wiring 
gauge is sufficient to carry max operational current with factor of safety 
FSRS01.03 To avoid HSC wiring failure the development team shall ensure wire bend radii are 
adhered to and wiring is protected from heat sources 
FSRS01.04 To avoid HSC unintended access or physical damage the development 
team shall ensure proper mounting, installation, and manufacturing of the 
HSC 
FSRS01.05 To avoid HSC unintended access or physical damage the development 
team shall ensure use of covering at wire-HSC interface  
FSRS01.06 To avoid HSC unintended access or physical damage the operator shall avoid adverse 
road conditions which may produce NVH 
FSRS01.07 To avoid HSC installation failure the development team shall ensure the 
mounting hardware are sufficient for max operational G-force with factor 
of safety 
FSRS01.08 To avoid HSC installation failure the development team shall ensure the 
mounting hardware is secure and free from potential lessening or 
unintended movement 
FSRS01.09 To avoid HSC over-current failure the development team shall ensure 
software limits current ranges 
FSRS01.10 To avoid HSC over-current failure the development team shall ensure relays and fuses 
are in place and functional 
FSRS01.11 To avoid HSC over-heating failure the development team shall ensure the HSC is 
mounted such that there is proper clearance and sufficient air flow to cool the HSC 
FSRS01.12 The HSC shall perform a shutdown procedure 
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The ECM shall control engine 
torque output 
 
The ECM shall control engine 
temperature 
 
The ECM shall control A/F 
ratio 
 
The ECM shall control idle 
speed 
 
The ECM shall control 
electronic valve 
 
FSRS02.01 To avoid ECM wiring failure the development team shall ensure wiring 
is securely installed using manufacturer installation specification 
FSRS02.02 To avoid ECM wiring failure the development team shall ensure wiring 
gauge is sufficient to carry max operational current with factor of safety 
FSRS02.03 To avoid ECM wiring failure the development team shall ensure wire bend radii are 
adhered to and wiring is protected from heat sources 
FSRS02.04 To avoid ECM unintended access or physical damage the development 
team shall ensure proper mounting, installation, and manufacturing of the 
ECM 
FSRS02.05 To avoid ECM unintended access or physical damage the development 
team shall ensure use of covering at wire-ECM interface  
FSRS02.06 To avoid ECM unintended access or physical damage the operator shall avoid adverse 
road conditions which may produce NVH 
FSRS02.07 To avoid ECM installation failure the development team shall ensure the 
mounting hardware are sufficient for max operational G-force with factor 
of safety 
FSRS02.08 To avoid ECM installation failure the development team shall ensure the mounting 
hardware is secure and free from potential lessening or unintended movement 
FSRS02.09 To avoid ECM over-current failure the development team shall ensure 
software limits current ranges 
FSRS02.10 To avoid ECM over-current failure the development team shall ensure relays and fuses 
are in place and functional 
FSRS02.11 The ECM shall perform a shutdown procedure 





The TCM shall control gear 
shifting 
 
The TCM shall control 
transmission temperature 
FSRS03.01 To avoid TCM wiring failure the development team shall ensure wiring 
is securely installed using manufacturer installation specifications 
FSRS03.02 To avoid TCM wiring failure the development team shall ensure wiring 
gauge is sufficient to carry max operational current with factor of safety 
FSRS03.03 To avoid TCM wiring failure the development team shall ensure wire bend radii are 
adhered to and wiring is protected from heat sources 
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 FSRS03.04 To avoid TCM unintended access or physical damage the development 
team shall ensure proper mounting, installation, and manufacturing of the 
TMC 
FSRS03.05 To avoid TCM unintended access or physical damage the development 
team shall ensure use of covering at wire-TMC interface  
FSRS03.06 To avoid TCM unintended access or physical damage the operator shall 
avoid adverse road conditions which may produce NVH 
FSRS03.07 To avoid TCM installation failure the development team shall ensure the 
mounting hardware are sufficient for max operational G-force with factor 
of safety 
FSRS03.08 To avoid TCM installation failure the development team shall ensure the mounting 
hardware is secure and free from potential lessening or unintended movement 
FSRS03.09 To avoid TCM over-current failure the development team shall ensure 
software limits current ranges 
FSRS03.10 To avoid TCM over-current failure the development team shall ensure relays and fuses 
are in place and functional 
FSRS03.11 To avoid TCM over-heating failure the development team shall ensure 
the TCM is mounted such that there is proper clearance and sufficient air 
flow to cool the TCM 
FSRS03.12 The TCM shall perform a shutdown procedure 





The EMC shall control current 
supply to EM 
 
The EMC shall control current 
direction 
 
The EMC shall control EM 
temperature 
 
FSRS04.01 To avoid EMC wiring failure the development team shall ensure wiring 
is securely installed using manufacturer installation specifications 
FSRS04.02 To avoid EMC wiring failure the development team shall ensure wiring 
gauge is sufficient to carry max operational current with factor of safety 
FSRS04.03 To avoid EMC wiring failure the development team shall ensure wire bend radii are 
adhered to and wiring is protected from heat sources 
FSRS04.04 To avoid EMC unintended access or physical damage the development 
team shall ensure proper mounting, installation, and manufacturing of the 
EMC 
FSRS04.05 To avoid EMC unintended access or physical damage the development team shall 
ensure use of covering at wire- EMC interface 
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FSRS04.06 To avoid EMC unintended access or physical damage the operator shall avoid adverse 
road conditions which may produce NVH 
FSRS04.07 To avoid EMC installation failure the development team shall ensure the 
mounting hardware are sufficient for max operational G-force with factor 
of safety 
FSRS04.08 To avoid EMC installation failure the development team shall ensure the mounting 
hardware is secure and free from potential lessening or unintended movement 
FSRS04.09 To avoid EMC over-current failure the development team shall ensure 
software limits current ranges 
FSRS04.10 To avoid EMC over-current failure the development team shall ensure relays and fuses 
are in place and functional 
FSRS04.11 To avoid EMC operation outside of max/min temperature range the 
development team shall ensure the EMC has a thermal controls system 
and software forces operation within specified EMC temperature range 
FSRS04.12 To avoid EMC operation outside of max/min temperature range the 
development team shall actuate cooling fans when EMC reaches 
specified temperature  
FSRS04.13 To avoid EMC operation outside of max/min temperature range the 
development team shall ensure thermal system components (radiator, 
coolant level, fans) are functional and sufficient to cool the EMC 
FSRS04.14 To avoid EMC operation outside of max/min temperature range the 
development team shall ensure the fans are free from potential physical 
damage 
FSRS04.15 To avoid EMC operation outside of max/min temperature range the development team 
shall ensure bolts, hoses and mounting hardware are securely fastened and free from 
potential loosening or unintended movement 
FSRS04.16 The EMC shall perform a shutdown procedure 





The BMS shall ensure safe 
ESS operating conditions 
 
FSRS05.01 To avoid BMS wiring failure the development team shall ensure wiring 
is securely installed using manufacturer installation specifications 
FSRS05.02 To avoid BMS wiring failure the development team shall ensure wiring 
gauge is sufficient to carry max operational current with factor of safety 
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SGS05.5 The BMS shall monitor ESS 
state (voltage, temperature, 
SOC, and current) 
 





The BMS shall report data 
 
The BMS shall control and 
balance ESS environment 
FSRS05.03 To avoid BMS wiring failure the development team shall ensure wire bend radii are 
adhered to and wiring is protected from heat sources 
FSRS05.04 To avoid BMS unintended access or physical damage the development 
team shall ensure proper mounting, installation, and manufacturing of the 
BMS 
FSRS05.05 To avoid BMS unintended access or physical damage the development 
team shall ensure use of covering at wire- BMS interface  
FSRS05.06 To avoid BMS unintended access or physical damage the operator shall 
avoid adverse road conditions which may produce NVH 
FSRS05.07 To avoid BMS installation failure the development team shall ensure the 
mounting hardware are sufficient for max operational G-force with factor 
of safety 
FSRS05.08 To avoid BMS installation failure the development team shall ensure the 
mounting hardware is secure and free from potential lessening or 
unintended movement 
FSRS05.09 To avoid BMS over-current failure the development team shall ensure 
software limits current ranges 
FSRS05.10 To avoid BMS over-current failure the development team shall ensure 
relays and fuses are in place and functional 
FSRS05.11 To avoid BMS over-heating failure the development team shall ensure 
the BMS is mounted such that there is proper clearance and sufficient air 
flow to cool the BMS 
FSRS05.12 The BMS shall perform a shutdown procedure 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGS06.1 
 
The OBC shall control 
charging to the HV battery 
pack 
FSRS06.01 To avoid OBC wiring failure the development team shall ensure 
charging port cover is sufficient to provide freedom from unintended 
access or physical damage 
FSRS06.02 To avoid OBC wiring failure the development team shall ensure wiring 
is securely installed using manufacturer installation specifications 
FSRS06.03 To avoid OBC wiring failure the development team shall ensure wiring 
gauge is sufficient to carry max operational current with factor of safety 
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FSRS06.04 To avoid OBC wiring failure the development team shall ensure wire bend radii are 
adhered to and wiring is protected from heat sources 
FSRS06.05 To avoid OBC unintended access or physical damage the development 
team shall ensure proper mounting, installation, and manufacturing of the 
OBC 
FSRS06.06 To avoid OBC unintended access or physical damage the development 
team shall ensure use of covering at wire- OBC interface  
FSRS06.07 To avoid OBC unintended access or physical damage the operator shall avoid adverse 
road conditions which may produce NVH 
FSRS06.08 To avoid OBC installation failure the development team shall ensure the 
mounting hardware are sufficient for max operational G-force with factor 
of safety 
FSRS06.09 To avoid OBC installation failure the development team shall ensure the 
mounting hardware is secure and free from potential lessening or 
unintended movement 
FSRS06.10 To avoid OBC over-current failure the development team shall ensure 
software limits current ranges 
FSRS06.11 To avoid OBC over-current failure the development team shall ensure relays and fuses 
are in place and functional 
FSRS06.12 To avoid OBC operation outside of max/min temperature range the 
development team shall ensure the OBC has a thermal controls system 
and software forces operation within specified OBC temperature range 
FSRS06.13 To avoid OBC operation outside of max/min temperature range the 
development team shall actuate cooling fans when OBC reaches 
specified temperature  
FSRS06.14 To avoid OBC operation outside of max/min temperature range the 
development team shall ensure thermal system components (radiator, 
coolant level, fans) are functional and sufficient to cool the OBC 
FSRS06.15 To avoid OBC operation outside of max/min temperature range the 
development team shall ensure the fans are free from potential physical 
damage 
FSRS06.16 To avoid OBC operation outside of max/min temperature range the development team 
shall ensure bolts, hoses and mounting hardware are securely fastened and free from 
potential loosening or unintended movement 
   
 
387 
FSRS06.17 The OBC shall perform a shutdown procedure 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGS07.1 
 
The OBD II shall provide 
requested vehicle parameters to 
monitor 
 
FSRS07.01 To avoid OBD II wiring failure the development team shall ensure 
wiring is securely installed using manufacturer installation specifications 
FSRS07.02 To avoid OBD II wiring failure the development team shall ensure 
wiring gauge is sufficient to carry max operational current with factor of 
safety 
FSRS07.03 To avoid OBD II wiring failure the development team shall ensure wire 
bend radii are adhered to and wiring is protected from heat sources 
FSRS07.04 To avoid OBD II unintended access or physical damage the development 
team shall ensure proper mounting, installation, and manufacturing of the 
OBD II 
FSRS07.05 To avoid OBD II installation failure the development team shall ensure the mounting 
hardware is secure, free from unintended movement, and sufficient for open road 
conditions with a factor of safety 
FSRS07.06 To avoid OBD II over-current failure the development team shall ensure 
software limits current ranges 
FSRS07.07 To avoid OBD II over-current failure the development team shall ensure relays and 
fuses are in place and functional 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGS08.1 
 
The CAN Bus shall transfer 
necessary signals such as EM 
speed, EM torque, EM 
temperature, EMC 
temperature, SOC, current, 
voltage, battery temperature, 
and OBC temperature 
FSRS08.01 To avoid CAN bus wiring failure the development team shall ensure 
wiring is securely installed using manufacturer installation specifications 
FSRS08.02 To avoid CAN bus wiring failure the development team shall ensure 
wiring gauge is sufficient to carry max operational current with factor of 
safety 
FSRS08.03 To avoid CAN bus wiring failure the development team shall ensure wire 
bend radii are adhered to and wiring is protected from heat sources 
FSRS08.04 To avoid CAN bus unintended access or physical damage the 
development team shall ensure proper mounting, installation, and 
manufacturing of the CAN bus 
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FSRS08.05 To avoid CAN bus unintended access or physical damage the development team shall 
ensure use of covering at wire- CAN bus interface 
FSRS08.06 To avoid CAN bus unintended access or physical damage the operator shall avoid 
adverse road conditions which may produce NVH 
FSRS08.07 To avoid CAN bus installation failure the development team shall ensure 
the mounting hardware are sufficient for max operational G-force with 
factor of safety 
FSRS08.08 To avoid CAN bus installation failure the development team shall ensure the mounting 
hardware is secure and free from potential lessening or unintended movement 
FSRS08.09 To avoid CAN bus over-current failure the development team shall 
ensure software limits current ranges 
FSRS08.10 To avoid CAN bus over-current failure the development team shall ensure relays and 
fuses are in place and functional 
FSRS08.11 To avoid CAN bus over-heating failure the development team shall ensure the CAN bus 
is mounted such that there is proper clearance and sufficient air flow to cool the CAN 
bus 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGS09.1 
 
The APPS shall monitor the 
position of the accelerator 
pedal and transmit a torque 
request 
FSRS09.01 To avoid AP/APPS wiring failure the development team shall ensure 
wiring is securely installed using manufacturer installation specifications 
FSRS09.02 To avoid AP/APPS wiring failure the development team shall ensure 
wiring gauge is sufficient to carry max operational current with factor of 
safety 
FSRS09.03 To avoid AP/APPS wiring failure the development team shall ensure 
wire bend radii are adhered to and wiring is protected from heat sources 
FSRS09.04 To avoid AP/APPS unintended access or physical damage the 
development team shall ensure proper mounting, installation, and 
manufacturing of the AP/APPS 
FSRS09.05 To avoid AP/APPS unintended access or physical damage the 
development team shall ensure use of covering at wire-AP/APPS 
interface  
FSRS09.06 To avoid AP/APPS unintended access or physical damage the operator 
shall avoid adverse road conditions which may produce NVH 
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FSRS09.07 To avoid AP/APPS installation failure the development team shall ensure 
the mounting hardware are sufficient for max operational G-force with 
factor of safety 
FSRS09.08 To avoid AP/APPS installation failure the development team shall ensure the mounting 
hardware is secure and free from potential lessening or unintended movement 
FSRS09.09 To avoid AP/APPS over-current failure the development team shall 
ensure software limits current ranges 
FSRS09.10 To avoid AP/APPS over-current failure the development team shall ensure relays and 
fuses are in place and functional 
FSRS09.11 To avoid AP/APPS over-heating failure the development team shall ensure the 
AP/APPS is mounted such that there is proper clearance and sufficient air flow to cool 
the AP/APPS 




The low voltage system shall 
control of all auxiliary 
functions to include air bags, 
windshield wipers, instrument 
cluster, lights, entertainment 
system, turn signals, haptic 
feedback, security system, 
pumps, fans, controller and 
DAQ 
 
The low voltage system shall 
control thermal components 
 
The low voltage system shall 
control data acquisition 
 
FSRS10.01 To avoid low voltage component wiring failure the development team 
shall ensure wiring is securely installed using manufacturer installation 
specifications 
FSRS10.02 To avoid low voltage component wiring failure the development team 
shall ensure wiring gauge is sufficient to carry max operational current 
with factor of safety 
FSRS10.03 To avoid low voltage component wiring failure the development team 
shall ensure wire bend radii are adhered to and wiring is protected from 
heat sources 
FSRS10.04 To avoid low voltage component unintended access or physical damage 
the development team shall ensure proper mounting, installation, and 
manufacturing of the low voltage systems 
FSRS10.05 To avoid low voltage component unintended access or physical damage the 
development team shall ensure use of covering at wire-low voltage component interface 
FSRS10.06 To avoid low voltage component unintended access or physical damage 
the operator shall avoid adverse road conditions which may produce 
NVH 
FSRS10.07 To avoid low voltage component installation failure the development 
team shall ensure the mounting hardware are sufficient for max 
operational G-force with factor of safety 
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FSRS10.08 To avoid low voltage component installation failure the development team shall ensure 
the mounting hardware is secure and free from potential lessening or unintended 
movement 
FSRS10.09 To avoid low voltage component over-current failure the development 
team shall ensure software limits current ranges 
FSRS10.10 To avoid low voltage component over-current failure the development team shall 
ensure relays and fuses are in place and functional 
FSRS10.11 To avoid low voltage over-heating failure the development team shall ensure the low 
voltage component is mounted such that there is proper clearance and sufficient air flow 
to cool the low voltage 
FSRS10.12 To avoid low voltage over-heating failure the development team shall ensure the low 
voltage component is mounted such that there is proper clearance and sufficient air flow 
to cool the low voltage 
 
Appendix 4.4 LKA Safety Goals and Functional Requirements 
CAVs / CSMS LKA Safety Goals and Functional Requirements 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGL01 The LKA system shall safely 
control lateral movement via 
the braking system (EBCM) 
FSRL01.01 The LKA system shall allow operator to override automated controls 
with minimal braking engagement  
FSRL01.02 LKA system shall brake the front wheel opposite to the side of deviation 
FSRL01.03 The LKA brake response system shall function according to operator 
engagement 
FSRL01.04 The LKA brake response system shall respond (feedback, lateral 
movement) more quickly in the event of less operator engagement (hands 
on wheel, head tilt, eye deviation) 
FSRL01.05 The LKA brake response system shall respond (feedback, lateral 
movement) less quickly in the event of more operator engagement (hands 
on wheel, head tilt, eye deviation) 
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FSRL01.06 To avoid wiring failures the LKA system shall be wired and installed 
according to manufacturer specifications to include bend radii, heat 
shielding, EMI avoidance, sheathing, proper gauge, and interface 
connections 
FSRL01.07 The LKA brake system shall engage in timely manner such that brake 
pad fatigue and passenger discomfort is minimized 
FSRL01.08 To avoid brake pad failures the development teams shall ensure proper 
mounting and installation of brake pads 
FSRL01.09 To avoid brake pad failures the development teams shall ensure brake 
pad bolts and mounting hardware are securely fastened and free from 
potential loosening or unintended movement 
FSRL01.10 To avoid brake pad failures the development shall avoid excessively 
adverse road conditions (bumpy terrain, excessive grade) which may 
cause a high NVH 
FSRL01.11 To avoid brake pad failures the operator shall avoid poor driving 
behaviors 
FSRL01.12 To avoid brake rotor failures the development teams shall ensure proper 
mounting and installation of brake rotors 
FSRL01.13 The LKA brake system shall engage in timely manner such that brake 
rotor fatigue and passenger discomfort is minimized 
FSRL01.14 To avoid brake rotor failures the development teams shall ensure brake 
rotor bolts and mounting hardware are securely fastened and free from 
potential loosening or unintended movement 
FSRL01.15 To avoid brake rotor failures the operator shall avoid excessively adverse 
road conditions (bumpy terrain, excessive grade) which may cause a high 
NVH  
FSRL01.16 The operator shall ensure brake system is free of build-up (snow, mud) 
and debris prior to use 
FSRL01.17 To avoid caliper failures the operator shall ensure routine inspection for 
caliper rust and corrosion 
FSRL01.18 LKA brake system shall engage in timely manner such that brake lines 
are immediately able to be actuated 
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FSRL01.19 To avoid brake fluid line failure the development team shall ensure 
proper bleeding, mounting,  installation, and routine maintenance and 
inspection of brake line hardware and its functionality 
FSRL01.20 To avoid brake fluid line failure the development team shall ensure lines, 
bolts and mounting hardware are securely fastened and free from 
potential loosening or unintended movement 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGL02 The LKA shall control lateral 
movement via the EPS system 
FSRL02.01 The LKA EPS response system shall function according to operator 
engagement 
FSRL02.02 The LKA EPS response system shall respond (feedback, lateral 
movement) more quickly in the event of less operator engagement (hands 
on wheel, head tilt, eye deviation) 
FSRL02.03 The LKA EPS response system shall respond (feedback, lateral 
movement) less quickly in the event of more operator engagement (hands 
on wheel, head tilt, eye deviation) 
FSRL02.04 The LKA EPS response system shall allow operator to override 
automated controls with minimal steering engagement 
FSRL02.05 To avoid contamination of EPS fluid the development team shall ensure 
proper mounting,  installation, and manufacturing of EPS hoses, clamps, 
and their components 
FSRL02.06 To avoid contamination of EPS fluid the development team shall ensure 
interface components, and mounting hardware are securely fastened and 
free from potential loosening or unintended movement 
FSRL02.07 To avoid contamination of EPS fluid the development team shall ensure 
functionality of EPS pump and check for hose deterioration 
FSRL02.08 To avoid EPS fluid leaks the development team shall ensure proper 
mounting,  installation, and manufacturing of EPS hoses, clamps, and 
their components 
FSRL02.09 To avoid EPS fluid leaks the development team shall ensure interface 
components (seals, gaskets), and mounting hardware are securely 
fastened and free from potential loosening or unintended movement 
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FSRL02.10 To avoid EPS fluid leaks the development team shall ensure the correct 
type of fluid is used, proper fluid levels, and check for leaks prior to 
operation 
FSRL02.11 To avoid EPS belt failure the development team shall ensure proper 
mounting,  installation, and manufacturing of the belt (tension, torque 
specs) and its components 
FSRL02.12 To avoid EPS belt failure the development teams hall ensure bolts, 
interface components, and mounting hardware are securely fastened and 
free from potential loosening or unintended movement 
FSRL02.13 To avoid EPS pump failure the development team shall ensure proper 
mounting,  installation, and manufacturing of pump and its components 
FSRL02.14 To avoid EPS pump failure the development team shall ensure bolts, 
interface components (seals, gaskets), and mounting hardware are 
securely fastened and free from potential loosening or unintended 
movement 
FSRL02.15 To avoid EPS failure the operator shall avoid excessively adverse road 
conditions (bumpy terrain, excessive grade) which may cause a high 
NVH 
FSRL02.16 The development team shall ensure power steering motor is functional 
FSRL02.17 To avoid EPS response system wiring failures the LKA system shall be 
wired and installed according to manufacturer specifications to include 
bend radii, heat shielding, EMI avoidance, sheathing, proper gauge, and 
interface connections 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGL03 The LKA shall perform lane-
line, object detection and 
multi-feature tracking 
FSRL03.01 The development team shall impose criteria for deviation and corrective 
action 
FSRL03.02 The LKA system shall monitor the operators engagement to include head 
tilt, hands on wheel,  and eye deviation 
FSRL03.03 The LKA system shall function according to operator engagement 
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FSRL03.04 The LKA system shall respond (feedback, acceleration, deceleration) 
more quickly in the event of less operator engagement (hands on wheel, 
head tilt, eye deviation) 
FSRL03.05 The LKA system shall respond (feedback, acceleration, deceleration) less 
quickly in the event of more operator engagement (hands on wheel, head 
tilt, eye deviation) 
FSRL03.06 The LKA system shall require minimum vehicle speed based on sensor 
requirements and lane-line visibility 
FSRL03.07 To avoid sensor visibility obstruction the LKA system shall have control 
of front lights 
FSRL03.08 To avoid sensor visibility obstruction the LKA system shall have control 
wind shield wipers 
FSRL03.09 The LKA system shall only be operational if sensor performance meets a 
minimum standard (communication speed, sensor availability or 
visibility) 
FSRL03.10 To avoid sensor visibility obstruction the operator shall ensure LKA 
system sensors have clear field of view and are free of visibility 
obstructions 
FSRL03.11 To avoid sensor failure the development team shall ensure sensor and 
sensor enclosure bolts and mounting hardware are securely fastened and 
free from potential loosening or unintended movement 
FSRL03.12 To avoid sensor failure the development team shall ensure sensor 
enclosure manufacturing and use of materials is sufficient to prevent 
unintended access and physical damage 
FSRL03.13 To avoid sensor failure the LKA sensors shall be wired and installed 
according to manufacturer specifications to include bend radii, heat 
shielding, EMI avoidance, sheathing, proper gauge, and interface 
connections 
FSRL03.14 The LKA system shall alert operator prior to and when shutdown occurs 
FSRL03.15 The LKA communications shall operate independently and be free from 
external manipulation 
FSRL03.16 The development team shall ensure the LKA system sensors are placed 
in a location which minimizes potential visibility failures 
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FSRL03.17 The development team shall ensure LKA system radars and cameras are 
of the quality which can produce true data during reasonably poor 
operational conditions (rain, fog, snow, dirt, poor lane-line quality) 
FSRL03.18 If LKA operating system fails, the LKA system shall alert the operator 
via audio and visual feedback 
FSRL03.19 The computer shall be aware of signal latency and the LKA program will 
actuate a control action accordingly 
FSRL03.20 If sensor signal stops in during a corrective control action the LKA  
system shall immediately disable and alert operator via visual, audio, and 
haptic feedback 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGL04 The LKA sensors shall 
transmit data to the associated 
controller 
FSRL04.01 The LKA sensors shall be wired and installed according to manufacturer 
specifications to include bend radii, heat shielding, EMI avoidance, 
sheathing, proper gauge, and interface connections 
FSRL04.02 The LKA system shall alert operator prior to and when shutdown occurs 
FSRL04.03 The LKA system shall only be operational if sensor performance meets a 
minimum standard (communication speed, sensor availability or 
visibility) 
FSRL04.04 The LKA communications shall operate independently and be free from 
external manipulation 
FSRL04.05 The LKA system shall have constant enabled/disabled form of feedback 
(light) indicated to the operator 
FSRL04.06 The development team shall ensure the LKA system signal transfers 
through appropriate medium (type, gauge of wiring) and adheres to 
automotive wiring standards 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGL05 The operator shall initiate the 
LKA system 
FSRL05.01 When the speed and operational environment allow, the LKA system 
shall alert the operator that the LKA system requires operator initiation 
FSRL05.02 When the speed and operational environment allow, the LKA initiation 
procedure shall be clearly defined to the operator via audio and visual 
   
 
396 
alert with minimal required actions by the operator (single button 
initiation) 
FSRL05.03 If LKA operating system fails, the LKA system shall alert the operator 
via audio and visual feedback 
FSRL05.04 To prevent accidental disabling of the LKA system, the LKA system 
shall have individual on/off buttons 
FSRL05.05 The development team shall ensure the LKA system signal transfers 
through an appropriate medium (type, gauge of wiring) and adheres to 
automotive wiring standards (twisted wires, EMI avoidance, shielding) 
FSRL05.06 The development team shall ensure the LKA system limits time of 
actuation once the operator initiates LKA system (ex. close loop after 
500ms) 
FSRL05.07 The development team shall ensure the LKA system alerts the operator 
once the LKA system has been enabled 
FSRL05.08 The LKA system shall operate within a specified vehicle velocity range 
FSRL05.09 Turn-indicator actuation shall be required for free movement out of lane, 
otherwise feedback will warn operator 
FSRL05.10 The operator shall be allowed to choose when LKA system will be 
enabled 
FSRL05.11 The development team shall ensure that if the LKA system “on” button is 
actuated, the LKA system enables, regardless of pressed time duration 
FSRL05.12 The development team shall ensure the LKA system “on” button is of the 
a reasonable quality to reduce bounce error 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGL06 The LKA system shall 
provide feedback to the 
operator (LKA status, haptic, 
visual, audio) 
FSRL06.01 The LKA feedback system shall be wired and installed according to 
manufacturer specifications to include bend radii, heat shielding, EMI 
avoidance, sheathing, proper gauge, and interface connections 
FSRL06.02 The LKA feedback system shall alert operator prior to and when 
shutdown occurs 
FSRL06.03 The LKA feedback system shall alert operator when deviation occurs 
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FSRL06.04 The LKA feedback system shall function according to operator 
engagement 
FSRL06.05 The LKA system shall provide audio, visual, and haptic feedback 
FSRL06.06 The LKA system shall provide feedback in manner that does not startle 
the operator and cause greater potential for hazard (not overly loud or 
bright) 
FSRL06.07 The LKA system audio feedback shall adjust to ambient volume (stereo 
system, excessive cabin noise) 
FSRL06.08 The LKA system visual feedback shall adjust to ambient light (decrease 
during night, increase during day) 
FSRL06.09 The LKA system shall only be operational if feedback performance 
meets a minimum standard (communication speed, audio, visual, haptic 
functionality) 
FSRL06.10 The LKA communications shall operate independently and be free from 
external manipulation (malicious intrusion, EMI) 
FSRL06.11 The LKA feedback system shall alert the operator using at least two 
forms of feedback  
FSRL06.12 The operator shall have control of the level of LKA system feedback 
stimuli 
FSRL06.13 The LKA system shall have constant enabled/disabled form of feedback 
(light) indicated to the operator 
FSRL06.14 The LKA system shall check for sensor obstructions (validate wheel 
speed with sensor data) 
FSRL06.15 The development team shall ensure LKA system radars and cameras are 
of the quality which can produce true data during reasonably poor 
operational conditions (rain, fog, snow, dirt, poor lane-line quality) 
FSRL06.16 The operator shall be capable of disenabling the LKA feedback system 
FSRL06.17 If LKA feedback system is disabled by the operator then the entire LKA 
system shall disengage until the operator initiates it again 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
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SGL07 The LKA computer shall safely 
perform sensor fusion data 
verification & validation using 
developed algorithms and NNs 
 
FSRL07.01 To avoid wiring failure of the intel tank computer the development team 
shall ensure wiring is securely installed using manufacturer installation 
specifications 
FSRL07.02 To avoid wiring failure of the intel tank computer the development team 
shall ensure wiring gauge is sufficient to carry max operational current 
with factor of safety 
FSRL07.03 To avoid wiring failure of the intel tank computer the development team shall ensure 
wire bend radii are adhered to 
FSRL07.04 The development team shall ensure the computer alerts operator that corrective action 
decision is disabled 
FSRL07.05 The development team shall ensure the computer determines fidelity of non-blended 
image and decide if corrective action should be applied 
FSRL07.06 The development team shall ensure the computer only makes corrective action 
decisions when fidelity of image meets minimum specified resolution 
FSRL07.07 The development team shall ensure if computer system fails, it does not 
prevent vehicle from manual driving operations 
FSRL07.08 The development team shall ensure manufacturing and installation is 
sufficient to prevent unintended access and physical damage to the 
computer 
FSRL07.09 To prevent unintended access and physical damage to the development team shall 
ensure use of coverings at wire-computer interface to prevent unintended access 
FSRL07.10 To prevent physical damage to the computer the operator shall avoid adverse road 
conditions which may produce NVH  
FSRL07.11 To prevent unintended access and physical damage the development team shall ensure 
computer installation is inside cabin in a dry debris-proof location 
FSRL07.12 To prevent unintended access and physical damage the development 
team shall ensure computer is inaccessible by passengers 
FSRL07.13 To prevent power failure the development team shall ensure the power 
supplied to the computer is within manufacturer operational range 
FSRL07.14 The development team shall ensure the computer NN model is thoroughly defined and 
highly sensitive to small variations in inputs 
FSRL07.15 The development team shall ensure the computer NN is thoroughly tested and validate 
prior to implementation 
FSRL07.16 The development team shall ensure the computer NN imposes limits on output to not 
exceed boundaries 
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FSRL07.17 The development team shall ensure the computer NNs use of hidden layers and neurons 
does not over-fit training data and is sufficient to fit new and unseen data 
FSRL07.18 The development team shall ensure the computer program code is thoroughly vetted 
(Auto industry standard is one defect per 1000 executable lines of code) 
FSRL07.19 The development team shall ensure the computer program is developed using 
automotive coding standards 
FSRL07.20 The development team shall ensure the use of multiple software scanning tools to 
identify vulnerability and error in computer program code (industry uses Jarvis which 
analyses the binary executable action and not the mistakes in the code) 
FSRL07.21 The development team shall ensure the control of computational overflow and 
compounding rounding errors 
FSRL07.22 The development team shall ensure the understanding of computer  input and output 
signal quality, noise, latency, and bandwidth accounting for measurement and control 
action error 
FSRL07.23 The development team shall reduce computer signal input and output latency, ensure 
use of high-quality transmission medium 
FSRL07.24 To prevent computer signal input and output bandwidth fault the development team 
shall ensure transmission medium gauge is sufficient to handle expected throughput 
(load) with factor of safety 
FSRL07.25 The development team shall ensure an understanding of time required to analyze and 
route computer signal data 
FSRL07.26 To reduce computer signal input and output noise the development team shall ensure 
wires are as short as possible 
FSRL07.27 To reduce computer signal input and output noise the development team shall  ensure 
wires are kept away from electrical machinery 
FSRL07.28 To reduce computer signal input and output noise it is recommended to use twisted 
together wires 
FSRL07.29 To reduce internal computer signal input and output noise the development team shall 
ensure thermal effects on amplifiers are minimized 
FSRL07.30 To reduce computer signal input and output noise, if possible, the development team 
shall ensure the amplifier bandwidth matches input signal bandwidth 
FSRL07.31 To reduce computer signal input and output noise the development team shall ensure 
use of proper filtering techniques 
FSRL07.32 To reduce computer signal input and output noise the development team shall  ensure 
use of wire shielding and conduit 
FSRL07.33 To reduce computer signal input and output noise the development team shall ensure 
understanding of ground loops and impose proper grounding practices 
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FSRL07.34 To ensure true data measurement the development team shall test the collection with the 
computer operating at the same temperature that it will be operating at in real-world 
scenarios 
FSRL07.35 The development team shall ensure the understanding of potential computer signal input 
and output storage delays 
FSRL07.36 The development team shall ensure the use of software safety and that 
the system is free from external unintended malicious control 
FSRL07.37 To prevent computer memory failure the development team shall ensure the computer is 
capable of storing and processing the expected amount of data with a factor of safety 
FSRL07.38 To prevent computer memory failure ensure the program is developed 
such that information that is too large cannot be written  into a memory 
buffer that is too small to contain it 
FSRL07.39 To prevent over-heating the development team shall ensure the computer is mounted 
such that there is proper clearance and  sufficient air flow to cool the computer 
FSRL07.40 To prevent over-heating the development team shall ensure the computer imposes 
thermal self-regulation  
FSRL07.41 To prevent over-heating the development team shall ensure the computer 
operates within specified temperature range 
FSRL07.42 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the system does 
not over heat 
FSRL07.43 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the computer is 
mounted such that there is proper clearance and  sufficient air flow to cool the computer 
FSRL07.44 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the computer fans 
pull air from cool and dry source 
FSRL07.45 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the computer 
imposes thermal self-regulation  
FSRL07.46 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the computer 
operates within specified temperature range 
FSRL07.47 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the program is 
developed such that it does not attempt to access an incorrect memory address leading 
to general protection fault 
FSRL07.48 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the program is 
developed such that the OS does not enter an infinite loop 
FSRL07.49 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the program is 
developed such that information that is too large cannot be written  into a memory 
buffer that is too small to contain it 
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FSRL07.50 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the program is 
developed such that deadlock is prevented (multiple programs having control some 
resource another program needs) 
FSRL07.51 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the 
program performs shutdown operations 
FSRL07.52 To prevent over-heating the development team shall ensure the computer 
fans pull air from cool and dry source 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGL08 The LKA computer shall send 
control action decisions to the 
associated controller 
FSRL08.01 The LKA system shall have constant enabled/disabled form of feedback 
(light) indicated to the operator 
FSRL08.02 To avoid wiring failure of the intel tank computer the development team 
shall ensure wiring is securely installed using manufacturer installation 
specifications 
FSRL08.03 To avoid wiring failure of the intel tank computer the development team 
shall ensure wiring gauge is sufficient to carry max operational current 
with factor of safety 
FSRL08.04 To avoid wiring failure of the intel tank computer the development team shall ensure 
wire bend radii are adhered to 
FSRL08.05 The development team shall ensure the computer alerts operator that 
corrective action decision is disabled 
FSRL08.06 The development team shall ensure the computer only makes corrective action 
decisions when fidelity of image meets minimum specified resolution 
FSRL08.07 The development team shall ensure if computer system fails, it does not 
prevent vehicle from manual driving operations 
FSRL08.08 The development team shall ensure manufacturing and installation is 
sufficient to prevent unintended access and physical damage to the 
computer 
FSRL08.09 To prevent unintended access and physical damage to the development team shall 
ensure use of coverings at wire-computer interface to prevent unintended access 
FSRL08.10 To prevent physical damage to the computer the operator shall avoid adverse road 
conditions which may produce NVH  
FSRL08.11 To prevent unintended access and physical damage the development team shall ensure 
computer installation is inside cabin in a dry debris-proof location 
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FSRL08.12 To prevent unintended access and physical damage the development 
team shall ensure computer is inaccessible by passengers 
FSRL08.13 To prevent power failure the development team shall ensure the power 
supplied to the computer is within manufacturer operational range 
FSRL08.14 The development team shall ensure the understanding of computer  input and output 
signal quality, noise, latency, and bandwidth accounting for measurement and control 
action error 
FSRL08.15 The development team shall reduce computer signal input and output latency, ensure 
use of high-quality transmission medium 
FSRL08.16 To prevent computer signal input and output bandwidth fault the development team 
shall ensure transmission medium gauge is sufficient to handle expected throughput 
(load) with factor of safety 
FSRL08.17 The development team shall ensure an understanding of time required to analyze and 
route computer signal data 
FSRL08.18 To reduce computer signal input and output noise the development team shall ensure 
wires are as short as possible 
FSRL08.19 To reduce computer signal input and output noise the development team shall  ensure 
wires are kept away from electrical machinery 
FSRL08.20 To reduce computer signal input and output noise it is recommended to use twisted 
together wires 
FSRL08.21 To reduce internal computer signal input and output noise the development team shall 
ensure thermal effects on amplifiers are minimized 
FSRL08.22 To reduce computer signal input and output noise, if possible, the development team 
shall ensure the amplifier bandwidth matches input signal bandwidth 
FSRL08.23 To reduce computer signal input and output noise the development team shall ensure 
use of proper filtering techniques 
FSRL08.24 To reduce computer signal input and output noise the development team shall  ensure 
use of wire shielding and conduit 
FSRL08.25 To reduce computer signal input and output noise the development team shall ensure 
understanding of ground loops and impose proper grounding practices 
FSRL08.26 To ensure true data measurement the development team shall test the collection with the 
computer operating at the same temperature that it will be operating at in real-world 
scenarios 
FSRL08.27 The development team shall ensure the understanding of potential computer signal input 
and output storage delays 
FSRL08.28 To prevent computer memory failure the development team shall ensure the computer is 
capable of storing and processing the expected amount of data with a factor of safety 
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FSRL08.29 To prevent computer memory failure ensure the program is developed 
such that information that is too large cannot be written  into a memory 
buffer that is too small to contain it 
FSRL08.30 To prevent over-heating the development team shall ensure the computer is mounted 
such that there is proper clearance and  sufficient air flow to cool the computer 
FSRL08.31 To prevent over-heating the development team shall ensure the computer fans pull air 
from cool and dry source 
FSRL08.32 To prevent over-heating the development team shall ensure the computer imposes 
thermal self-regulation  
FSRL08.33 To prevent over-heating the development team shall ensure the computer 
operates within specified temperature range 
FSRL08.34 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the system does 
not over heat 
FSRL08.35 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the computer is 
mounted such that there is proper clearance and  sufficient air flow to cool the computer 
FSRL08.36 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the computer fans 
pull air from cool and dry source 
FSRL08.37 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the computer 
imposes thermal self-regulation  
FSRL08.38 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the computer 
operates within specified temperature range 
FSRL08.39 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the program is 
developed such that it does not attempt to access an incorrect memory address leading 
to general protection fault 
To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the program is 
developed such that the OS does not enter an infinite loop 
FSRL08.40 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the program is 
developed such that information that is too large cannot be written  into a memory 
buffer that is too small to contain it 
FSRL08.41 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the program is 
developed such that deadlock is prevented (multiple programs having control some 
resource another program needs) 
FSRL08.42 To prevent operating system crash the development team shall ensure the 
program performs shutdown operations 
FSRL08.43 The LKA system shall allow the operator to easily override the corrective 
control action via actuation of steering, braking or accelerating 
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FSRL08.44 The LKA system shall temporarily disengage when the operator actuates 
turn signal 
FSRL08.45 The development team shall ensure the use of software safety and that 
the system is free from external unintended malicious control 
 
Appendix 4.5 PSI HV Safety Goals and Functional Requirements 
PSI HV Safety Goals and Functional Requirements 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGH01 The HV battery pack shall 
safely store and supply energy 
to the EM 
FSRH01.01 To prevent the HV battery pack from operating outside of the max/min 
temperature range the development team shall ensure specified 
temperature limits are controlled by the BMS 
FSRH01.02 To prevent the HV battery pack from operating outside of the max/min 
temperature range the development team shall ensure actuation of 
battery pack thermal control system (fans) when the temperature reaches 
limit 
FSRH01.03 To prevent the HV battery pack from operating outside of the max/min 
temperature range the development team shall ensure proper installation 
using manufacturer recommended specifications to include component 
clearances and wire bend radii 
FSRH01.04 To prevent the HV battery pack from operating outside of the max/min 
temperature range the development team shall ensure a limit to charging 
and discharging current to a specified range 
FSRH01.05 To prevent the HV battery pack from operating while undercharged the 
development team shall ensure the BMS monitors and controls the SOC 
in real-time 
FSRH01.06 To prevent the HV battery pack from operating while undercharged the 
development team shall ensure controls software will only draw current 
at specified minimum SOC 
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FSRH01.07 To prevent the HV battery pack from unintended access the development 
team shall ensure proper mounting,  installation, and manufacturing of 
enclosure and HV components 
FSRH01.08 To prevent the HV battery pack from unintended access the development 
team shall ensure bolts and mounting hardware is securely fastened and 
free from potential loosening or movement 
FSRH01.09 To prevent the HV battery pack from unintended access the development 
team shall ensure all HV enclosure vents are covered with appropriate 
screening to prevent access from liquid, debris, dust, or insects 
FSRH01.10 To prevent the HV battery pack from unintended access the development 
team shall ensure HV thermal control system fans are pulling air from 
dry particulate-free source 
FSRH01.11 To prevent the HV battery pack from unintended access the development 
team shall ensure the enclosure location is covered and free from the 
external environment when vehicle is not in use 
FSRH01.12 To ensure the HV battery pack is properly installed the development 
team shall ensure manufacturer recommended installation instructions 
(clearance, bend radii, and soldering) 
FSRH01.13 To ensure the HV battery pack is properly installed the development 
team shall ensure the wires, bus bars, and all interfacing components are 
securely mounted and adequate clearance used 
FSRH01.14 To prevent the HV battery pack failure from excess charging or 
discharging of current the development team shall ensure software 
(HSC, OBC, EMC) limits charging and discharging rates and ranges 
FSRH01.15 To prevent the HV battery pack failure from excess charging or 
discharging of current the development team shall ensure relays and 
fuses are in place and functional to prevent over drawing of current 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGH02 The HV enclosure shall safely 
contain enclosed components 
through the prevention of 
FSRH02.01 To prevent the HV enclosure failure from unintended access the 
development team shall ensure proper mounting,  installation, and 
manufacturing of enclosure (sealing, welds, bolt holes) 
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unintended horizontal or 




FSRH02.02 To prevent the HV enclosure failure from unintended access the 
development team shall ensure bolts and mounting hardware is securely 
fastened and free from potential loosening or movement 
FSRH02.03 To prevent the HV enclosure failure from unintended access the 
development team shall ensure the enclosure location is covered and free 
from the external environment when vehicle is not in use 
FSRH02.04 To prevent the HV enclosure failure from improper mounting to the 
vehicle frame the development team shall ensure the use of existing 
mount locations on vehicle frame 
FSRH02.05 To prevent the HV enclosure failure from improper mounting to the 
vehicle frame the development team shall ensure mounting hardware is 
sufficient for max operational G-force with factor of safety 
FSRH02.06 To prevent the HV enclosure failure from improper mounting to the 
vehicle frame the development team shall ensure proper enclosure 
manufacturing (welds, thread engagement ) 
FSRH02.07 To prevent the HV enclosure failure from improper installation and 
mounting of components the development team shall ensure 
FSRH02.08 To prevent the HV enclosure failure from improper installation and 
mounting of components the development team shall ensure component 
mounting hardware is fire retardant 
FSRH02.09 To prevent the HV enclosure failure from improper installation and 
mounting of components the development team shall ensure component 
mounting hardware is secure and free from unintended movement 
FSRH02.10 To prevent a HV enclosure cooling failure the development team shall 
ensure the enclosure fans are operational and sufficient to cool that 
battery pack 
FSRH02.11 To prevent a HV enclosure cooling failure the development team shall 
ensure the enclosure fans are free from potential physical damage 
FSRH02.12 To prevent a HV enclosure cooling failure the development team shall 
ensure the enclosure fans pull air from a dry and particulate free source 
FSRH02.13 To prevent a HV enclosure cooling failure the development team shall 
ensure the enclosure ventilation is sufficient to cool HV components 
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FSRH02.14 To prevent a HV enclosure cooling failure the development team shall 
ensure the enclosure is designed such that there is sufficient air flow to 
cool HV components and that the flow is free from interference 
FSRH02.15 To prevent a HV enclosure failure the operator shall not operate vehicle 
during adverse environmental conditions (excessively rough roads, 
NVH) 
FSRH02.16 To prevent a HV enclosure manufacturing failure the development team 
shall ensure materials used in enclosure manufacturing are capable of 
withstanding high NVH 
FSRH02.17 To prevent a HV enclosure manufacturing failure the development team 
shall ensure proper enclosure manufacturing (welds, thread engagement) 
FSRH02.18 To prevent a HV enclosure failure the development team shall ensure 
materials used in manufacturing of enclosure are fire retardant 
FSRH02.19 To prevent the HV enclosure from unintended access the development 
team shall ensure all vents are covered with appropriate screening 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGH03 The HV junction box shall 
safely contain and consolidate 
HV wire connections and 
relays and provide a 
maintenance ease of use 
FSRH03.01 To prevent junction box wiring failure the development team shall 
ensure wiring is securely installed using manufacturer installation 
specifications 
FSRH03.02 To prevent junction box wiring failure the development team shall 
ensure wiring gauge is sufficient to carry max operational current with 
factor of safety 
FSRH03.03 To prevent junction box wiring failure the development team shall 
ensure wire bend radii are adhered to 
FSRH03.04 To prevent junction box  failure from unintended access the development 
team shall ensure the box manufacturing is sufficient to prevent 
unintended access, loosening, and physical damage 
FSRH03.05 To prevent junction box  failure from unintended access the development 
team shall ensure the use of grommets at wire-box interface prevent 
unintended access 
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FSRH03.06 To prevent junction box failure the development team shall ensure the 
junction box and mounting hardware is sufficient for max operational G-
force with factor of safety 
FSRH03.07 To prevent junction box failure the development team shall ensure the 
junction box and mounting hardware is fire retardant 
FSRH03.08 To prevent junction box failure the development team shall ensure the 
junction box and mounting hardware is secure and free from unintended 
movement 
FSRH03.09 To prevent junction box over-current failure the development team shall 
ensure software (HSC, OBC, EMC) limits current magnitude 
FSRH03.10 To prevent junction box over-current failure the development team shall 
ensure relays and fuses are in place and functional to prevent over 
drawing of current 
FSRH03.11 To prevent junction box failure the development team shall ensure box 
minimum rating of IP67 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGH04 The HV wiring harness shall 
safely transfer energy 
FSRH04.01 To prevent HV wiring harness failure the development team shall ensure 
wiring is securely installed using manufacturer installation specifications 
FSRH04.02 To prevent HV wiring harness failure the development team shall ensure 
wiring gauge is sufficient to carry max operational current with factor of 
safety 
FSRH04.03 To prevent HV wiring harness failure the development team shall ensure 
wire bend radii are adhered to 
FSRH04.04 To prevent HV wiring harness failure the development team shall ensure 
the harness manufacturing is sufficient to prevent unintended access and 
physical damage 
FSRH04.05 To prevent HV wiring harness failure the development team shall ensure 
the use of covers and shielding to prevent unintended access and 
physical damage 
FSRH04.06 To prevent HV wiring harness failure the operator shall avoid adverse 
road condition which may project debris and damage harness 
   
 
409 
FSRH04.07 To prevent HV wiring harness installation failure the development team 
shall ensure the harness and mounting hardware is secure and free from 
unintended movement 
FSRH04.08 To prevent HV wiring harness over-current failure the development team 
shall ensure software (HSC, OBC, EMC) limits current rates and ranges 
FSRH04.09 To prevent HV wiring harness over-current failure the development team 
shall ensure relays and fuses are in place and functional to prevent over 
drawing of current 
FSRH04.10 To prevent HV wiring harness installation failure the development team 
shall ensure the harness and mounting hardware is sufficient for max 
operational G-force with factor of safety 






The BMS shall safely ensure 
the HV ESS operating 
conditions 
 
The BMS shall safely monitor 
and report the data of the HV 
ESS voltage, temperature, 
SOC, and current 
 





The BMS shall safely control 
and balance the HV ESS 
environment 
FSRH05.01 To prevent BMS wiring failure the development team shall ensure the 
wiring is securely installed using manufacturer installation specifications 
FSRH05.02 To prevent BMS wiring failure the development team shall ensure the 
wiring gauge is sufficient to carry max operational current with factor of 
safety 
FSRH05.03 To prevent BMS wiring failure the development team shall ensure wire 
bend radii are adhered to 
FSRH05.04 To prevent BMS failure the development team shall ensure the  
manufacturing is sufficient to prevent unintended access and physical 
damage 
FSRH05.05 To prevent BMS unintended access or physical damage failure the 
development team shall ensure use of covering at wire-BMS interface 
prevent unintended access 
FSRH05.06 To prevent BMS unintended access or physical damage failure the 
operator  shall avoid adverse road condition which may produce NVH 
and damage BMS 
FSRH05.07 To prevent BMS installation failure the development team shall ensure 
the BMS and mounting hardware are sufficient for max operational G-
force with factor of safety 
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FSRH05.08 To prevent BMS installation failure the development team shall ensure 
the BMS and mounting hardware is secure and free from unintended 
movement 
FSRH05.09 To prevent BMS over-current failure the development team shall ensure 
software limits current rates and ranges 
FSRH05.10 To prevent BMS over-current failure the development team shall ensure 
relays and fuses are in place and functional to prevent over drawing of 
current 
FSRH05.11 To prevent BMS over-heating failure the development team shall ensure 
the BMS is mounted such that there is proper clearance and  sufficient 
air flow to cool the BMS 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGH06 
 
The OBC shall safely control 
charging to the HV battery 
pack 
FSRH06.01 To prevent OBC charging port failure the development team shall ensure 
the charging port cover is sufficient to provide freedom from unintended 
access or physical damage 
FSRH06.02 To prevent OBC charging port failure the development team shall ensure 
the charging port is securely installed using manufacturer installation 
specifications 
FSRH06.03 To prevent OBC charging port failure the development team shall ensure 
wiring gauge is sufficient to carry max operational current with factor of 
safety 
FSRH06.04 To prevent OBC charging port failure the development team shall ensure 
wire bend radii are adhered to 
FSRH06.05 To prevent OBC wiring failure the development team shall ensure the 
wiring is securely installed using manufacturer installation specifications 
FSRH06.06 To prevent OBC wiring failure the development team shall ensure wiring 
gauge is sufficient to carry max operational current with factor of safety 
FSRH06.07 To prevent OBC wiring failure the development team shall ensure wire 
bend radii are adhered to 
FSRH06.08 To prevent OBC failure the development team shall ensure 
manufacturing is sufficient to prevent unintended access and physical 
damage 
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FSRH06.09 To prevent OBC unintended access or physical damage failure the 
development team shall ensure the use of covering at wire-OBC 
interface 
FSRH06.10 To prevent OBC unintended access or physical damage failure the 
development team shall ensure charging port cover is sufficient to 
provide freedom from unintended access or physical damage 
FSRH06.11 To prevent OBC unintended access or physical damage failure the 
operator shall avoid adverse road condition which may produce NVH 
and damage OBC 
FSRH06.12 To prevent OBC installation failure the development team shall ensure 
the OBC and mounting hardware are sufficient for max operational G-
force with factor of safety 
FSRH06.13 To prevent OBC installation failure the development team shall ensure 
the OBC, charging port, and mounting hardware are secure and free 
from unintended movement 
FSRH06.14 To prevent OBC over-current failure the development team shall ensure 
software limits current rates and ranges 
FSRH06.15 To prevent OBC over-current failure the development team shall ensure 
relays and fuses are in place and functional to prevent over drawing of 
current 
FSRH06.16 To prevent OBC over-heating failure the development team shall ensure 
software limits operation within specified OBC temperature range 
FSRH06.17 To prevent OBC over-heating failure the development team shall ensure 
actuation of thermal control system (fans) when OBC reaches specified 
temperature 
FSRH06.18 To prevent OBC over-heating failure the development team shall ensure 
manufacturer recommended installation instructions (clearance, bend 
radii) 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGH07.1 
SGH07.2 
FSRH07.01 To prevent EMC wiring failure the development team shall ensure the 
wiring is securely installed using manufacturer installation specifications 





The EMC shall safely control 
the supply of current to the 
EM 
 
The EMC shall safely convert 
the DC to AC 
 
The EMC shall safely control 
the direction of current 
 
The EMC shall safely control 
the EM temperature 
FSRH07.02 To prevent EMC wiring failure the development team shall ensure 
wiring gauge is sufficient to carry max operational current with factor of 
safety 
FSRH07.03 To prevent EMC wiring failure the development team shall ensure wire 
bend radii are adhered to 
FSRH07.04 To prevent EMC failure the development team shall ensure 
manufacturing is sufficient to prevent unintended access and physical 
damage 
FSRH07.05 To prevent EMC unintended access failure the development team shall 
ensure the use of covering at wire-EMC interface prevent unintended 
access 
FSRH07.06 To prevent EMC unintended access failure the operator  shall avoid 
adverse road condition which may produce NVH and damage EMC 
FSRH07.07 To prevent EMC installation failure the development team shall ensure 
the EMC and mounting hardware are sufficient for max operational G-
force with factor of safety 
FSRH07.08 To prevent EMC installation failure the development team shall ensure 
the EMC and mounting hardware is secure and free from unintended 
movement 
FSRH07.09 To prevent EMC over-current failure the development team shall ensure 
software limits current rates and ranges 
FSRH07.10 To prevent EMC over-current failure the development team shall ensure 
relays and fuses are in place and functional to prevent over drawing of 
current 
FSRH07.11 To prevent EMC over-heating failure the development team shall ensure 
software limits operation within specified EMC temp range 
FSRH07.12 To prevent EMC over-heating failure the development team shall ensure 
actuation of thermal control system (fans) when EMC reaches specified 
temperature 
FSRH07.13 To prevent EMC over-heating failure the development team shall ensure 
using manufacturer recommended installation instructions (clearance, 
bend radii) 
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SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGH08 The HV component clearance 
requirements shall be met to 
ensure safe vehicle operation 
FSRH08.01 The HV ESS components shall ensure proper clearance, based on 
analysis, in order to prevent overheating, heat transfer,  and thermal 
runaway 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGH09 The HV ESS shall operate 
within a safe and specified 
temperature range 
FSRH09.01 The HV ESS shall avoid, detect, mitigate, and contain overheating  
FSRH09.02 The HV ESS shall ensure accurate temperature sensing 
FSRH09.03 The HV ESS shall ensure accurate voltage sensing 
FSRH09.04 The HV ESS shall utilize EPO system 
FSRH09.05 The BMS shall control the battery pack temperature and actuate EPO 
when unsafe state is detected 
FSRH09.06 The ESS enclosure shall have a cooling system to ensure temperature 
control and thermal ventilation 
FSRH09.07 The HV ESS shall be installed in the vehicle bed to allow for air 
movement and ventilation 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGH10 The magnitude of the current 
applied to the HV ESS when 
charging shall match the 
current requested 
FSRH10.01 The OBC shall control the current to the battery pack while in a 
stationary charging state 
FSRH10.02 The HSC shall control the current to the battery pack while in a mobile 
charging state to meet the SOC requirements 
FSRH10.03 The OBC shall determine when max SOC has been met and ensure a 
stop to charging operations 
FSRH10.04 The HV ESS shall ensure accurate SOC sensing 
FSRH10.05 The HV ESS shall ensure accurate current/voltage sensing system by use 
of EMC, BMS, and OBC 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
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SGH11 The magnitude of the current 
applied by the HV ESS when 
discharging shall match the 
current requested 
FSRH11.01 The current supplied by the HV ESS shall be determined by the 
EM/engine torque split 
FSRH11.02 The HSC shall determine the torque split and ultimately the current 
request 
FSRH11.03 The current discharged shall also be determined by the SOC 
requirements 
FSRH11.04 The HSC and EMC shall determine and control the max current 
discharge 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGH12 The current applied shall 
match the direction of the 
current requested 
FSRH12.01 The state of the vehicle (stationary/mobile), SOC requirements, and 
torque request shall determine the direction of current flow 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGH13 The current applied shall be 
delivered at the time intended 
FSRH13.01 In a mobile state, the time of a torque request shall determine the time of 
current delivered 
 
Appendix 4.6 PSI Mechanical Safety Goals and Functional Requirements 
PSI Mechanical Safety Goals and Functional Requirements 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGM01 The driveshaft shall transmit torque 
from the engine and/or EM to the 
rear of the vehicle 
FSRM01.01 To avoid driveshaft-EM interface failure the development team shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, and manufacturing of modified driveshaft and its components 
FSRM01.02 To avoid driveshaft-EM interface failure the development team shall ensure driveshaft 
bolts and mounting hardware is securely fastened and free from potential loosening or 
unintended movement 
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FSRM01.03 To avoid driveshaft-EM interface failure the development team shall ensure driveshaft-
EM interface location is covered and free from potential unintended access or physical 
damage 
FSRM01.04 To avoid driveshaft-EM interface failure the development team shall ensure proper 
manufacturing and design for minimal driveshaft-EM interface angle 
FSRM01.05 To avoid driveshaft-EM interface failure the operator shall avoid adverse road condition 
which may produce NVH 
FSRM01.06 To avoid driveshaft-differential interface failure the development team shall ensure 
proper mounting, installation, and manufacturing of modified driveshaft and its 
components 
FSRM01.07 To avoid driveshaft-differential interface failure the development team shall ensure 
driveshaft bolts and mounting hardware is securely fastened and free from potential 
loosening or movement 
FSRM01.08 To avoid driveshaft-differential interface failure the development team shall ensure 
driveshaft-EM interface location is covered and free from potential unintended access 
or physical damage 
FSRM01.09 To avoid unintended access or physical damage of the driveshaft the development team 
shall ensure driveshaft manufacturing and use of materials is sufficient to prevent 
unintended access and physical damage 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGM02 The differential shall  provide power 
from the driveshaft to the wheels and 
shall allow the wheels to rotate 
independently 
FSRM02.01 To avoid differential-driveshaft interface failure the development team shall ensure 
proper mounting,  installation, and manufacturing of modified driveshaft, differential 
and their components 
FSRM02.02 To avoid differential-driveshaft interface failure the development team shall ensure the 
differential bolts and mounting hardware is securely fastened and free from potential 
loosening or unintended movement 
FSRM02.03 To avoid differential-driveshaft interface failure the development team shall ensure 
differential-driveshaft interface location is covered and free from potential unintended 
access or physical damage 
FSRM02.04 To avoid differential-driveshaft interface failure the operator shall avoid excessively 
adverse road conditions (bumpy terrain, excessive grade) which may cause a high NVH 
and damage the differential and interfacing components 
FSRM02.05 To avoid differential-half shaft interface failure the development team shall ensure 
proper mounting,  installation, and manufacturing of half-shafts and their components 
FSRM02.06 To avoid differential-half shaft interface failure the development team shall ensure half-
shaft bolts and mounting hardware is securely fastened and free from potential 
loosening or unintended movement 
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FSRM02.07 To avoid differential-half shaft interface failure the development team shall ensure 
differential-half shaft interface location is free from potential unintended access or 
physical damage 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGM03 The suspension system shall safely 
support the vehicle weight and 
absorb/reduce excess energy from 
road shock 
FSRM03.01 To avoid uneven tire pressure and tire wear the operator shall ensure proper tire 
pressure prior to operation 
FSRM03.02 To avoid uneven tire pressure and tire wear the operator shall ensure proper tire 
alignment 
FSRM03.03 To avoid uneven tire pressure and tire wear the operator shall ensure wheels are 
balanced and suspension is free of bent or broken wheels 
FSRM03.04 To avoid uneven tire pressure and tire wear the operator shall avoid poor driving 
behaviors which may degrade suspension performance 
FSRM03.05 To avoid uneven tire pressure and tire wear the operator shall ensure manufacturer 
recommended tire rotations 
FSRM03.06 To avoid radius rod failure the development team shall ensure suspension radius rods 
are free from fatigue and corrosion 
FSRM03.07 The operator shall avoid excessively adverse road conditions (bumpy terrain, excessive 
grade) which may cause a high NVH leading to a degradation of the suspension system 
FSRM03.08 To avoid suspension spring failure the development team shall ensure suspension spring 
compression is calibrated and that springs are free of fatigue and corrosion 
FSRM03.09 To avoid suspension hardware mounting failures the development team shall ensure the 
suspensions system and components have proper mounting, installation, and routine 
maintenance and inspection 
FSRM03.10 To avoid suspension hardware mounting failures the development team shall ensure the 
suspensions system bolts and mounting hardware is securely fastened and free from 
potential loosening or unintended movement 
FSRM03.11 To avoid suspension wheel bearing failures the development team shall ensure proper 
mounting,  installation, and routine maintenance and inspection of wheel bearings 
FSRM03.12 To avoid suspension strut failure the development team shall ensure struts are installed 
properly and free of fatigue and corrosion 
FSRM03.13 To avoid shock absorber failure the development team shall ensure shock absorbers are 
installed properly and free of fatigue and leaks 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGM04 The braking system shall inhibit 
vehicle motion, slow or stop a 
FSRM04.01 To avoid brake pad failure the development team shall ensure proper mounting and  
installation of pads 
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vehicle in motion, and keep 
stationary vehicles stopped 
FSRM04.02 To avoid brake pad failure the development team shall ensure brake pad bolts and 
mounting hardware are securely fastened and free from potential loosening or 
unintended movement 
FSRM04.03 To avoid brake pad failure the operator shall avoid excessively adverse road conditions 
(bumpy terrain, excessive grade) which may cause a high NVH  
FSRM04.04 To avoid brake pad failure the operator shall perform routine inspection of brake system 
to check for rust, fatigue, and corrosion 
FSRM04.05 To avoid brake pad failure the operator shall avoid poor driving behaviors 
FSRM04.06 To avoid brake rotor failure the development team shall ensure proper mounting and  
installation of rotors 
FSRM04.07 To avoid brake rotor failure the development team shall ensure rotor bolts and 
mounting hardware is securely fastened and free from potential loosening or unintended 
movement 
FSRM04.08 To avoid brake rotor failure the operator shall avoid excessively adverse road 
conditions (bumpy terrain, excessive grade) which may cause a high NVH 
FSRM04.09 To avoid brake rotor failure the development team shall perform routine maintenance 
and inspection for rotor fatigue, rust, and corrosion 
FSRM04.10 The operator shall ensure brake system is free of build-up and debris prior to use 
FSRM04.11 To avoid caliper failure the operator shall avoid excessively adverse road conditions 
(bumpy terrain, excessive grade) which may cause a high NVH leading to a degradation 
of the suspension system 
FSRM04.12 To avoid caliper failure the development team shall perform routine maintenance and 
inspection for caliper fatigue, rust, and corrosion 
FSRM04.13 To avoid brake fluid line failure the development team shall ensure proper bleeding, 
mounting,  installation, and routine maintenance and inspection of hardware and 
functionality 
FSRM04.14 To avoid brake fluid line failure the development team shall ensure brake lines, bolts, 
and mounting hardware are securely fastened and free from potential loosening or 
unintended movement 
FSRM04.15 To avoid parking brake failure the development team shall ensure routine maintenance 
and inspection parking brake  hardware and verify functionality 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGM05 The thermal system shall detect and 
control cabin and component 
temperatures 
FSRM05.01 To avoid engine overheating the development team shall ensure thermal system 
components (radiator, coolant level, fans) are functional and sufficient to cool the 
engine 
FSRM05.02 To avoid engine overheating the development team shall ensure the thermal systems 
fans are free from potential physical damage 
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FSRM05.03 To avoid engine overheating the development team shall ensure thermal system fans 
pull air from a cool source 
FSRM05.04 To avoid engine overheating the development team shall ensure engine ventilation is 
sufficient to provide appropriate air movement through engine bay 
FSRM05.05 To avoid engine overheating the development teams shall ensure thermal system is 
designed such that there is sufficient air flow to cool engine components 
FSRM05.06 To avoid engine overheating the development team shall ensure proper mounting,  
installation, and manufacturing of thermal system and its components 
FSRM05.07 To avoid engine overheating the development team shall ensure thermal system bolts 
and mounting hardware are securely fastened and free from potential loosening or 
unintended movement 
FSRM05.08 To avoid engine overheating the development team shall ensure the ECM controls and 
mitigates engine overheating 
FSRM05.09 To avoid engine overheating the operator shall avoid poor driving behaviors 
FSRM05.10 To avoid engine overheating the engine temperature shall be displayed for operator to 
view in real-time 
FSRM05.11 To avoid engine overheating the vehicle shall provide feedback warning to operator 
when engine temperature exceed specified range 
FSRM05.12 The vehicle shall have fire extinguisher in event of thermal incident 
FSRM05.13 To avoid insufficient coolant levels the operator shall ensure proper coolant levels and 
check for leaks prior to operation 
FSRM05.14 To avoid thermal system pump failure the development team shall ensure proper 
mounting,  installation, and manufacturing of water pump and its components 
FSRM05.15 To avoid thermal system pump failure the team shall ensure thermal system pump bolts, 
interface components (seals, gaskets), and mounting hardware are securely fastened and 
free from potential loosening or unintended movement 
FSRM05.16 To avoid thermal system pump failure the development team shall ensure the correct 
type of coolant is used, proper coolant levels, and check for leaks prior to operation 
FSRM05.17 To avoid thermal system pump failure the development team shall ensure thermal 
system belt drive components are properly installed (tensioning, torque specs 
FSRM05.18 To avoid radiator failure the development team shall ensure proper mounting, 
installation, and manufacturing of radiator, clamps, hoses and their components 
FSRM05.19 To avoid radiator failure the development team shall ensure radiator bolts, interface 
components (seals, gaskets), and mounting hardware are securely fastened and free 
from potential loosening or unintended movement 
FSRM05.20 To avoid radiator failure the development team shall ensure the correct type of coolant 
is used, proper coolant levels, and check for rust and leaks prior to operation 
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FSRM05.21 To avoid hose failure the development team shall ensure proper mounting,  installation, 
and manufacturing of hoses, clamps, and their components 
FSRM05.22 To avoid hose failure the development team shall ensure thermal system hose interface, 
and mounting hardware are securely fastened and free from potential loosening or 
unintended movement 
FSRM05.23 To avoid hose failure the development team shall ensure the correct type of coolant is 
used, proper coolant levels, and check for leaks prior to operation 
FSRM05.24 To avoid thermostat failure the development team shall ensure proper mounting,  
installation, and manufacturing of thermostat 
FSRM05.25 To avoid thermostat failure the development team shall ensure thermostat interface 
components and mounting hardware are securely fastened and free from potential 
loosening or unintended movement 
FSRM05.26 To avoid fan failure the development team shall ensure proper mounting,  installation, 
and manufacturing of the thermal system fans and its components 
FSRM05.27 To avoid fan failure the development team shall ensure the thermal system fans bolts, 
interface components, and mounting hardware are securely fastened and free from 
potential loosening or unintended movement 
FSRM05.28 To avoid fan failure the development team shall ensure that the thermostat, fuse, fan 
wires, coolant level and fan clutch are functional 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGM06 The electric power steering system 
shall control lateral movement of the 
vehicle 
FSRM06.01 To avoid contamination of the power steering fluid the development team shall ensure 
proper mounting, installation, and manufacturing of EPS system hoses, clamps, and 
their components 
FSRM06.02 To avoid contamination of the power steering fluid the development team shall ensure 
EPS system interface components, and mounting hardware are securely fastened and 
free from potential loosening or unintended movement 
FSRM06.03 To avoid contamination of the power steering fluid the development team shall ensure 
EPS system  functionality of pump and check for hose deterioration 
FSRM06.04 To avoid EPS system fluid leaks the development team shall ensure proper mounting,  
installation, and manufacturing of EPS system hoses, clamps, and their components 
FSRM06.05 To avoid EPS system fluid leaks the development team shall ensure EPS system 
interface components (seals, gaskets), and mounting hardware are securely fastened and 
free from potential loosening or unintended movement 
FSRM06.06 To avoid EPS system fluid leaks the operator shall ensure the correct type of EPS fluid 
is used, proper fluid levels, and check for leaks prior to operation 
FSRM06.07 To avoid EPS belt failure the development team shall ensure proper mounting, 
installation, and manufacturing of the power steering belt (tension, torque specs) and its 
components 
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FSRM06.08 To avoid EPS belt failure the development team shall ensure EPS belt bolts, interface 
components, and mounting hardware are securely fastened and free from potential 
loosening or unintended movement 
FSRM06.09 To avoid EPS pump failure the development team shall ensure proper mounting, 
installation, and manufacturing of EPS pump and its components 
FSRM06.10 To avoid EPS pump failure the development team shall ensure EPS pump bolts, 
interface components (seals, gaskets), and mounting hardware are securely fastened and 
free from potential loosening or movement 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGM07 The exhaust system shall safely assist 
in the removal of toxic gases, fumes 
and noise reduction 
FSRM07.01 To avoid manifold failure the development team shall ensure proper mounting, 
installation, and manufacturing of intake manifold and its components 
FSRM07.02 To avoid manifold failure the development team shall ensure manifold bolts, interface 
components (seals, gaskets), and mounting hardware are securely fastened and free 
from leaks and potential loosening or unintended movement 
FSRM07.03 To avoid catalytic converter failure the development team shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, and manufacturing of catalytic converter and its components 
FSRM07.04 To avoid catalytic converter failure the development team shall ensure catalysts bolts, 
interface components (seals, gaskets), and mounting hardware are securely fastened and 
free from leaks and potential loosening or movement 
FSRM07.05 To avoid catalytic converter failure the development team shall ensure there are no 
leaky fuel injectors or engine misfires 
FSRM07.06 To avoid catalytic converter failure the development team shall ensure engine operates 
at correct A/F ratio (running lean causes excess heat damaging catalyst) 
FSRM07.07 To avoid catalytic converter failure the development team shall ensure proper 
functionality of exhaust gas recirculation (EGR) valve and O2 sensor 
FSRM07.08 To avoid catalytic converter failure the operator shall ensure manufacturer 
recommended oil changes 
FSRM07.09 To avoid catalytic converter failure the operator shall avoid excessively adverse road 
conditions (bumpy terrain, excessive grade) which may cause a high NVH 
FSRM07.10 To avoid exhaust system mounting failures the development team shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, and manufacturing of the exhaust system and its components 
FSRM07.11 To avoid exhaust system mounting failures the development team shall ensure exhaust 
system bolts, interface components, and mounting hardware are securely fastened and 
free from leaks and potential loosening or unintended movement 
FSRM07.12 To avoid muffler failures the development team shall ensure proper mounting, 
installation, and manufacturing of muffler and its components 
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FSRM07.13 To avoid muffler failures the development team shall ensure muffler bolts, interface 
components (seals, gaskets), and mounting hardware are securely fastened and free 
from leaks and potential loosening or unintended movement. 
FSRM07.14 To avoid exhaust system sensor failures the development team shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, and manufacturing of O2 sensor 
FSRM07.15 To avoid exhaust system sensor failures the development team shall ensure O2 sensor 
bolts, interface components, and mounting hardware are securely fastened and free 
from leaks and potential loosening or unintended movement 
FSRM07.16 To avoid exhaust pipe failure the development team shall ensure proper mounting,  
installation, and manufacturing of the exhaust pip 
FSRM07.17 To avoid exhaust pipe failure the development team shall ensure exhaust pipe bolts, 
interface components (seals, gaskets), and mounting hardware are securely fastened and 
free from leaks and potential loosening or unintended movement 
FSRM07.18 To avoid exhaust pipe failure the development team shall ensure exhaust pipes are free 
from corrosion and physical damage 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGM08 The engine shall provide torque at the 
request of the operator 
FSRM08.01 To avoid improper engine lubrication the development team shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, and manufacturing of the oil filter and pump 
FSRM08.02 To avoid improper engine lubrication the development team shall ensure oil filter and 
pump bolts, interface components (seals, gaskets), and mounting hardware are securely 
fastened and free from leaks and potential loosening or unintended movement  
FSRM08.03 To avoid improper engine lubrication the operator shall ensure frequent oil changes, 
clean oil,  and that the oil filter is not ballooned or deformed 
FSRM08.04 To avoid improper fuel octane number the operator shall ensure proper fuel octane 
number prior to filling tank 
FSRM08.05 To avoid excessive engine heating the development team shall ensure thermal system 
components (radiator, coolant level, fans) are functional and sufficient to cool the 
engine 
FSRM08.06 To avoid excessive engine heating the development team shall ensure the thermal 
system fans are free from potential physical damage 
FSRM08.07 To avoid excessive engine heating the development team shall ensure thermal system 
fans pull air from a cool source 
FSRM08.08 To avoid excessive engine heating the development team shall ensure engine ventilation 
is sufficient to provide appropriate air movement through engine bay 
FSRM08.09 To avoid excessive engine heating the development team shall ensure the thermal 
system is designed such that there is sufficient air flow to cool engine components 
FSRM08.10 To avoid excessive engine heating the development team shall ensure proper mounting, 
installation, and manufacturing of thermal system and its components 
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FSRM08.11 To avoid excessive engine heating the development team shall ensure thermal system 
bolts and mounting hardware are securely fastened and free from potential loosening or 
unintended movement 
FSRM08.12 To avoid excessive engine heating the development team shall ensure the ECM controls 
and mitigates engine overheating 
FSRM08.13 To avoid head gasket failure the development team shall ensure proper mounting, 
installation, and manufacturing of head gasket. intake manifold and its components 
FSRM08.14 To avoid head gasket failure the development team shall ensure head gasket 
components and mounting hardware are securely fastened and free from leaks and 
potential loosening or unintended movement 
FSRM08.15 To avoid head gasket failure the development team shall ensure the thermal system is 
functional 
FSRM08.16 To avoid head gasket failure the development team shall ensure proper mounting,  
installation, and manufacturing of the sparkplugs, fuel injectors, and air intake system 
FSRM08.17 To avoid head gasket failure the development team shall ensure ECM, sparkplugs, 
injection system valves, springs, bolts, interface components, and mounting hardware 
are securely fastened and free from leaks and potential loosening or unintended 
movement 
FSRM08.18 To avoid head gasket failure the development team shall ensure proper A/F ratio and 
functioning O2 sensor 
FSRM08.19 To avoid head gasket failure the development team shall ensure vacuum lines and 
manifold gasket are free from cracks and physical damage 
FSRM08.20 To avoid head gasket failure the development team shall ensure properly functioning 
timing belt 
FSRM08.21 To avoid head gasket failure the development team shall ensure properly functioning 
EGR valve 
FSRM08.22 To avoid excessive load and improper driving leading to engine failure the operator 
shall ensure proper vehicle operation (reduce engine speed/load) 
FSRM08.23 To avoid EGR system failure the development team shall ensure proper mounting,  
installation, and manufacturing of EGR system and its components 
FSRM08.24 To avoid EGR system failure the development team shall ensure EGR system bolts, 
interface, and mounting hardware are securely fastened and free from leaks and 
potential loosening or unintended movement 
FSRM08.25 To avoid EGR system failure the development team shall ensure proper functionality of 
exhaust gas recirculation (EGR) valve and O2 sensor 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGM09 FSRM09.01 The engine and EM shall split the torque magnitude requested based on associated map 
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The applied torque magnitude shall 
match the torque magnitude 
requested 
FSRM09.02 The operator and HSC shall be responsible for torque request magnitude 
FSRM09.03 The control algorithm shall be validated in SIL to match torque applied to torque 
requested 
FSRM09.04 The APPS shall be validated during zero velocity testing to match APPS applied to 
APPS requested 
FSRM09.05 The final torque output shall be validated in SIL, zero velocity, and under load during 
closed course testing  
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGM10 The applied torque direction shall 
match the torque request intended 
direction 
FSRM10.01 The EM/engine actuated torque direction shall be controlled by the HSC and PRNDL 
controls 
FSRM10.02 The control algorithm shall validate torque direction during SIL 
FSRM10.03 Torque direction shall be validated during zero velocity testing 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGM11 The applied torque shall actuate at 
the time intended 
FSRM11.01 The operator and HSC shall determine the timing of torque requested 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGM12 The motor shall provide torque at the 
request of the operator 
FSRM12.01 The EM shall be hard mounted to the transmission 
FSRM12.02 The EM/transmission drivetrain system shall remain soft mounted 
FSRM12.03 The EM shall be properly modified to interface with the motor shaft exiting the 
transmission 
FSRM12.04 The EM shall monitor the temperature within that component 
FSRM12.05 The EM shall have a thermal control system 
FSRM12.06 To avoid over-current the development team shall ensure software (HSC) limits the 
magnitude of current to the EM 
FSRM12.07 To avoid over-current the development team shall ensure relays and fuses are in place 
and functional to prevent over drawing of current 
FSRM12.08 To avoid contamination of the EM housing or EM coolant system the development 
team shall ensure proper mounting,  installation, and manufacturing of the EM and 
housing 
FSRM12.09 To avoid contamination of the EM housing or EM coolant system the development 
team shall ensure EM housing and coolant system bolts, interface components, and 
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mounting hardware are securely fastened and free from leaks and potential loosening or 
unintended movement 
FSRM12.10 To avoid contamination of the EM housing or EM coolant system the development 
team shall ensure EM cooling system and its components are functioning, proper 
coolant levels, and hoses running to and from the motor are leak free 
FSRM12.11 To avoid EM overheating the development team shall ensure EM thermal system 
components (radiator, coolant level, fans) are functional and sufficient to cool the EM 
FSRM12.12 To avoid EM overheating the development team shall ensure EM coolant system fans 
are free from potential physical damage 
FSRM12.13 To avoid EM overheating the development team shall ensure EM coolant system fans 
pull air from a cool source 
FSRM12.14 To avoid EM overheating the development team shall ensure proper mounting, 
installation, and manufacturing of EM coolant system and its components 
FSRM12.15 To avoid EM overheating the development team shall ensure EM coolant system bolts, 
hoses and mounting hardware are securely fastened and free from potential loosening or 
unintended movement 
FSRM12.16 To avoid EM overheating the development team shall ensure the HSC controls and 
mitigates EM overheating 
FSRM12.17 To avoid EM overheating the development team shall ensure a real time EM 
temperature display is visible by the operator 
FSRM12.18 To avoid EM overheating the operator shall ensure proper vehicle operation (reduce 
engine speed/load) 
FSRM12.19 To avoid low EM resistance and insufficient insolation between windings the 
development team shall ensure EM thermal system components (radiator, coolant level, 
fans) are functional and sufficient to cool the EM 
FSRM12.20 To avoid low EM resistance and insufficient insolation between windings the 
development team shall ensure EM bolts, hoses and mounting hardware are securely 
fastened and free from potential loosening or unintended movement 
FSRM12.21 To avoid low EM resistance and insufficient insolation between windings the 
development team shall ensure the HSC controls and mitigates EM overheating 
FSRM12.22 To avoid EM internal component failure the operator shall avoid adverse road 
conditions which may produce NVH 
FSRM12.23 To avoid EM internal component failure the development team shall ensure EM 
thermal system components (radiator, coolant level, fans) are functional and sufficient 
to cool the EM 
FSRM12.24 To avoid EM-driveshaft interface failure the development team shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, and manufacturing of EM, driveshaft, and its interfacing 
components 
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FSRM12.25 To avoid EM-driveshaft interface failure the development team shall ensure EM-
driveshaft interface bolts and mounting hardware is securely fastened and free from 
potential loosening or unintended movement 
FSRM12.26 To avoid EM-driveshaft interface failure the development team shall ensure EM-
driveshaft interface location is covered and free from potential unintended access or 
physical damage 
FSRM12.27 To avoid EM-driveshaft interface failure the development team shall ensure proper EM-
driveshaft alignment 
FSRM12.28 To avoid EM-driveshaft interface failure the development team shall ensure EM-
driveshaft interface angle is minimized 
FSRM12.29 To avoid EM-driveshaft interface failure the operator shall avoid adverse road 
conditions which may produce NVH 
FSRM12.30 To avoid EM-transmission failure the development team shall ensure proper mounting,  
installation, and manufacturing of EM, transmission, and its interfacing components 
FSRM12.31 To avoid EM-transmission failure the development team shall ensure EM-transmission 
interface bolts and mounting hardware are securely fastened and free from potential 
loosening or unintended movement  
FSRM12.32 To avoid EM-transmission failure the development team shall ensure EM-transmission 
interface location is covered and free from potential unintended access or physical 
damage 
FSRM12.33 To avoid EM-transmission failure the development team shall ensure proper EM-
transmission alignment 
FSRM12.34 To avoid EM-transmission failure the operator shall avoid adverse road conditions 
which may produce NVH 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGM13 The current applied shall match the 
current necessary to meet EM torque 
request 
FSRM13.01 The HSC shall request current from the ESS based on operator intent 
FSRM13.02 EM current applied shall be validated during SIL 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGM14 The applied current direction shall 
match the direction necessary to meet 
the EM torque request and SOC 
requirement 
FSRM14.01 The operator, OBC, HSC, and SOC management strategy shall be responsible for 
charging and discharging 
FSRM14.02 SOC shall determine direction of current based on SOC management strategy 
FSRM14.03 The current direction shall be validated during SIL and zero velocity testing 
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SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGM15 The EM applied current shall actuate 
at the time intended 
FSRM15.01 The HSC shall request current from ESS at the time of the operators request 
FSRM15.02 The ESS shall deliver current at time Requested 
FSRM15.03 HSC shall validate current request timing during SIL and zero velocity testing 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGM16 The current applied shall not exceed 
max operating parameter 
FSRM16.01 The ESS shall impose charging and discharging operating parameters  
FSRM16.02 Charging and discharging operating parameters shall be validated during SIL and zero 
velocity testing 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGM17 The fuel system shall store and 
supply fuel to the engine 
FSRM17.01 To avoid a fuel filter failure the development team shall ensure proper mounting,  
installation, and manufacturing of the fuel filter 
FSRM17.02 To avoid a fuel filter failure the development team shall ensure the permeable material 
is clean and the fuel filter is free of physical damage and leaks while under pressure 
FSRM17.03 To avoid fuel injection failure the development team shall ensure proper installation of 
the fuel injectors 
FSRM17.04 To avoid fuel injection failure the development team shall ensure fuel injector mounting 
hardware is securely fastened and free from potential loosening or unintended 
movement 
FSRM17.05 To avoid fuel injection failure the operator shall ensure adequate fuel level and type 
FSRM17.06 To avoid fuel injection failure the operator shall ensure use of fuel system cleaners 
when recommended 
FSRM17.07 To avoid fuel pump failure the development team shall ensure proper mounting and 
installation of fuel pump 
FSRM17.08 To avoid fuel pump failure the development team shall ensure fuel pump mounting 
hardware is securely fastened and free from potential loosening or unintended 
movement 
FSRM17.09 To avoid fuel pump failure the operator shall ensure adequate fuel level and type 
FSRM17.10 To avoid poor fuel quality the operator shall verify fuel quality prior to filling 
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SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGM18 The transmission shall transfer power 
from the engine to the driveshaft 
FSRM18.01 To avoid transmission fluid failure the development team shall ensure proper mounting,  
installation, and manufacturing of transmission and its components 
FSRM18.02 To avoid transmission fluid failure the development team shall ensure transmission 
bolts, interface components (seals, gaskets), and mounting hardware are securely 
fastened and free from potential loosening or unintended movement 
FSRM18.03 To avoid transmission fluid failure the operator shall ensure the correct type of coolant 
(ATF) is used, proper coolant levels, and check for leaks prior to operation 
FSRM18.04 To avoid transmission fluid failure the development team shall ensure belt drive 
components are properly installed (tensioning, torque specs) 
FSRM18.05 To avoid transmission overheating the development team shall ensure transmission 
thermal system components (radiator, coolant level, fans) are functional and sufficient 
to cool the transmission 
FSRM18.06 To avoid transmission overheating the development team shall ensure transmission 
thermal system fans are free from potential physical damage 
FSRM18.07 To avoid transmission overheating the development team shall ensure transmission 
thermal system fans pull air from a cool source 
FSRM18.08 To avoid transmission overheating the development team shall ensure proper mounting, 
installation, and manufacturing of transmission thermal system and its components 
FSRM18.09 To avoid transmission overheating the development team shall ensure transmission 
thermal system bolts, hoses and mounting hardware are securely fastened and free from 
potential loosening or unintended movement 
FSRM18.10 To avoid transmission overheating the development team shall ensure the TCM controls 
and mitigates transmission temperature 
FSRM18.11 To avoid transmission overheating the operator shall ensure proper vehicle operation 
(reduce engine speed/load) 
FSRM18.12 To avoid transmission-EM interface failure the development team shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, and manufacturing of EM, transmission, and its interfacing 
components 
FSRM18.13 To avoid transmission-EM interface failure the development team shall ensure 
transmission-EM interface bolts and mounting hardware are securely fastened and free 
from potential loosening or unintended movement 
FSRM18.14 To avoid transmission-EM interface failure the development team shall ensure 
transmission-EM interface location is covered and free from potential unintended 
access or physical damage 
FSRM18.15 To avoid transmission-EM interface failure the development team shall ensure proper 
transmission-EM alignment 
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FSRM18.16 To avoid transmission-EM interface failure the operator shall avoid adverse road 
conditions which may produce NVH 
SG No. Safety Goal FSR No.  Functional Safety Requirement 
SGM19 The vehicle body shall allow operator 
access to the vehicle, protect 
components contained within the 
vehicle, prevent debris from being 
thrown by rotating tires, allow 
operator to see in low light scenarios, 
protect operator from environmental 
debris, absorb impact of minor 
collisions, signal request to turn or 
brake, and allow the operator to have 
surrounding views 
 
FSRM19.01 To avoid a hood failure the development team shall ensure proper mounting,  
installation, and manufacturing of the hood, and latch 
FSRM19.02 To avoid a hood failure the development team shall ensure hood bolts, interface 
components, and mounting hardware are securely fastened and free from potential 
loosening or unintended movement 
FSRM19.03 To avoid grill failure and restricted airflow to the radiator the development team shall 
ensure proper mounting, installation, and manufacturing of the grill 
FSRM19.04 To avoid grill failure and restricted airflow to the radiator the development team shall 
ensure grill bolts, interface components, and mounting hardware are securely fastened 
and free from leaks and potential loosening or movement 
FSRM19.05 To avoid grill failure and restricted airflow to the radiator the operator shall ensure grill 
is free of clogging debris  
FSRM19.06 To avoid headlight or tail light failure the development team shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, and manufacturing of head and tail lights 
FSRM19.07 To avoid headlight or tail light failure the operator shall ensure functionality of lights 
prior to use 
FSRM19.08 To avoid body panel, door, or window failure the development team shall ensure proper 
mounting, installation, and manufacturing of the body panels, windows, and doors 
FSRM19.09 To avoid body panel, door, or window failure the development team shall ensure body 
panels, doors, and window bolts, interface components, and mounting hardware are 
securely fastened and free from leaks and potential loosening or movement 
FSRM19.10 To avoid body panel, door, or window failure the operator shall ensure body panels, 
windows, and doors are free of physical damage prior to use 
FSRM19.11 To avoid body panel, door, or window failure the operator shall ensure window and 









ACC  Adaptive Cruise Control 
ADAS  Advanced Driver Assistance Systems 
ADF  Automated Driving Function 
APP  Accelerator Pedal Position 
APPS  Accelerator Pedal Position Sensor 
ASIL  Automotive Safety Integrity Level 
AVTC  Advanced Vehicle Technology Competition 
BMS  Battery Management System 
CAVs  Connected and Automated Vehicles 
CAE  Computer Aided Engineering 
CAN  Controller Area Network 
CSMS  Control Systems Modeling and Simulation 
CSU  Colorado State University 
D  Detectability 
DAQ  Data Acquisition 
DFMEA Design Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
E/E  Electrical and or Electronic 
EBCM  Electric Brake control Module 
ECM  Engine Control Module 
EM  Electric Motor 
EMC  Electric Motor Controller 
EMI  Electromagnetic Interference 
EPS  Electric Power Steering 
ESS  Energy Storage System 
FEA  Finite Element Analysis 
FMEA  Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
FSR  Functional Safety Requirement 
GM  General Motors 
GPS  Global Positioning System 
HARA  Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment 
HazOP  Hazard and Operability Study 
HEV  Hybrid Electric Vehicle 
HIL  Hardware in the Loop 
HSC  Hybrid Supervisory Controller 
HV  High-voltage 
ISA  Integrated Safety Analysis 
ISO  International Organization for Standardization 
KDP  Key Decision Points 
LKA  Lane Keeping Assist 
MC  Mobility Challenge 
MRR  Medium Range Radar 




NN  Neural Network 
NVH  Noise, Vibration, and Harshness 
O  Occurrence 
OBC  On-board Charger 
OBD II On-board Diagnostic 
OEM  Original Equipment Manufacturer 
PAE  Predictive Acceleration Event 
PHA  Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
PM  Project Manager 
PRNDL Park, Reverse, Neutral, Drive, Low 
PSI  Propulsion Systems Integration 
QM  Quality Managed 
RISC  Risk Informed Safety Case 
RPN  Risk Priority Number 
S  Severity 
SAE  Society of Automotive Engineers 
SEFA  System Element Fault Analysis 
SG  Safety Goal 
SIL  Software in the Loop 
SLFTA System-level Fault Tree Analysis 
SOC  State of Charge 
SSM  System Safety Manager 
STPA  System-Theoretic Process Analysis 
TCM  Transmission Control Module 
TVP  Test Vehicle Platform 
UCA  Unsafe Control Action 
V&V  Verification and Validation 
V2X  Vehicle-to-X 
VIT  vehicle Innovation Team 
VTI  Vehicle Technical Inspection 
